The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

Approximation algorithms for dynamic resource allocation

We consider a problem of allocating limited quantities of M types of resources among N independent activities that evolve over T epochs. In each epoch, we assign to each activity a task which consumes resources, generates utility, and determines the subsequent state of the activity. We study the complexity of, and approximation algorithms for, maximizing average utility.     

Heuristic Solution Methods for the Multilevel Generalized Assignment Problem

The multilevel generalized assignment problem is a problem of assigning agents to tasks where the agents can perform tasks at more than one efficiency level. A profit is associated with each assignment and the objective of the problem is profit maximization. Two heuristic solution methods are presented for the problem. The heuristics are developed from solution methods for the generalized assignment problem. One method uses a regret minimization approach whilst the other method uses a repair approach on a relaxation of the problem. The heuristics are able to solve moderately large instances of the problem rapidly and effectively. Procedures for deriving an upper bound on the solution of the problem are also described. On larger and harder instances of the problem one heuristic is particularly effective.     

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes

The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.     

一种新的WDM光网中的共享链路保护策略

研究了WDM光网中的链路保护问题.提出了一种新的共享链路保护策略--基于SRLG的共享链路保护策略(SRLG-SLP).SRLG(共享风险链路组)定义了对一条工作光通道分配保护资源时的资源可用性的约束.它规定任意两条有着同样故障风险或者说处于同一个SRLG的工作光通道不能利用同样的保护资源.另外,还提出了一种更加符合实际的单链路故障模型,其中链路故障间隔时间和链路故障保持时间被考虑作为两个独立的变量.基于该链路故障模型,通过大量的仿真试验,比较了专用链路保护(DLP)、共享链路保护(SLP)和提出的SRLG-SLP保护策略的资源利用率、保护效率以及业务中断率.结果显示,我们提出的SRLG-SLP在保护效率和业务中断率方面的保护性能远好于DLP和SLP,但会牺牲一些资源利用率.     

Allocating electricity transmission costs through tracing: a game-theoretic rationale

Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game.     

Compensatory transfers in two-player decision problems

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves.The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t.The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a “best claim for compensation”. A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.This work was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School. Thanks are due to the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for its kind hospitality during the Spring of 2002. I have received helpful advice and comments from Youngsub Chun, Ehud Kalai, Herve Moulin, Al Roth, Ilya Segal, Adam Szeidl, Richard Zeckhauser, and other members of the Theory Seminars at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Rice and Northwestern.     

基于MPEG-4的视频流式传输系统及动态带宽分配方法

提出了一个基于MPEG 4精细可分级编码技术的视频流式传输系统。介绍了系统中主要模块的作用,并重点研究了速率控制模块。速率控制模块采用了适合视频流式传输的动态带宽分配方法。它可以根据实时的网络通道波动状况来动态调整滑动参数,以适应网络波动和高效地利用网络的有限资源。实验结果表明,动态带宽分配方法在动态带宽波动条件下不仅可以使相邻帧间的视频质量更加平滑,而且可以大大提高解码视频图像的总体质量,也就是说可同时改善解码视频的主客观性能。     

Balanced contributions for TU games with awards and applications

Calleja et al. [Calleja, P., Borm, P., Hendrickx, R., 2005. Multi-issue allocation situations. European Journal of Operational Research 164, 730–747] introduced multi-issue allocation situations with awards. In this paper, we extend the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility to the cooperative games with transferable utility and awards. We define a run-to-the-bank rule for cooperative games with transferable utility and awards and characterise it in terms of a property of balanced contributions. We apply our main result to bankruptcy problems and multi-issue allocation situations with awards.     

A perturbation-based heuristic for the capacitated multisource Weber problem

This paper proposes a perturbation-based heuristic for the capacitated multisource Weber problem. This procedure is based on an effective use of borderline customers. Several implementations are considered and the two most appropriate are then computationally enhanced by using a reduced neighbourhood when solving the transportation problem. Computational results are presented using data sets from the literature, originally used for the uncapacitated case, with encouraging results.