Combinatorial auctions |
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| Authors: | Jawad Abrache Teodor Gabriel Crainic Michel Gendreau Monia Rekik |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Business Administration,Al Akhawayn University,Ifrane,Morocco;2.Chaire de recherche industrielle du CRSNG en management logistique, ESG,Université du Québec à Montréal,Montréal,Canada;3.Département d’informatique et de recherche opérationnelle,Université de Montréal,Montréal,Canada;4.Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les réseaux d’entreprise, la logistique et le transport (CIRRELT),Université de Montréal,Montréal,Canada |
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| Abstract: | Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of
multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial
auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids,
the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support
tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose
avenues for further research.
An earlier version of this paper appeared in 4OR 2, 1–33, 2004. |
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| Keywords: | E-commerce Mechanism design Combinatorial auctions Bidding languages Iterative auctions Advisors |
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