Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games |
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Authors: | Tamás Solymosi |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Operations Research, Corvinus University of Budapest, Pf. 489, 1828 Budapest, Hungary |
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Abstract: | Partitioning games are useful on two counts: first, in modeling situations with restricted cooperative possibilities between
the agents; second, as a general framework for many unrestricted cooperative games generated by combinatorial optimization
problems.We show that the family of partitioning games defined on a fixed basic collection is closed under the strategic equivalence
of games, and also for taking the monotonic cover of games. Based on these properties we establish the coincidence of
the Mas-Colell, the classical, the semireactive, and the reactive bargaining setswith the core for interesting balanced subclasses
of partitioning games, including assignment games, tree-restricted superadditive games, and simple network games.
Prepared during the author’s Bolyai János Research Fellowship. Also supported by OTKA grant T46194. |
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Keywords: | Cooperative games Combinatorial optimization games Partitioning games Core Bargaining set |
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