A (Different) Virtue Responsibilism: Epistemic Virtues Without Motivations |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Benjamin?W?McCrawEmail author |
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Institution: | 1.Department of History, Political Science, Philosophy and American Studies,University of South Carolina Upstate,Spartanburg,USA |
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Abstract: | Debate rages in virtue epistemology between virtue reliabilists and responsibilists. Here, I develop and argue for a new kind of responsibilism that is more conciliar to reliabilism. First, I argue that competence-based virtue reliabilism(s) cannot adequately ground epistemic credit. Then, with this problem in hand, I show how Aristotle’s virtue theory is motivated by analogous worries. Yet, incorporating too many details of Aristotelian moral theory leads to problems, notably the problem of unmotivated belief. As a result, I suggest a re-turn to Aristotle to develop a distinctively epistemological virtue theory that does not require any motive or affect for epistemic virtue. Nevertheless, my theory affirms that virtues are acquired, agent-expressive traits. The result is a conciliar responsibilism that leans closer to reliabilism. I end by arguing that my virtue responsibilism can solve worries facing both reliabilism and (extant) responsibilism. |
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