Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game |
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Authors: | Claudia Keser Roy Gardner |
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Institution: | Institut für Statistik und mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universit?t Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany (e-mail: keser@vw13.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de), DE Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405, USA (e-mail: gardner@indiana.edu), IN
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Abstract: | This paper describes the results of an experiment applying the strategy method to analyze the behavior of subjects in an
8-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The CPR game consists of a constituent game played for 20 periods. The CPR game
has a unique optimum and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; the latter involves overinvestment in the appropriation from
the CPR. Sixteen students, all experienced in game theory, were recruited to play the CPR game over the course of 6 weeks.
In the first phase of the experiment, they played the CPR game on-line 3 times. In the second phase of the experiment, the
tournament phase, they designed strategies which were then played against each other. At the aggregate level, subgame perfect
equilibrium organizes the data fairly well. At the individual level, however, fewer than 5% of subjects play in accordance
with the game equilibrium prediction.
Received May 1994/Final version August 1996 |
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Keywords: | : Strategy method common pool resources Nash equilibrium bounded rationality |
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