α-OXIDASE ACTIVITY IN PLANTS AS PROMOTOR OF ELECTRONIC ENERGY

Abstract The a-oxidase activity of higher plants acting on long chain fatty acids generates the lower aldehyde in the ground state; however if chlorophyll or chioroplasts are present the chlorophylls are excited most likely by a chemically initiated electron exchange (CIEEL) luminescence process with the putative a-peroxylactone intermediate. When the aldehyde is substituted for the acid, the lower aldehyde appears in the triplet state. The chiral discrimination observed in the quenching by D- and L-tryptophan of the chlorophyll sensitized emission indicates that the triplet aldehyde is generated within the enzymatic preparation and transfers energy while still bound to the enzyme.
Chlorophylls in chioroplasts are excited by addition of a long chain fatty acid or aldehyde. The mechanism, however, is unknown.     

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS WITH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A DYNAMIC APPROACH

This paper is devoted to study the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a pollution abatement model. We focus our attention on two asymmetric agents: developed countries characterized by a strong measure of environmental awareness and developing ones characterized by less attention to environmental preservation. We model a differential game in order to determine both the optimal path of the abatement levels and stock pollutant as results of open‐loop and feedback Nash equilibria. By means of the concepts of internal and external stability, we explain how the environmental awareness of two types of countries and the number of cooperators and defectors influence the size of stable coalitions. The results establish that the asymmetry assumption does not have consequences for the stability of the grand coalition, which can be obtained only with transfers.     

THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Abstract The game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems has received increasing attention in recent years. Major issues are as follows. Under which conditions will an international environmental agreement (IEA) be signed? Will the agreement be stable? Game theory has given different answers to these questions; in particular, it is possible to show that if countries are myopic then only small stable coalitions occur, but if they are farsighted then both large and small stable coalitions exist. This paper studies the size of a farsighted stable IEA by considering a quadratic cost function in a pollution abatement model. Following Rubio and Ulph [2006] , we consider both the case of non‐negative emissions as well as the case of unrestricted ones.     

COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A DYNAMICAL MODEL OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Abstract In this paper, we propose a model describing the commercial exploitation of a common renewable resource by a population of strategically interacting agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the payoff of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. The partition of the players into two groups, defectors and cooperators, results from the players' choices, so it is not predetermined. This partition is decided as a Nash equilibrium of a static game. It is shown that different types of players can exist in an equilibrium; more precisely, depending on the parameter values such as resource stock, cost, and so on, there might be equilibria only with defectors, cooperators, or with a combination of cooperators and defectors. In any case the total harvest depends on the renewable resource stock, so it influences agents' positions. It is assumed that at each time period the agents harvest according to Nash equilibrium, which can be combined with a dynamic model describing the evolution of fish population. A complete analysis of the equilibria is presented and their stability is analysed. The effect of the different Nash equilibria on the stability of the fish stock, showing that full cooperation is the most stable case, is examined.     

Information Transmission of a Policy Program: Models for the Optimal Detection of Key Players

The underlying motivation for this work stems from the observation that there was weak participation in a policy program to modernize the commerce of a city center. This was due in part to a poor performance from the trade association board in the transmission of information. Using the tools of social network analysis and combinatorial optimization, we search for new sets of key players that are better positioned to disseminate information in the collective. We detect 2 new sets of key players and compare them with the trade association board. The comparison shows that social network analysis and combinatorial optimization can be useful tools in making policy implementation processes more effective.     

Imidazolium-Based Dicationic Cyclophanes. Solid-State Aggregates with Unconventional (C–H)+···Cl− Hydrogen Bonding Revealed by X-ray Diffraction

The first single-crystal X-ray crystallographic diffraction analysis of a dicationic heterophane showed a non-classic (C–H)⁺···Cl^?  hydrogen bond between the imidazolium rings and halide anions and the formation of unconventional charged assisted hydrogen bonds, which were the non-covalent forces driving the anion interactions shown by the dications 4·2X. Here is reported the halide-templated controlled synthesis and chemical response in basic media of 4·2X. Their structural properties were examined at the gas phase by electrospray ionization mass spectrometry in the negative-ion mode and in the solid-state by X-ray crystallography. Thus, the negative-ion ESI-MS response showed that the formation of non-covalent self-aggregates of macrocyclic dications is a consequence of hydrogen-bonded complexes with halide anions. Notably, X-ray diffraction of dication 4a·2Cl·2H₂O provides evidence for the H-bonding network, which has a crucial role in crystal packing. The solid-state aggregates showed that chloride anions and water molecules formed channels among dications 4a⁺.