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1.
This paper considers hypergraph communication situations, where for a group of agents the economic possibilities are described by a coalitional game and the communication possibilities are described by a hypergraph in which the nodes are the agents and the edges are the subgroups of agents who can effect communication. Axiomatic characterizations are provided for two allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value. 相似文献
2.
3.
F. Thuijsman S. H. Tijs O. J. Vrieze 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1991,69(2):311-324
We examine stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. For the -discounted case, as well as for the irreducible limiting average case, we show the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria and give characterizations of those equilibria. In the final section, we give an example which illustrates that the existence of stationary limiting average equilibria in a nonirreducible stochastic game does not imply the existence of a perfect limiting average equilibrium.Support was provided by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO via the Netherlands Foundation for Mathematics SMC, Project 10-64-10. 相似文献
4.
The general nucleolus and the reduced game property 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Professor M. Maschler J. A. M. Potters S. H. Tijs 《International Journal of Game Theory》1992,21(1):85-106
The nucleolus of a TU game is a solution concept whose main attraction is that it always resides in any nonempty -core. In this paper we generalize the nucleolus to an arbitrary pair (,F), where is a topological space andF is a finite set of real continuous functions whose domain is . For such pairs we also introduce the least core concept. We then characterize the nucleolus forclasses of such pairs by means of a set of axioms, one of which requires that it resides in the least core. It turns out that different classes require different axiomatic characterizations.One of the classes consists of TU-games in which several coalitions may be nonpermissible and, moreover, the space of imputations is required to be a certain generalized core. We call these gamestruncated games. For the class of truncated games, one of the axioms is a new kind ofreduced game property, in which consistency is achieved even if some coalitions leave the game, being promised the nucleolus payoffs. Finally, we extend Kohlberg's characterization of the nucleolus to the class of truncated games. 相似文献
5.
Traveling salesman games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In this paper we discuss the problem of how to divide the total cost of a round trip along several institutes among the institutes visited. We introduce two types of cooperative games—fixed-route traveling salesman games and traveling salesman games—as a tool to attack this problem. Under very mild conditions we prove that fixed-route traveling salesman games have non-empty cores if the fixed route is a solution of the classical traveling salesman problem. Core elements provide us with fair cost allocations. A traveling salesman game may have an empty core, even if the cost matrix satisfies the triangle inequality. In this paper we introduce a class of matrices defining TS-games with non-empty cores. 相似文献
6.
Endre?Bj?rndal Maurice?KosterEmail author Stef?Tijs 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2004,59(2):249-270
In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals both the set of weighted down-home allocations and the set of weighted neighbour allocations. Since every weighted down-home allocation specifies a weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) in a natural way, and vice versa, our results provide an alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of weighted neighbour allocations is a generalization of the nucleolus, in the sense that the latter is in this class as the special member where players have all equal weights. 相似文献
7.
Closed kernel systems of the coalition matrix turn out to correspond to cones of games on which the core correspondence is
additive and on which the related barycentric solution is additive, stable and continuous. Different perfect cones corresponding
to closed kernel systems are described.
Received: December 2001/Revised: July 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This note contains the new results, which were presented by the first author in an invited lecture at the XIV Italian
Meeting on Game Theory and Applications in Ischia, July 2001. The lecture was dedicated to Irinel Dragan on the occasion of
his seventieth birthday. 相似文献
8.
In this paper the main focus is on a stability concept for solutions of a linear complementarity problem. A solution of such
a problem is robust if it is stable against slight perturbations of the data of the problem. Relations are investigated between
the robustness, the nondegenerateness and the isolatedness of solutions. It turns out that an isolated nondegenerate solution
is robust and also that a robust nondegenerate solution is isolated. Since the class of linear complementarity problems with
only robust solutions or only nondegenerate solutions is not an open set, attention is paid to Garcia's classG
n
of linear complementarity problems. The nondegenerate problems inG
n
form an open set. 相似文献
9.
This paper deals with a constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games named the d value. It is proved that the d value of a convex multi-choice game belongs to the precore, Lorenz dominates each other element of the precore and possesses a population monotonicity property regarding players’ participation levels. Furthermore, an axiomatic characterization is given where a specific consistency property plays an important role. 相似文献
10.
Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2