Fast deterministic approximation for the multicommodity flow problem

In this paper we consider an optimization version of the multicommodity flow problem which is known as the maximum concurrent flow problem. We show that an approximate solution to this problem can be computed deterministically using O(k(ε ⁻² + logk) logn) 1-commodity minimum-cost flow computations, wherek is the number of commodities,n is the number of nodes, andε is the desired precision. We obtain this bound by proving that in the randomized algorithm developed by Leighton et al. (1995) the random selection of commodities can be replaced by the deterministic round-robin without increasing the total running time. Our bound significantly improves the previously known deterministic upper bounds and matches the best known randomized upper bound for the approximation concurrent flow problem. A preliminary version of this paper appeared inProceedings of the 6th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, San Francisco CA, 1995, pp. 486–492.     

On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values

We propose a new more general approach to TU-games and their efficient values, significantly different from the classical one. It leads to extended TU-games described by a triplet \((N,v,\Omega )\), where (N, v) is a classical TU-game on a finite grand coalition N, and \(\Omega \in {\mathbb {R}}\) is a game worth to be shared between the players in N. Some counterparts of the Shapley value, the equal division value, the egalitarian Shapley value and the least square prenucleolus are defined and axiomatized on the set of all extended TU-games. As simple corollaries of the obtained results, we additionally get some new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the egalitarian Shapley value. Also the problem of independence of axioms is widely discussed.     

Games of timing related to distribution of resources

The paper considers a class of zero-sum, two-person games which are related to distribution of resources. Each of the players is in possession of an amount of resource, to be distributed by him in the time interval [0, 1] according to an arbitrary measure. The payoff function is defined in such a manner that the games are a generalization of the so-called silent, nondiscrete duels. It is proven that these games have a value, and the optimal strategies for the players are found. The results of the paper bring to light new, essential elements, common to almost all games of timing on [0, 1].     

Weighted Banzhaf values

The family of weighted Banzhaf values for cooperativen-person TU-games is studied. First we introduce the weighted Banzhaf value for an exogenously given vector of positive weights of the players. Then we give an axiomatic characterization of the class of all possible weighted Banzhaf values.     

A solidarity value forn-person transferable utility games

In this paper, we introduce axiomatically a new value for cooperative TU games satisfying the efficiency, additivity, and symmetry axioms of Shapley (1953) and some new postulate connected with the average marginal contributions of the members of coalitions which can form. Our solution is referred to as the solidarity value. The reason is that its interpretation can be based on the assumption that if a coalition, sayS, forms, then the players who contribute toS more than the average marginal contribution of a member ofS support in some sense their weaker partners inS. Sometimes, it happens that the solidarity value belongs to the core of a game while the Shapley value does not.This research was supported by the KBN Grant 664/2/91 No. 211589101.     

A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value

everal new families of semivalues for weighted n-person transferable utility games are axiomatically constructed and discussed under increasing collections of axioms, where the weighted Shapley value arises as the resulting one member family. A more general approach to such weighted games defined in the form of two components, a weight vector λ and a classical TU-game v, is provided. The proposed axiomatizations are done both in terms of λ and v. Several new axioms related to the weight vector λ are discussed, including the so-called “amalgamating payoffs” axiom, which characterizes the value of a weighted game in terms of another game with a smaller number of players. They allow for a new look at the role of players’ weights in the context of the weighted Shapley value for the model of weighted games, giving new properties of it. Besides, another simple formula for the weighted Shapley value is found and examples illustrating some surprising behavior of it in the context of players’ weights are given. The paper contains a wide discussion of the results obtained.     

Poor convexity and Nash equilibria in games

This paper considers two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square with payoff functions having a new property called poor convexity. This property describes “something between” the classical convexity and quasi-convexity. It is proved that various types of such games have Nash equilibria with a very simple structure, consisting of the players’ mixed strategies with at most two-element supports. Since poor convexity is a basic notion in the paper, also a theory of poorly convex functions is also developed.     

Shortest paths algorithms: Theory and experimental evaluation

We conduct an extensive computational study of shortest paths algorithms, including some very recent algorithms. We also suggest new algorithms motivated by the experimental results and prove interesting theoretical results suggested by the experimental data. Our computational study is based on several natural problem classes which identify strengths and weaknesses of various algorithms. These problem classes and algorithm implementations form an environment for testing the performance of shortest paths algorithms. The interaction between the experimental evaluation of algorithm behavior and the theoretical analysis of algorithm performance plays an important role in our research. This work was done while Boris V. Cherkassky was visiting Stanford University Computer Science Department and supported by the NSF and Powell Foundation grants mentioned below. Andrew V. Goldberg was supported in part by ONR Young Investigator Award N00014-91-J-1855, NSF Presidential Young Investigator Grant CCR-8858097 with matching funds from AT&T, DEC, and 3M, and a grant from Powell Foundation. Corresponding author. This work was done while Tomasz Radzik was a Postdoctoral Fellow at SORIE, Cornell University, and supported by the National Science Foundation, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the Office of Naval Research, through NSF grant DMS-8920550, and by the Packard Fellowship of éva Tardos.     

On the existence of almost-pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in <Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-person finite games

This paper gives wide characterization of n-person non-coalitional games with finite players’ strategy spaces and payoff functions having some concavity or convexity properties. The characterization is done in terms of the existence of two-point-strategy Nash equilibria, that is equilibria consisting only of mixed strategies with supports being one or two-point sets of players’ pure strategy spaces. The structure of such simple equilibria is discussed in different cases. The results obtained in the paper can be seen as a discrete counterpart of Glicksberg’s theorem and other known results about the existence of pure (or “almost pure”) Nash equilibria in continuous concave (convex) games with compact convex spaces of players’ pure strategies.     

An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value

We provide a new characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value derived from some postulates in a recent paper by Radzik, Nowak and Driessen [7]. Our approach owes much to the work by Lehrer [4] on the classical Banzhaf value based on the idea of amalgamation of pairs of players and an induction construction of the value. Compared with the approach in [7] we consider two new postulates: a weighted version of Lehrer’s “2-efficiency axiom” [4] and a generalized “null player out” property studied in terms of symmetric games by Derks and Haller [2]. Received: December 1997/final version: October 1999