排序方式: 共有48条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Juan J. Vidal-Puga 《International Journal of Game Theory》2008,37(4):457-474
Alternating offers bargaining has been extensively used to model two-sided negotiations. The celebrated model of Rubinstein [Econometrica 50(1):97–109, 1982] has provided a formal justification for equitable payoff division. A typical assumption of these models under risk is that the termination event means a complete and irrevocable breakdown in negotiations. In this paper, the meaning of termination is reinterpreted as the imposition to finish negotiations immediately. Specifically, bargaining terminates when the last offer becomes definitive. While Rubinstein’s model predicts an immediate agreement with stationary strategies, we show that the same payoff allocation is attainable under non-stationary strategies. Moreover, the payoffs in delayed equilibria are potentially better for the proposer than those in which agreement is immediately reached. 相似文献
2.
We analyze retail space-exchange problems where two or more retailers exchange their excess retail spaces to improve the utilization of their space resource. We first investigate the two-retailer space exchange problem. In order to entice both retailers with different bargaining powers to exchange their spaces, we use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme to allocate the total profit surplus between the two retailers. Next, we consider the space-exchange problem involving three or more retailers, and construct a cooperative game in characteristic function form. We show that the game is essential and superadditive, and also prove that the core is non-empty. Moreover, in order to find a unique allocation scheme that ensures the stability of the grand coalition, we propose a new approach to compute a weighted Shapley value that satisfies the core conditions and also reflects retailers’ bargaining powers. Our analysis indicates that the space exchange by more retailers can result in a higher system-wide profit surplus and thus a higher allocation to each retailer under a fair scheme. 相似文献
3.
Rafael Espin Eduardo Fernandez Gustavo Mazcorro Maria Ines Lecich 《European Journal of Operational Research》2007
The object of this paper is to provide a systematic treatment of bargaining procedures as a basis for negotiation. An innovative fuzzy logic approach to analyze n-person cooperative games is developed. A couple of indices, the Good Deal Index and the Counterpart Convenience Index are proposed to characterize the heuristic of bargaining and to provide a solution concept. The indices are examined theoretically and experimentally by analyzing three case studies. The results verify the validity of the approach. 相似文献
4.
Cailin O’Connor 《The Journal of mathematical sociology》2017,41(3):155-171
Why do minority groups tend to be discriminated against when it comes to situations of bargaining and resource division? In this article, I explore an explanation for this disadvantage that appeals solely to the dynamics of social interaction between minority and majority groups—the cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017). As I show, in agent-based models of bargaining between groups, the minority group will tend to get less as a direct result of the fact that they frequently interact with majority group members, while majority group members meet them only rarely. This effect is strengthened by certain psychological phenomenon—risk aversion and in-group preference—is robust on network models, and is strengthened in cases where preexisting norms are discriminatory. I will also discuss how this effect unifies previous results on the impacts of institutional memory on bargaining between groups. 相似文献
5.
We introduce a new solution concept for -person bargaining problems, which can be considered as the dual of the Equal-Area solution (EA) (see Anbarc? and Bigelow (1994)). Hence, we call it the Dual Equal-Area solution (DEA). We show that the point selected by the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)) lies in between those that are selected by EA and DEA. We formulate an axiom–area-based fairness–and offer three characterizations of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in which this axiom plays a central role. 相似文献
6.
Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.Bloch is also affiliated with the University of Warwick. 相似文献
7.
James P. Kahan 《Mathematical Social Sciences》1980,1(1):11-37
Eighteen groups of subjects each participated in five different computer-controlled superadditive 3-person characteristic function games with sidepayments, that modeled negotiable conflicts in which two of the players are weak and one is considerably stronger. Both the degree to which the strong player was powerful and the type of communication were experimentally manipulated. The 90 game outcomes rejected any solution concept that predicts a single payoff vector for a given coalition structure, but supported the recently developed single-parameter α-power model that allows range predictions. Both the degree of power and type of communication were found to affect game outcomes and to determine the predictive power of models that make point predictions in 3-person games. 相似文献
8.
We present an alternative formulation of the two-person equal area bargaining solution based on a dynamical process describing
the disagreement point set. This alternative formulation provides an interpretation of the idea of equal concessions. Furthermore,
it leads to an axiomatic characterization of the solution.
Received: November 1998/Revised version: September 1999 相似文献
9.
Tamás Solymosi 《Central European Journal of Operations Research》2008,16(4):425-440
Partitioning games are useful on two counts: first, in modeling situations with restricted cooperative possibilities between
the agents; second, as a general framework for many unrestricted cooperative games generated by combinatorial optimization
problems.We show that the family of partitioning games defined on a fixed basic collection is closed under the strategic equivalence
of games, and also for taking the monotonic cover of games. Based on these properties we establish the coincidence of
the Mas-Colell, the classical, the semireactive, and the reactive bargaining setswith the core for interesting balanced subclasses
of partitioning games, including assignment games, tree-restricted superadditive games, and simple network games.
Prepared during the author’s Bolyai János Research Fellowship. Also supported by OTKA grant T46194. 相似文献
10.
The purpose of this paper is to show that evolutionary stable market equilibrium is achievable through complete disintermediation of auctioneers if the option of bargaining-based supply chain contracting exists. The paper analyzes the evolutionary dynamics of a market that caters both the scopes of auction-intermediation and supply chain contracting to a set of homogeneous buyers and sellers. The motivation of this work developed from the contradiction between the theoretical framework of Lu and McAfee (1996) that identifies auction to be evolutionary stable over bargaining and the real instance of sustained disintermediation of auctioneers in the world’s largest tea industry in India where supply chain contracting is the other option of trading. 相似文献