A two-phase inspection policy with imperfect testing

This paper presents an inspection policy to detect failures of a single component system that remain hidden otherwise. Inspection reveals whether the unit is in good or failed state. The possibility of non perfect testing is assumed, thus, successive inspections may fail detecting a failure or result in a false alarm. The occurrence of false alarms is reported in optical fire detectors and inspection of printing circuit boards which are on the basis of electronic systems. A two-phase inspection schedule takes into account the changes in component’s aging. The system may undergo different inspection frequencies to detect both early failures or those due to the natural deterioration in the system as time goes by. The examples reveal the advantages of a two-phase inspection when comparing with the unique interval inspection.     

Extended optimal inspection policies for a system in storage

A system such as missiles and spare parts of aircraft has to perform a normal operation in a severe environment at any time when it is used. However, the system is in storage for a long time from the delivery to the usage and its reliability goes down with time. Thus, a system in storage should be inspected and maintained at periodic times to hold a higher reliability than is prespecified.The following inspection model is considered: A system has three types of units, where unit 1 is maintained, unit 21 is not maintained but is replaced and unit 22 is neither maintained nor replaced. The system is overhauled if its reliability becomes lower than a prespecified probability. The number of replacements and time until overhaul are derived. Using these results, the average cost is obtained and both an optimal inspection time and an optimal replacement time to minimize it are numerically discussed.     

A maintenance model with failures and inspection following Markovian arrival processes and two repair modes

We consider a deteriorating system submitted to external and internal failures, whose deterioration level is known by means of inspections. There are two types of repairs: minimal and perfect, depending on the deterioration level, each one following a different phase-type distribution. The failures and the inspections follow different Markovian arrival processes (MAP). Under these assumptions, the system is governed by a generalized Markov process, whose state space and generator are constructed. This general model includes the phase-type renewal process as a special case. The distribution of the number of minimal and perfect repairs between two inspections are determined. A numerical application optimizing costs is performed, and different particular cases of the model are compared.     

An LDQBD process under degradation,inspection, and two types of repair

A warm standby n-system with operational and repair times following phase-type distributions is considered. The online unit goes through degradating levels, determined by inspections. Two types of repairs are performed, preventive and corrective, depending on the degradation level. The standby units undergo corrective repair. This systems is governed by a level-dependent-quasi-birth-and-death proces (LDQBD process), whose generator is constructed. The availability, rate of occurrence of failures, and other quantities of interest are calculated. A numerical example including an optimization problem and illustrating the calculations is presented. This system extend other previously studied in the literature.     

Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game

An inspection game models a conflict situation between an inspector and an inspectee. The mathematical analysis aims to generate optimal behavior of the inspectee under the assumption that an undesirable action of the inspectee could otherwise be carried out strategically. In this paper the controller’s (inspector’s) particular job is to audit a manager’s (inspectee’s) decision and to submit a report to the company’s top managers for examination. Thus, a conflict as regards the choice of behavioral actions of the manager, the controller and the top management impends. Based on Fandel and Trockel (2011a) this modified inspection game is discussed here for the first time as a three-person game in the context of a manager’s faulty decision that will unnecessarily add to the company’s costs and that the top management understandably wishes to minimize. We will first examine the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium occurs in this three-person game in which poor management, poor monitoring and poor revision coincide. We will then examine the effects that the penalties and bonuses exert on the Nash equilibrium solution. We will find that penalties and bonuses can neutralize each other in their effects on the improved decision making by the manager and the controller.     

Pseudo Availability of Repairable System

Availability is a very basic characteristic of a system for measuring its performance. Various traditional availabilities have been defined in the literature. This article considers repairable system, the failure of which can be detected only by inspection, and incorporates both inspection and repair into consideration. The concept of pseudo availability is introduced and studied. Pseudo availability differs from the traditional availabilities in that once the system is in ‘up’ state it will remain there forever without change. The expression and/or its Laplace transform are derived. The limiting behavior of pseudo availability is also studied. AMS 2000 Subject Classification Primary 60K10, Secondary 60E10     

红外图像法鉴别打印机种类

采用红外图像系统对收集到的针式、激光、喷墨3种类型打印机的打印字迹样本各4份分别进行检验,依据3类打印机打印字迹的可见图像、化学图像和红外谱图,可以鉴别3种类型的打印机。可见图像鉴别可根据字迹的清晰程度及有无虚边等特点加以鉴别,化学图像鉴别可根据在不同的波程范围上化学图像清晰程度不同为依据。红外谱图部分主要是在相同的波程上吸收峰数目不同作为鉴别的主要依据。通过红外图像法鉴别打印机种类与其他方法相比,具有不破坏检材、检测范围广、检测速度快等优点。     

ISO/IEC 17043: the new International Standard for proficiency testing

The revision of ISO/IEC Guide 43 is well underway by CASCO Working Group 28, with the author as Convener. The ballot on the committee draft was successfully completed in June 2008. The Working Group met in September to resolve the CD comments and to recommend that the document should advance as an ISO/IEC DIS. The document is in harmony with ISO/IEC 17025 (2005), ILAC G13 (2007), and the IUPAC Harmonized Protocol (2006) for proficiency testing. Major changes from Guide 43 include considerations for inspection bodies, requirements for metrological traceability of assigned values for calibration schemes, limitations on subcontracting, requirements for reporting the uncertainty of assigned values, and for including method information and technical commentary in scheme reports. Minor changes include requirements for equipment used in the manufacture and testing of proficiency test items, considerations for handling laboratories’ reported uncertainties, and the issuance of certificates of participation. These changes have not generated any substantial objections from the CASCO membership and liaisons.     

强激光装置中玻璃疵病在线检测的光学系统设计

介绍了一种用于玻璃疵病在线检测的近摄工作距成像光学系统,其光组结构形式采用了光阑后置的准远心结构形式,主要光学参量为f′=14mm;在物像距为250mm约束条件下,物方视场达到90mm（对角线）;F/number=3.56;光谱适应范围为400~800nm,对应的空间分辨率为100lp/mm时,调制传递函数大于0.29.     

Inspection games in arms control

An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that the potential illegal action is carried out strategically; thus a non-cooperative game with two players, inspector and inspectee, is defined. Three phases of development in the application of such models to arms control and disarmament may be identified. In the first of these, roughly from 1961 through 1968, studies that focused on inspecting a nuclear test ban treaty emphasized game theory, with less consideration given to statistical aspects associated with data acquisition and measurement uncertainty. The second phase, from 1968 to about 1985, involves work stimulated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Here, the verification principle of material accountancy came to the fore, along with the need to include the formalism of statistical decision theory within the inspection models. The third phase, 1985 to the present, has been dominated by challenges posed by such far-reaching verification agreements as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as perceived failures of the NPT system in Iraq and North Korea. In this connection, the interface between the political and technical aspects of verification is being examined from the game-theoretic viewpoint.