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失业保险制度的博弈分析
引用本文:夏少刚,张敏.失业保险制度的博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2006,15(1):38-41.
作者姓名:夏少刚  张敏
作者单位:东北财经大学,数量经济系,辽宁,大连,116023
摘    要:完善失业保险制度是解决我国失业问题的有效手段。在失业保险制度的制定中。失业保险金支付水平的确定是关键。本文从博弈的角度建立模型对此问题进行了分析,并据此对失业问题的解决提出一些建议。

关 键 词:运筹学  博弈论  支付矩阵  纳什均衡  失业保险金
文章编号:1007-3221(2006)01-0038-04
收稿时间:03 6 2005 12:00AM
修稿时间:2005年3月6日

The Analysis of Unemployment Insurance System by Game Theory
XIA Shao-gang,ZHANG Min.The Analysis of Unemployment Insurance System by Game Theory[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2006,15(1):38-41.
Authors:XIA Shao-gang  ZHANG Min
Institution:Department of Quantitative Economics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116023, China
Abstract:Improving unemployment insurance system is an effective measure to solve the problem of unemployment. It is the key to making sure how much the unemployment insurance payment should be given to a person who is out of work when we enact the unemployment insurance system. This paper analyzes this problem with Game Theory and gives some advice to solve unemployment.
Keywords:operational research  game theory  payment matrix  Nash Equilibrium  unemployment insurance system
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