考虑政府补贴和公平偏好的可追溯食品供应链决策研究

考虑消费者溯源偏好与食品供应链可追溯水平对市场需求的影响,构建由一个食品生产企业和一个食品零售企业组成的可追溯食品供应链博弈模型,研究政府补贴、可追溯努力成本分担和公平偏好对可追溯食品供应链决策及利润的影响.结果 表明:政府补贴与可追溯努力成本分担均能促进食品生产企业提高可追溯努力水平,进而提升食品供应链可追溯水平.政...

The Decision-making of Traceability Food Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Fairness Preference

Considering the effect of consumer ’s traceability preference and traceability level of food supply chain on the market demand,the game model of traceability food supply chain is constructed,which consists of a food producer and a food retailer.The effects of government subsidy,cost sharing behavior and fairness preference characteristic on traceability food supply chain strategies and profits were studied.The results show that both the government subsidy and cost sharing behavior of food retailer can promote the food producer to increase the traceability effort level,so as to improve the traceability level of food supply chain.The government subsidy is beneficial to both food producer and food retailer,while the cost-sharing behavior of food retailer is beneficial to itself and food supply chain when the cost-sharing ratio is relatively small.In the case of fairness preference information symmetry,the fairness preference of food retailer will increase its own profit,but will weaken the traceability effort level,wholesale price and optimal profit of food producer and the whole profit of traceability food supply chain.In the case of fairness preference information asymmetry,the fairness preference of food retailer does not affect the decision of food producer,but will increase his own retail price,thus reducing the market demand and weakening the profits of all members of the traceability food supply chain.