Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism

Each woman indicates a set of acceptable men. Following a line, each man selects his favorite woman among those available to him and to whom he is acceptable. Roth (1982) imposes that women select the whole set of men and Alcalde et al (2000) restrict the choices of women to singleton. We relax these restrictions by allowing women to select any set of men and investigate how this change affects the strategic structure of the games induced by the old procedures.     

A new oxovanadium(IV)–cucurbit[6]uril complex: Properties and potential for confined heterogeneous catalytic oxidation reactions

This work presents a new oxovanadium(IV)–cucurbit[6]uril complex, which combines the catalytic properties of the metal ion with the size-excluding properties of the macrocycle cavity. In this coordination compound, the VO²⁺${\text{VO}}^{2+}$ ions are coordinated to the oxygen atoms located at the rim of the macrocycle in slightly distorted square-pyramidal configurations, which are in fact _C2v$C_{2v}$ symmetries. This combination results in a size-selective heterogeneous catalyst, which is able to oxidize linear alkanes like n-pentane at room temperature, but not styrene, cyclohexane or z-cyclooctene, which are too big to enter the cucurbit[6]uril cavity. The results presented here contribute to understanding the mechanism of alkane catalytic oxidation by oxovanadium(IV) complexes.     

On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets

We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik’s (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d’Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461–479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873–888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” that implies and generalizes two “folk theorems” for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem.     

The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained.     

Influence of Organophilic Ammonium-Free Nanoclay Incorporation on Mechanical Properties and Biodegradability of Biodegradable Polyester

Summary: Disposal of petroleum-derived polymers is a growing global environmental problem of alarming proportions, which has increased interest in the use and production of biodegradable materials. In addition to biodegradation, investment in research and development in the nanotechnology area is also significant. This study evaluated the effect of incorporation of an organophilic nanoclay ammonium-free salt (Novaclay™) on the mechanical properties and biodegradation of a biodegradable polyester (Ecoflex®), according to ASTM G 160. Ecoflex with and without incorporated Novaclay was characterized before and after biodegradation in organically enriched soil for up to 180 days, by visual analysis, optical microscopy, weight loss, differential scanning calorimetry, dynamic mechanical analysis, mechanical testing, and scanning electron microscopy. The pure Ecoflex and the Ecoflex/Novaclay nanocomposite were partially biodegraded by the method used, and showed changes in their morphological and mechanical properties.     

Some remarks on the stable matching problem

The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their mates. We establish three results on properties of these matchings and present two short proofs of a recent theorem of Dubins and Freedman.     

Bounding the mim-width of hereditary graph classes

A large number of $\mathsf{NP}$-hard graph problems are solvable in $\mathsf{XP}$ time when parameterized by some width parameter. Hence, when solving problems on special graph classes, it is helpful to know if the graph class under consideration has bounded width. In this paper we consider maximum-induced matching width (mim-width), a particularly general width parameter that has a number of algorithmic applications whenever a decomposition is “quickly computable” for the graph class under consideration. We start by extending the toolkit for proving (un)boundedness of mim-width of graph classes. By combining our new techniques with known ones we then initiate a systematic study into bounding mim-width from the perspective of hereditary graph classes, and make a comparison with clique-width, a more restrictive width parameter that has been well studied. We prove that for a given graph $H$, the class of $H$-free graphs has bounded mim-width if and only if it has bounded clique-width. We show that the same is not true for $(H_1,H_2)$-free graphs. We identify several general classes of $(H_1,H_2)$-free graphs having unbounded clique-width, but bounded mim-width; moreover, we show that a branch decomposition of constant mim-width can be found in polynomial time for these classes. Hence, these results have algorithmic implications: when the input is restricted to such a class of $(H_1,H_2)$-free graphs, many problems become polynomial-time solvable, including classical problems, such as $k$- Colouring and Independent Set , domination-type problems known as Locally Checkable Vertex Subset and Vertex Partitioning (LC-VSVP) problems, and distance versions of LC-VSVP problems, to name just a few. We also prove a number of new results showing that, for certain $H_1$ and $H_2$, the class of $(H_1,H_2)$-free graphs has unbounded mim-width. Boundedness of clique-width implies boundedness of mim-width. By combining our results with the known bounded cases for clique-width, we present summary theorems of the current state of the art for the boundedness of mim-width for $(H_1,H_2)$-free graphs. In particular, we classify the mim-width of $(H_1,H_2)$-free graphs for all pairs $(H_1,H_2)$ with $\mid V(H_1)\mid +\mid V(H_2)\mid \le 8$. When $H_1$ and $H_2$ are connected graphs, we classify all pairs $(H_1,H_2)$ except for one remaining infinite family and a few isolated cases.     

Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.