MODELING A RIGHTS‐BASED APPROACH FOR MANAGING HABITAT IMPACTS OF FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. Limiting adverse consequences of fishing on essential fish habitat has emerged as a key fishery management objective. The conventional approach to providing habitat protection is to create MPAs or marine reserves that prohibit all or certain types of fishing in specific areas. However, there may be more cost‐effective and flexible ways to provide habitat protection. We propose an individual habitat quota (IHQ) system for habitat conservation that would utilize economic incentives to achieve habitat conservation goals cost‐effectively. Individual quotas of habitat impact units (HIU) would be distributed to fishers with an aggregate quota set to maintain a target habitat “stock.” HIU use would be based on a proxy for marginal habitat damage. We use a dynamic, explicitly spatial fishery and habitat simulation model to explore how such a system might work. We examine how outcomes are affected by spatial heterogeneity in the fishery and the scale of habitat regulation. We find that the IHQ system is a highly cost‐effective means of ensuring a given level of habitat protection, but that spatial heterogeneity and the scale of regulation can have significant effects on the distribution of habitat protection.     

AN ENCOMPASSING APPROACH TO MODELING FISHERY DYNAMICS: MODELING DYNAMIC NONLINEAR SYSTEMS

Uncertainty about the nature and significance of nonlinearities and the manner in which dynamics affect future realizations makes model specification the most difficult aspect of modeling dynamic systems. By interpreting several popular fishery models as subcases of a nesting dynamic Taylor series approximation, we isolate the specification differences between these models in a way that accounts for commonalities. On the argument that the differences due to alternative nonlinear forms are likely to be small compared to more mundane considerations such as delay difference and general dynamic lag specification, we propose an alternative model that uses the terms from the first order approximation common to all models combined with a data-based determination of the appropriate lags using the methods of state space time series analysis. Finally, the success of the alternative models is judged in an application to Pacific halibut data.     

COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Abstract We show that with symmetric agents, noncooperation is the only stable coalition structure in a fishery with more than two countries. In the case of asymmetric fishing nations, partial or full cooperation may be stable even if the number of countries exceeds two. These are important results for recent fisheries economics papers that have not allowed for coalition formation. As an example how of one can use the model, we study the problem of new entrants into Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). We show that depending on the economic structure of the fishery, new entrants may make cooperation more difficult or easier.     

Sliding and oscillations in fisheries with on–off harvesting and different switching times

In this paper, we propose a fishery model with a discontinuous on–off harvesting policy, based on a very simple and well known rule: stop fishing when the resource is too scarce, i.e. whenever fish biomass is lower than a given threshold. The dynamics of the one-dimensional continuous time model, represented by a discontinuous piecewise-smooth ordinary differential equation, converges to the Schaefer equilibrium or to the threshold through a sliding process. We also consider the model with discrete time impulsive on–off switching that shows oscillations around the threshold value. Finally, a discrete-time version of the model is considered, where on–off harvesting switchings are decided with the same discrete time scale of non overlapping reproduction seasons of the harvested fish species. In this case the border collision bifurcations leading to the creations and destruction of periodic oscillations of the fish biomass are studied.     

EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes a two-stage game, based on the Gordon-Schaefer model of the fishery, to examine the strategic entry-deterring role for effort subsidies in noncooper-ative transboundary fisheries. The game reveals that a country, whose domestic fleet has an effort cost advantage over a rival foreign fleet, may choose to subsidize domestic effort to the point that foreign entry in the fishery becomes unprofitable. Whether the outcome of the game is characterized by foreign entry deterrence or accommodation, and whether it is also characterized by a domestic effort subsidy or a tax, depends on domestic and foreign effort costs and the number of firms in each fleet. The various outcomes of the game analyzed here help to explain the persistence of subsidies in some world fisheries.     

OPTIMAL HARVEST FEEDBACK RULE ACCOUNTING FOR THE FISHING‐UP EFFECT AND SIZE‐DEPENDENT PRICING

Abstract Fishing leads to truncation of a population's age and size structure. However, large‐sized fish are usually more valuable per unit weight than small ones. Nevertheless, these size‐related factors have mostly been ignored in bioeconomic modeling. Here, we present a simple extension to the Gordon–Schaefer model that accounts for variations in mean individual catch weight, and derive the feedback rule for optimal harvest in this setting. As the Gordon–Schaefer model has no population structure, size effects have to be accounted for indirectly. Here we assume a simple negative relationship between fishing effort and mean individual weight, and a positive relationship between mean catch weight and price. The aim is to emulate alterations of size structure in fish populations due to fishing and the influence of size on price per weight unit and eventually, net revenues. This demonstrates, on a general level, how such size‐dependent effects change the patterns of optimal harvest paths and sustainable revenue in single fish stocks. The model shows clear shifts toward lower levels of optimal effort and yield compared to classical models without size effects. This suggests that ignoring body size could lead to misleading assumptions and policies, potentially causing rent dissipation and suboptimal utilization of renewable resources.     

EQUIVALENCIES IN THE FISHERY

Abstract We consider the management of a resource by a sole owner whose utility depends on income and leisure. Income is generated from time spent harvesting the resource and time spent working for a wage in the nonfishing sector. Our analysis produces two results. (i) The sole owner maximizing discounted utility will seek to achieve the same steady‐state optimum as a manager seeking to maximize discounted net revenue. (ii) The approach paths to the common steady‐state optimum will be the same if the utility function is linear in income and separable in income and leisure. These equivalencies are illustrated in a numerical example.     

PAST AND FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF A COLLAPSED FISHERY: THE BAY OF BISCAY ANCHOVY

Abstract We analyze the efficiency of the international management of the Bay of Biscay anchovy. While a sharing agreement between France and Spain has been in place since 1992, the fish stock collapsed in 2005 and the fishery closed from 2005 to spring 2010. We consider differences in production technologies between both countries and calibrate our model using data from 1987 to 2009. Our results suggest two sources of rent dissipation under the existing sharing agreement: inefficient quota allocation and production inefficiencies due to inflexible national regulations. We discuss several alternatives to improve management.     

ENTRY AND EXIT OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN A FISHERY

ABSTRACT. Exit and entry of fishermen, as well as vessels, is modeled explicitly. If the speed of exit and entry of fishermen is less than instantaneous the wage rate varies with the fortunes of the fishing firms and affects the endogenous labor supply creating a second transmission mechanism from profits to effort. There are realistic cases where this mechanism has important effects on the stability of the dynamic system and on the effects of taxes (subsisdies) on the size of the fish stock. If labor supply depends negatively on the wage rate, the immediate effect of an increase in the tax rate is to increase effort and harvest. This condition makes it also more probable that the dynamic system is unstable. In those cases where the dynamic system is unstable the increase in the tax rate increases overexploitation not only in the short‐term but also in the long‐term.     

MODELING THE DYNAMICS OF FISHERY STOCK RECOVERY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES

ABSTRACT. During the restoration planning phase of the natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) process, potential injuries to natural resources and services are evaluated in terms of the nature, degree and extent of injury so that the need for and scale of restoration actions can be ascertained. Injuries are quantified by comparing the condition of the injured natural resource relative to baseline (pre‐injury) conditions. The “Type A” procedures are used to quantify damages from smaller spills and rely on a standardized methodology and computer model to calculate injury and value of damages. In this model, fishery stock changes from injuries and resulting changes in user participation are not treated as dynamic. If true stock growth and re‐growth are indeed dynamic, then the Type A model is likely underestimating fishery losses. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the potential for such underestimation by comparing simulated stock and harvest losses under dynamic treatment and a static treatment that more closely represents the way stock and service losses are estimated under the current NRDA process.