A dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit adjustments

We study a dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit of firms under general demand and cost functions. We show that the number of firms in a steady-state open-loop solution for a dynamic free-entry oligopoly is smaller than that at static equilibrium and that the number of firms in a steady-state memoryless closed-loop solution is larger than that in an open-loop solution.     

基于利他偏好的电商供应链最优决策与契约协调

构建了由一个占主导地位的电商平台和一个处于跟随地位的制造商组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了电商平台有无利他偏好时电商供应链的最优决策和契约协调问题,并通过数值算例验证了本文的主要结论.研究表明:电商平台的利他偏好行为能够促使自身服务水平提高、正向影响制造商的最优销售价格并削弱自身利润.但电商平台的让利行为能够提高制造商的利润水平、缓和供应链冲突并改善供应链整体绩效."销售佣金比例+服务成本共担"契约能够完美的协调电商供应链,使双方最优利润获得帕累托改进,从而保证电商平台有足够的激励执行利他偏好行为.另外,进一步分析发现电商平台的利他偏好正向影响制造商支付给电商平台的固定技术服务费、制造商占有的电商供应链利润份额和服务成本分担比例,负向影响自身的销售佣金比例.     

政府监管下的医院医疗信息分享演化博弈分析

在分析政府监管下医院间医疗信息分享特征的基础上,结合我国当前正在推行的医联体医院间信息分享运作模式,引入梅特卡夫定律并考虑患者评价的影响,分析了监管部门与医院各自的利益组成,建立了监管部门与医院两者之间的演化博弈模型,并采用复制动态方程研究了不同情形下医院间信息分享的演化博弈轨迹。研究表明,政府通过监管并建立激励惩罚机制等引导措施对医院最终达到的演化稳定态具有极大影响;降低医院主体信息分享的风险成本、规范提高医院分享信息的质量、引导患者增强对医院信息分享的关注、制定有吸引力和威慑力的奖惩政策,是促进医院医疗信息分享的关键。研究结果可为政府监管部门预测医院间的信息分享趋势和制定精准化政策以促进分享提供参考。     

Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.     

The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework

The game theoretic modelling of coalition for environmental protection within the framework of a new concept of co-utility is discussed. The co-utility concept contains mainly two elements. Firstly, agents can increase their payoffs by collaborating with each-other. Secondly, the outcome of collaboration is robust towards internal and external disturbances. The advantages of using of co-utility are two-fold. Primarily, the co-utility concept is broad and can serve as an umbrella concept in all applications where agents have a space for simultaneous improvement of payoffs. Secondly the co-utility concept can be associated with different stability concept such as myopic or farsighted stability. The myopic and farsighted co-utile sets are defined and their element-co-utile outcomes are found.