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TIME INCONSISTENCY AND REPUTATION IN MONETARY POLICY: A STRATEGIC MODELLING IN CONTINUOUS TIME
引用本文:李静远,田国强.TIME INCONSISTENCY AND REPUTATION IN MONETARY POLICY: A STRATEGIC MODELLING IN CONTINUOUS TIME[J].数学物理学报(B辑英文版),2008,28(3):697-710.
作者姓名:李静远  田国强
作者单位:[1]School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China [2]Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, USA
基金项目:Sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70602012), Texas Advanced Research Program as well as from the Bush Program in the Economics of Public Policy, the Private Enterprise Research Center, and the Lewis Faculty Fellowship at Texas A&M University
摘    要:This article develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic and endogenized distortion. First, the authors introduce the notion of sequentially rational equilibrium, and show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies for stochastic setting. The conditions for the existence of sequentially rational equilibrium are provided. Then, the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. The authors compare the relative stability between the cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior, and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium is sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, they tend to persist for longer periods of the time.

关 键 词:货币政策  推测稳定平衡  时间矛盾  最优终止

TIME INCONSISTENCY AND REPUTATION IN MONETARY POLICY: A STRATEGIC MODELLING IN CONTINUOUS TIME
Institution:[1]School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China; [2]Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, USA
Abstract:Time inconsistency, optimal stopping, stochastically stable equilibrium
Keywords:Time inconsistency  optimal stopping  stochastically stable equilibrium
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