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基于演化博弈论的装配式建筑创新激励政策研究
引用本文:薛渊,彭盈. 基于演化博弈论的装配式建筑创新激励政策研究[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2021, 0(5): 64-73
作者姓名:薛渊  彭盈
作者单位:四川大学建筑与环境学院
基金项目:四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项(skqy201740);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(17YJA630078)。
摘    要:
我国在推广装配式建筑过程中,一直面临构件制造、安装成本高,推广效果不理想等问题.运用演化博弈理论来研究政府激励和企业进行技术创新之间的关系,构建了政府和企业的演化博弈模型并进行数值仿真,发现在不同的初始比例下,政府激励政策的效果有显著差别.在数值分析的基础上,进一步讨论了补贴额度对双方策略选择的影响,并对政府的政策制定...

关 键 词:装配式建筑  演化博弈  激励政策

Research on Innovation Incentive Policy of Prefabricated Building Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
XUE Yuan,PENG Ying. Research on Innovation Incentive Policy of Prefabricated Building Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2021, 0(5): 64-73
Authors:XUE Yuan  PENG Ying
Affiliation:(College of Architecture and Environment,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China)
Abstract:
In the process of promoting prefabricated buildings,the government has been facing problems such as high component manufacturing and installation costs,and unsatisfactory promotion effects.This paper uses evolutionary game theory to study the relationship between government incentives and enterprises’ technological innovation,constructs an evolutionary game model between government and enterprises and conducts numerical simulations.It is found that under different initial ratios,the effects of government incentive policies are significantly different.Based on the numerical analysis,the influence of the subsidy amount on the strategic choices of both parties was further discussed,and suggestions were provided for the government’s policy formulation.
Keywords:prefabricated building  evolutionary game theory  incentive policy
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