On effectiveness of wiretap programs in mapping social networks

Snowball sampling methods are known to be a biased toward highly connected actors and consequently produce core-periphery networks when these may not necessarily be present. This leads to a biased perception of the underlying network which can have negative policy consequences, as in the identification of terrorist networks. When snowball sampling is used, the potential overload of the information collection system is a distinct problem due to the exponential growth of the number of suspects to be monitored. In this paper, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness of a wiretapping program in terms of its ability to map the rapidly evolving networks within a covert organization. By running a series of simulation-based experiments, we are able to evaluate a broad spectrum of information gathering regimes based on a consistent set of criteria. We conclude by proposing a set of information gathering programs that achieve higher effectiveness then snowball sampling, and at a lower cost. Maksim Tsvetovat is an Assistant Professor at the Center for Social Complexity and department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA. He received his Ph.D. from the Computation, Organizations and Society program in the School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University. His dissertation was centered on use of artificial intelligence techniques such as planning and semantic reasoning as a means of studying behavior and evolution of complex social networks, such as these of terrorist organizations. He received a Master of Science degree from University of Minnesota with a specialization in Artificial Intelligence and design of Multi-Agent Systems, and has also extensively studied organization theory and social science research methods. His research is centered on building high-fidelity simulations of social and organizational systems using concepts from distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Other projects focus on social network analysis for mapping of internal corporate networks or study of covert and terrorist orgnaizations. Maksim’s vita and publications can be found on Kathleen M. Carley is a professor in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University and the director of the center for Compuational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) which has over 25 members, both students and research staff. Her research combines cognitive science, social networks and computer science to address complex social and organizational problems. Her specific research areas are dynamic network analysis, computational social and organization theory, adaptation and evolution, text mining, and the impact of telecommunication technologies and policy on communication, information diffusion, disease contagion and response within and among groups particularly in disaster or crisis situations. She and her lab have developed infrastructure tools for analyzing large scale dynamic networks and various multi-agent simulation systems. The infrastructure tools include ORA, a statistical toolkit for analyzing and visualizing multi-dimensional networks. ORA results are organized into reports that meet various needs such as the management report, the mental model report, and the intelligence report. Another tool is AutoMap, a text-mining systems for extracting semantic networks from texts and then cross-classifying them using an organizational ontology into the underlying social, knowledge, resource and task networks. Her simulation models meld multi-agent technology with network dynamics and empirical data. Three of the large-scale multi-agent network models she and the CASOS group have developed in the counter-terrorism area are: BioWar a city-scale dynamic-network agent-based model for understanding the spread of disease and illness due to natural epidemics, chemical spills, and weaponized biological attacks; DyNet a model of the change in covert networks, naturally and in response to attacks, under varying levels of information uncertainty; and RTE a model for examining state failure and the escalation of conflict at the city, state, nation, and international as changes occur within and among red, blue, and green forces. She is the founding co-editor with Al. Wallace of the journal Computational Organization Theory and has co-edited several books and written over 100 articles in the computational organizations and dynamic network area. Her publications can be found at: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/bios/carley/publications.php     

Trade-offs between target hardening and overarching protection

Defenders concerned about protecting multiple targets can either protect them individually (through target hardening), or collectively (through overarching protections such as border security, public health, emergency response, or intelligence). Decision makers may find it relatively straightforward to choose which targets to harden, but are likely to find it more difficult to compare seemingly incommensurate forms of protection - e.g., target hardening, versus a reduction in the likelihood of weapons being smuggled across the border. Unfortunately, little previous research has addressed this question, and fundamental research is needed to provide guidance and practical solution approaches. In this paper, we first develop a model to optimally allocate resources between target hardening and overarching protection, then investigate the factors affecting the relative desirability of target hardening versus overarching protection, and finally apply our model to a case study involving critical assets in Wisconsin. The case study demonstrates the value of our method by showing that the optimal solution obtained using our model is in some cases substantially better than the historical budget allocation.     

Cooperative game theoretic centrality analysis of terrorist networks: The cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda

The identification of key players in a terrorist organization aids in preventing attacks, the efficient allocation of surveillance measures, and the destabilization of the corresponding network. In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist networks. In particular we use the Shapley value as a measure of importance in cooperative games that are specifically designed to reflect the context of the terrorist organization at hand. The advantage of this approach is that both the structure of the terrorist network, which usually reflects a communication and interaction structure, as well as non-network features, i.e., individual based parameters such as financial means or bomb building skills, can be taken into account. The application of our methodology to the analysis results in rankings of the terrorists in the network. We illustrate our methodology through two case studies: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing and Al Qaedas 9/11 attack, which lead to new insights in the operational networks responsible for these attacks.     

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems

A system of independent components is defended by a strategic defender and attacked by a strategic attacker. The reliability of each component depends on how strongly it is defended and attacked, and on the intensity of the contest. In a series system, the attacker benefits from a substitution effect since attacker benefits flow from attacking any of the components, while the defender needs to defend all components. Even for a series system, when the attacker is sufficiently disadvantaged with high attack inefficiencies, and the intensity of the contest is sufficiently high, the defender earns maximum utility and the attacker earns zero utility. The results for the defender (attacker) in a parallel system are equivalent to the results for the attacker (defender) in a series system. Hence, the defender benefits from the substitution effect in parallel systems. With budget constraints the ratio of the investments for each component, and the contest success function for each component, are the same as without budget constraints when replacing the system values for the defender and attacker with their respective budget constraints.     

Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest

Nepotism has been the primary influence on political behavior throughout human history. Despite the spread of democracy in the 20th century, nepotistic regimes have hardly disappeared. Nepotism heavily influences political activity throughout the developing world, Middle East, and central Asia where family ties are essential for gaining access to power, state resources, and privileges. Rebelling against such nepotistic regimes is difficult and risky. RiskTaker is an agent-based model we developed for testing the influences of various social forces on risk taking behavior, including the formulation of rebellious coalitions. We use RiskTaker to examine the influence of nepotism on the distribution of wealth and social status. Nepotism heavily skews the distribution of wealth and status, leading to the formation of opposing coalitions and exacerbating social unrest.This paper was tied for Best Paper, NAACSOS (North American Association for Computational Social and Organizational Science) Annual Conference 2005, June 26–28, Notre Dame. Robert Sedlmeyer, Department of Computer Science, Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne provided programming for the RiskTaker model. Lawrence A. Kuznar is a professor of anthropology and director of the Decision Sciences and Theory Institute at Indiana University—Purdue University, Fort Wayne. He has conducted fieldwork among Aymara Indians in Andean Peru and the Navajo of the American southwest. His research interests include computer modeling, theories of risk taking and conflict, terrorism, social evolution, and scientific epistemology. He has authored articles in Ecological Economics (with W. Frederick), Current Anthropology, American Anthropologist, Mathematical Anthropology and Culture Theory and Journal of Anthropological Research, and published two books (Awatimarka Harcourt Brace, 1995 and Reclaiming a Scientific Anthropology Altamira Press, 1997) and two edited volumes. William Frederick has served as a faculty member in the departments of mathematical sciences and the department of computer sciences at Indiana University—Purdue University, Fort Wayne since 1979. His primary interests include mathematical modeling, game theory, and genetic algorithms.     

Combating terrorist networks: An evolutionary approach

This paper will briefly examine how Al Qaeda evolved from an insurgency assistance group to a terrorist network of sophistication and global reach. It argues that Al Qaeda filled the needs of Islamist insurgencies and then developed into a complex system of networks by co-opting other groups, hijacking their agendas and transforming their ideologies during the late 1990s to the present. Al Qaeda thus has global and local aspects. Locally-oriented “associate” organizations may have somewhat variant structures and will vary in their goals, targets, and ideology. In some ways, these groups are more vulnerable to discovery by local authorities and disruption. They tend to lack the training, professionalism, education and capacity to ensure strict security measures and discipline within their own ranks. They lack resources such as weaponry and human social capital, such as experience or specific kinds of knowledge that Al Qaeda has been able to provide. Because they are only loosely coupled to the parent organization, both parent and “child” network receive “force multiplier” benefits while minimizing risks and costs.     

Hidden power law patterns in the top European football leagues

Because sports are stylized combat, sports may follow power laws similar to those found for wars, individual clashes, and acts of terrorism. We show this fact for football (soccer) by adjusting power laws that show a close relationship between rank and points won by the clubs participating in the latest seasons of the top fifteen European football leagues. In addition, we use Shannon entropy for gauging league competitive balance. As a result, we are able to rank the leagues according to competitiveness.     

Destabilization of covert networks

Covert networks are often difficult to reason about, manage and destabilize. In part, this is because they are a complex adaptive system. In addition, this is due to the nature of the data available on these systems. Making these covert networks less adaptive, more predictable, more consistent will make it easier to contain or constrain their activity. But, how can we inhibit adaptation? Herein, covert networks are characterized as dynamic multi-mode multi-plex networks. Dynamic network analysis tools are used to assess their structure and identify effective destabilization strategies that inhibit the adaptivity of these groups.     

A quantum metric of organizational performance: Terrorism and counterterrorism

Political terrorism and insurgency have become the primary means of global war among states. Lacking comparable military and political means to compete directly with Western civilization, many failed states and tribes have honed the art of asymmetric warfare. But traditional models of organizations do not work under normal or these extreme circumstances, precluding realistic models of terrorism and a fruitful search among alternatives for potential solutions. In contrast to traditional models, we have made substantial progress with a quantum model of organizations, which we further develop in this study with the introduction of a case study of a normal organization in the process of being restructured. We apply preliminary results from our model to terrorist organizations and counter terrorism.     

Shock waves in aviation security and safety

Accident investigations such as of Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 reveal the key role of shock-wave propagation in destroying the aircraft when an on-board explosion occurs. This paper surveys shock wave propagation inside an aircraft fuselage, caused either by a terrorist device or by accident, and provides some new experimental results. While aircraft-hardening research has been under way for more than a decade, no such experiments to date have used the crucial tool of high-speed optical imaging to visualize shock motion. Here, Penn State's Full-Scale Schlieren flow visualization facility yields the first shock-motion images in aviation security scenarios: 1) Explosions beneath full-size aircraft seats occupied by mannequins, 2) Explosions inside partially-filled luggage containers, and 3) Luggage-container explosions resulting in hull-holing. Both single-frame images and drum-camera movies are obtained. The implications of these results are discussed, though the overall topic must still be considered in its infancy. Received 22 July 2001 / Accepted 19 July 2002 Published online 4 November 2002 Correspondence to: G.S. Settles (e-mail: gss2@psu.edu) An abridged version of this paper was presented at the 23rd International Symposium on Shock Waves at Fort Worth, Texas, from July 22 to 27, 2001.