主从竞争供应链博弈分析

考虑两条均由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的竞争供应链模型,链间采用Stackelberg博弈,而链内分别考虑制造商主导和零售商主导两种情况.考察了在链内企业实力不同时对供应链之间的竞争有何影响.分析了当企业实力发生改变时,对己链以及他链成员的最优决策有何影响.最后对反映供应链竞争程度的(?)_i做灵敏度分析.结果表明任何供应链内部主导权的改变对链与链之间的竞争没有影响.链内企业之间的博弈只是一种内耗.当两条链实力旗鼓相当时,后进入市场的供应链具有"后动优势"以及竞争加剧对各方都有利.  

Iterative solutions to the extended Sylvester-conjugate matrix equations

This paper is concerned with iterative solutions to a class of complex matrix equations. By applying the hierarchical identification principle, an iterative algorithm is constructed to solve this class of complex matrix equations. The range of the convergence factor is given to guarantee that the proposed algorithm is convergent for arbitrary initial matrix by applying a real representation of a complex matrix as a tool. By using some properties of the real representation, a sufficient convergence condition that is easier to compute is also given by original coefficient matrices. Two numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.  

信息熵增量最小化准则在供应链中的应用

本文研究了在考虑利润最大化准则和信息熵增量最小准则下，既能满足了利润最大化，又要增加利润可得性，销售商如何确定订购量的问题。数字实验表明：考虑双重准则得到的策略比仅考虑利润最大化准则得到的策略更好，可以使供应链、销售商及制造商都受益。  

考虑最优广告费用及数量折扣的供应链企业间的博弈分析

主要研究由一个制造商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链系统,在随机需求下,考虑广告促销及数量折扣前后,双方如何博弈,如何决策的问题.在制造商Stackelberg策略下,对供应链协调价进行了分析,提供了制造商制定数量折扣策略的思路.