Nonlinear frequency response analysis: a recent review and perspectives

The nonlinear frequency response analysis (NFRA) can be seen as an extension of electrochemical impedance spectroscopy. NFRA gives a full and detailed representation of the system response and can establish a connection between model parameters and the experimentally observed phenomena. In this article, different theoretical NFRA approaches and the most recent application examples are discussed. A simple electrochemical example is used to showcase the benefits and disadvantages of analyzing the system response by using different approaches. In addition, it was shown how to extract experimental harmonic values and analyze them.     

基于Hopf-Cole变换的Burgers方程初边值问题的Sinc-Galerkin法

利用Sinc-Galerkin法数值求解Burgers方程的初边值问题。首先,用Hopf-Cole变换将二阶非线性的Burgers方程变换为二阶线性方程,同时把第一类边界条件变为第二类边界条件。时间上的导数采用θ加权格式离散,空间导数采用Sinc-Galerkin法离散,端点处分别引入权函数处理变换后的第二类边界条件。最后,通过数值算例验证了Sinc-Galerkin法的指数收敛性,与精确解相比,本文构造的数值格式精度高,能够有效捕捉激波等物理现象。     

A bound on the Wasserstein-2 distance between linear combinations of independent random variables

We provide a bound on a distance between finitely supported elements and general elements of the unit sphere of ${?}^2\left({\mathbb{N}}^1\right)$. We use this bound to estimate the Wasserstein-2 distance between random variables represented by linear combinations of independent random variables. Our results are expressed in terms of a discrepancy measure related to Nourdin–Peccati’s Malliavin–Stein method. The main application is towards the computation of quantitative rates of convergence to elements of the second Wiener chaos. In particular, we explicit these rates for non-central asymptotic of sequences of quadratic forms and the behavior of the generalized Rosenblatt process at extreme critical exponent.     

Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction

When buyer valuations are drawn IID from a known regular distribution, a second price auction with a symmetric reserve price is the revenue-optimal single-item auction. When this distribution is irregular, we provide the first separation result showing that a second price auction with reserves earns at most 0.778 times the revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction, even when the reserves can be asymmetric. Since the lower bound is 0.745 for i.i.d. buyers, our result is nearly tight.