一个东部和中西部协调发展的经济模型

本文对关于两区域经济发展的Raham－Intriligator模型进行了适合中国国情的修改，得出Raham-Intriligator模型不同的结论：对于两地区经济发展不平衡的发展中国家使区域经济协调发展是可行的．     

TIME INCONSISTENCY AND REPUTATION IN MONETARY POLICY： A STRATEGIC MODELLING IN CONTINUOUS TIME

This article develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic and endogenized distortion. First, the authors introduce the notion of sequentially rational equilibrium, and show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies for stochastic setting. The conditions for the existence of sequentially rational equilibrium are provided. Then, the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. The authors compare the relative stability between the cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior, and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium is sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, they tend to persist for longer periods of the time.