利他偏好下供应链效率和公平度动态演进研究

根据零售商利他偏好信息非对称性和动态演进特征,将零供博弈信息结构分为4个演进过程,采用逆向归纳法求解各个过程中供应链主观效率和客观效率、以"公平熵"计算供应链主观公平度和客观公平度,从主观与客观2个维度分析供应链利他偏好行为对供应链效率和公平度动态演进的影响.通过对比分析得出:信息对称下零售商利他偏好行为不改变供应链利润但会改变各个成员在供应链中的利润分配比例,起到"供应链利润分配机制"的作用;供应链主观效率总是不低于客观效率,供应链主观公平度总是不低于客观公平度;从主观评价供应链能够实现协调且供应链能够兼顾效率和公平.     

Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness

In both dictator and impunity games, one player, the dictator, divides a fixed amount of money between himself and one other, the recipient. Recent lab studies of these games have produced seemingly inconsistent results, reporting substantially divergent amounts of dictator giving. Also, one prominent explanation for some of these differences, the impact of experimenter observation, displayed weak explanatory power in a different but related lab game. Data from the new experiment reported here offers some explanations. We find that dictators determine how much they will give on the basis of the total money available for the entire experimental session, not on the basis of what is available per game. This explains the reported differences between impunity and dictator studies. When distributing a gift among several recipients, individual dictators show little tendency towards equal treatment. Also, we find no evidence for the experimenter observation effect. Comparison with earlier experiments suggests that differences in the context of the game, affected by differences in written directions and independent of experimenter observation, account for differences across dictator studies. We propose a hypothetical decision procedure, based on the notion that dictator giving originates with personal and social rules that effectively constrain self-interested behavior. The procedure provides a link between dictator behavior and a broader class of laboratory phenomena. Received August 1993/Final version April 1994     

The Cultural Evolution of Indiscriminate Altruism in a Large Randomly Matching Population

Altruism is hard to explain because altruistic acts are costly to the individuals who perform them. Although past work has identified conditions under which altruism can evolve, there is wide agreement among evolutionary theorists in the social sciences and biology that indiscriminate altruism cannot evolve in a large randomly matching population. Building on earlier work (Mark, 2002 Mark , N. P. ( 2002 ). Cultural transmission, disproportionate acquisition, and the evolution of cooperation . American Sociological Review , 67 , 323 – 344 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), I show that cultural transmission can create a cultural evolutionary force toward indiscriminate altruism in a large randomly matching population. The cultural transmission of a behavior (altruistic or selfish) disproportionately exposes those who acquire that behavior to that behavior prior to its acquisition. That is, individuals who have acquired an altruistic behavior through cultural transmission (i.e., who learned to behave altruistically from other people) were disproportionately exposed to the altruistic acts of others. Likewise, individuals who have acquired a selfish behavior through cultural transmission were disproportionately exposed to the selfish acts of others. Because of this disproportionate prior exposure, altruists have disproportionately benefitted from the altruistic acts of others, and selfish individuals have disproportionately been hurt by the selfish acts of others. If the benefits of being the target of altruistic acts increase one's attractiveness as a behavioral model, then a cultural evolutionary force toward altruism results.

[An appendix to the article is featured as an online supplement at the publisher's website.]     

Evolution in spatial predator–prey models and the “prudent predator”: The inadequacy of steady‐state organism fitness and the concept of individual and group selection

We review recent research which reveals: (1) how spatially distributed populations avoid overexploiting resources due to the local extinction of over‐exploitative variants, and (2) how the conventional understanding of evolutionary processes is violated by spatial populations so that basic concepts, including fitness assignment to individual organisms, are not applicable, and even kin and group selection are unable to describe the mechanism by which exploitative behavior is bounded. To understand these evolutionary processes, a broader view is needed of the properties of multiscale spatiotemporal patterns in organism–environment interactions. We discuss measures that quantify the effects of these interactions on the evolution of a population, including multigenerational fitness and the heritability of the environment. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2008.     

Harvesting Altruism in Open-Source Software Development

Firms have the choice of developing software as either open source or closed source. The open-source approach to software development has been advocated as a new and better method for developing high quality software than the traditional closed-source approach. In open source, volunteer programmers freely contribute code to develop and improve the software. This paper describes the key nonpecuniary motivations for these programmers. They are less motivated to contribute if they observe commercial marketing of the open-source software they helped create, leading to a reduction in improvements to the software. A primary concern for software firms seeking to develop and market open-source software is, thus, how the motivation of contributors should be managed. We examine optimal pricing strategies for open-source and closed-source software keeping in mind the distinct motivations of programmers in the two cases. We compare profits and software qualities from the two approaches and provide implications for firms in the software industry.     

Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency

Recent studies draw attention on the highly specialized capacity of human beings in recognizing altruists versus cheaters in social interactions. These results hint at the existence of specialized abilities that support discriminating behavior in strategic interactions. In this paper, we explore the implications of discriminating behavior in the study of the indirect evolutionary selection of selfish versus altruistic motivations in the context of generic 2×2 base games, and in particular for coordination and cooperation scenarios. We find that inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism can enforce under rather general conditions socially optimal outcomes, including cases where selfishness cannot, such as in prisoner’s dilemmas. Inequality seeking (Nietzschian) altruism in no case improves upon Rawlsian altruism in terms of social optimality of outcomes, and often does worse. In the cooperation scenario in particular, Nietzschean altruism never manages to implement the cooperative outcome. Under perfect discrimination, moreover, inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism often evolves at the expense of selfishness. These results suggest that the development of sophisticated discrimination abilities may be strongly adaptive in supporting fairness-oriented forms of pro-sociality in humans in the context of social dilemmas and coordination problems.     

轻微利他弱Pareto-Nash均衡

2008年,Marco和Morgan在正规型博弈中引入轻微利他均衡和友好均衡的概念.利用轻微利他的思想,研究多目标博弈.证明轻微利他弱Pareto-Nash均衡的存在性定理,进一步地讨论轻微利他弱Pareto-Nash均衡和本质均衡的关系.     

The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals

The paper provides an explanation for altruistic behavior based on the matching and learning technology in the population. In a infinite structured population, in which individuals meet and interact with their neighbors, individuals learn by imitating their more successful neighbors. We ask which strategies are robust against invasion of mutants: A strategy is unbeatable if when all play it and a finite group of identical mutants enters then the learning process eliminates the mutants with probability 1. We find that such an unbeatable strategy is necessarily one in which each individual behaves as if he is related to his neighbors and takes into account their welfare as well as his. The degree to which he cares depends on the radii of his neighborhoods. Received June 1996/Revised version October 1998     

Evolution of shame as an adaptation to social punishment and its contribution to social cohesiveness

Feelings of shame are common among humans although shameless individuals do not seem to be handicapped in achieving social success in life. What then is the adaptive value of shame? How can shame have evolved? Here I simulate shame as the emotion that induces an increase in pro‐social behavior after receiving social punishment. Simulations with the agent‐based model, Sociodynamica, show that shame is evolutionary stable in a context of individual selection, without the need for including group selection as an evolutionary force. The adaptive advantage of shame is based on the fact that it increases flexibility to the shameful individual, allowing it to act selfish if the probabilities of being punished are low and achieving a reduction in the costs of social punishment when frequent punishment is likely. The results show that shame, together with pro‐social punishment and social cooperation, produce a fluctuating dynamics of social cooperation, achieving long periods where the populations stabilizes pro‐social behavior interspersed with periods where selfish behavior predominates. This temporal stabilization of pro‐social behavior might provide societies with sufficient time to build institutions that might stabilize sustainable pro‐social behavior. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2008     

Regulation under partial cooperation: The case of a queueing system

Socially optimal behavior can be achieved through the cooperation of the participating agents with a central planner. What happens when only a fraction of the population cooperates? We investigate this question in a Markovian single server queue. The main result is non-intuitive: the optimal control of cooperative customers is independent of their proportion. We also conclude that the gain from controlling cooperative customers after they join the queue is relatively small.