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1.
In this paper we study price competition for two types of location-price models in which facility locations are set up and price decisions have to be made in order to maximise profit. We discuss the existence and determination of equilibrium prices in a general location space when facilities have different production costs. It is assumed that each price is bounded from below and demand for a single homogeneous product is price-inelastic. When facilities set mill prices, a price equilibrium rarely exists and necessary conditions for existence are obtained. In particular, when the location space is a tree network, we give a characterisation of the locations for which a unique equilibrium exists for two competitors. With spatial price discrimination, though equilibrium prices might not exist, it is shown that ε-equilibrium prices always exist for any locations of the facilities. A characterisation of ε-equilibrium is also given. Then the location-price problem is reduced to a location problem. A comparison of results with the two types of price determination is also presented. This work has been supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Spain under the research project BEC2002-01026, in part financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).  相似文献
2.
In this paper, we study monopolistic pricing behaviors within a two-way network. In this symbiotic production system, independent decision centers carry out an activity which concurs to the production of different system goods. The players are assumed to know the whole network. Due to this rationality, they try to capture a share of the profit of the firms who sell the system goods to the consumers. These double marginalization behaviors are studied within very general networks. Conditions with ensure existence and uniqueness are discussed. We even provided a complete characterization of an equilibrium. Potential applications are also discussed  相似文献
3.
We compute constrained equilibria satisfying an optimality condition. Important examples include convex programming, saddle problems, noncooperative games, and variational inequalities. Under a monotonicity hypothesis we show that equilibrium solutions can be found via iterative convex minimization. In the main algorithm each stage of computation requires two proximal steps, possibly using Bregman functions. One step serves to predict the next point; the other helps to correct the new prediction. To enhance practical applicability we tolerate numerical errors. Research supported partly by the Norwegian Research Council, project: Quantec 111039/401.  相似文献
4.
We propose and analyze a primal-dual, infinitesimal method for locating Nash equilibria of constrained, non-cooperative games. The main object is a family of nonstandard Lagrangian functions, one for each player. With respect to these functions the algorithm yields separately, in differential form, directions of steepest-descent in all decision variables and steepest-ascent in all multipliers. For convergence we need marginal costs to be monotone and constraints to be convex inequalities. The method is largely decomposed and amenable for parallel computing. Other noteworthy features are: non-smooth data can be accommodated; no projection or optimization is needed as subroutines; multipliers converge monotonically upward; and, finally, the implementation amounts, in essence, only to numerical integration.  相似文献
5.
In this paper, we provide several extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem from single-valued mappings to set-valued mappings on chain-complete posets. Then we examine some non-monetized, non-cooperative games where both the collections of the strategies and the ranges of the utilities for the players are posets. By applying the extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem and by applying the order-preserving property of mappings, we prove some existence theorems of extended and generalized Nash equilibria for non-monetized, non-cooperative games on chain-complete posets.  相似文献
6.
We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm’s type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs.  相似文献
7.
分析了包含一个供应商和两个不同零售商的供应链网络的协调问题.将这一问题构建为一个两层次的博弈模型:零售商之间的非合作博弈以及供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈.博弈的均衡表明,通过简单的价格歧视,供应商就能够实现整个供应链网络的协调,而且价格歧视的水平与零售商之间的市场容量差异、产品需求的价格敏感系数以及产品的边际生产成本有关.在合理的参数范围内,市场容量更大的零售商所收取的零售价格较低,从供应商那里取货的成本也较低.这样的结论是比较符合现实情形的,这也就说明该模型为现实世界中的价格差异提供了另一种解释.此外,还分析了当供应商无法实施价格歧视时,由此导致的供应链的损失.  相似文献
8.
Two manufacturers produce substitutable goods for a homogeneous market. The advertising efforts of the two manufacturers determine the demand for the goods and interfere negatively with each other. The demand of each good is a piecewise linear function of the product goodwill, and the latter is a linear function of advertising efforts. In a game with two competing profit-maximizing manufacturers who have access to a set of several advertising media, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are characterized and their existence is shown.  相似文献
9.
In this note we prove the existence of minmax points for strategic form games where the sets of strategies are topological spaces and the payoff functions satisfy conditions weaker than continuity. The employed tools are the class of transfer weakly upper continuous functions and the class of weakly lower pseudocontinuous functions. An example shows that our result is of minimal character.  相似文献
10.
The goal of this paper is to study Nash Equilibrium (NE) existence of some game-theoretic pricing models. In Soon et al. [17], deterministic pricing models incorporating a complete demand system were proposed. As in those models, the demand function is defined via a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP), the models’ pricing constraints include complementarity conditions. When incorporated within a game, the best response problem facing each seller is a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints. A randomized version of this pricing problem will be introduced in this work and the issue of NE existence will be discussed for both the deterministic and random pricing games.  相似文献
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