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1.
Natural disasters increase in number and severity. Studies have shown the failure of the catastrophe insurance market by listing many causes or through developing economic models (Charpentier and Le Maux, 2014; Kousky and Cooke, 2012; Ibragimov et al., 2009). However, they have not considered the effect of the following factors on market equilibrium: advanced disaster-resistant technologies used by insureds, alternative financial innovations employed by insurers, and various disaster policies that are implemented by governments. To fill this gap, this study examines how these three factors affect the market equilibrium by changing the supply of, and demand for insurance and determines which factor(s) contributes to the market equilibrium. Furthermore, we derive the formula of position size which gives criteria for selecting index-based contracts. Overall annual numbers and insured losses of catastrophes are collected by peril type and by occurrence region listed in Sigma, which is issued by Swiss Re annually. The comparative static equilibrium analysis demonstrates that the improvement of market equilibrium is significant at low level of loss correlation in all cases. The empirical findings give insurers good references for business and geographical diversification in portfolio of catastrophe insurance policies.  相似文献   
2.
Participating contracts are popular insurance policies, in which the payoff to a policyholder is linked to the performance of a portfolio managed by the insurer. We consider the portfolio selection problem of an insurer that offers participating contracts and has an S-shaped utility function. Applying the martingale approach, closed-form solutions are obtained. The resulting optimal strategies are compared with portfolio insurance hedging strategies (CPPI and OBPI). We also study numerical solutions of the portfolio selection problem with constraints on the portfolio weights.  相似文献   
3.
In this paper we investigate the hedging problem of a unit-linked life insurance contract via the local risk-minimization approach, when the insurer has a restricted information on the market. In particular, we consider an endowment insurance contract, that is a combination of a term insurance policy and a pure endowment, whose final value depends on the trend of a stock market where the premia the policyholder pays are invested. To allow for mutual dependence between the financial and the insurance markets, we use the progressive enlargement of filtration approach. We assume that the stock price process dynamics depends on an exogenous unobservable stochastic factor that also influences the mortality rate of the policyholder. We characterize the optimal hedging strategy in terms of the integrand in the Galtchouk–Kunita–Watanabe decomposition of the insurance claim with respect to the minimal martingale measure and the available information flow. We provide an explicit formula by means of predictable projection of the corresponding hedging strategy under full information with respect to the natural filtration of the risky asset price and the minimal martingale measure. Finally, we discuss applications in a Markovian setting via filtering.  相似文献   
4.
This article considers a co-reinsurance strategy that (1) protects insurance companies against catastrophic risks; (2) enables insurers to gather sufficient information about the different risk attitudes of reinsurers and diversify their reinsured risks; (3) enables insurers to create better risk-sharing profiles by balancing the risk tolerances of reinsurers; (4) has the benefit of allowing reinsurers to accumulate experience with risks with which they are unfamiliar; (5) reduces the overall direct cost of a reinsurance contract; (6) allows a government to back some insurance products, such as the terrorism insurance programs that were established in many countries after the September 11th terrorist attacks; and (7) reflects the practical reinsurance industry of some countries, such as Iran. Such a co-reinsurance strategy can be fully determined by estimating its parameters whenever three optimal criteria are satisfied and prior information about the unknown parameters is available. Two simulation-based studies have been conducted to demonstrate (1) the practical applications of our findings and (2) the possible impact of any type of dependency between the co-reinsurance’s parameters and the evaluated optimal co-reinsurance strategy.  相似文献   
5.
The calculation of Net Asset Values and Solvency Capital Requirements in a Solvency 2 context–and the derivation of sensitivity analyses with respect to the main financial and actuarial risk drivers–is a complex procedure at the level of a real company, where it is illusory to be able to rely on closed-form formulas. The most general approach to performing these computations is that of nested simulations. However, this method is also hardly realistic because of its huge computation resources demand. The least-squares Monte Carlo method has recently been suggested as a way to overcome these difficulties. The present paper confirms that using this method is indeed relevant for Solvency 2 computations at the level of a company.  相似文献   
6.
政府部门往往会承担公共品负担提高社会公共福利和满足社会诉求,私人部门在PPP项目建设运营中会采取机会主义行为损害政府部门利益和降低社会福利。本文运用演化博弈分析私人部门的机会主义行为演化机制。通过模型分析可得,当政府补贴系数低于一定程度时,私人部门采取机会主义行为的概率随着公共品负担强度的增加而增加;当政府实施公共品负担小于一定强度时,私人部门会随着政府补贴程度提高而不采取机会主义行为,而当公共品负担强度大于一定值时,政府补贴政策正相关性就被严重削弱;私人部门占据更多的利益分配比重,更有倾向采取机会主义行为。根据研究结果,政府部门应增强契约精神,公共品负担下,政府补贴并不能有效降低机会主义行为,而应完善监管机制和提升私人部门对项目收益的信心。  相似文献   
7.
This paper considers an aging multi‐state system, where the system failure rate varies with time. After any failure, maintenance is performed by an external repair team. Repair rate and cost of each repair are determined by a corresponding corrective maintenance contract with a repair team. The service market can provide different kinds of maintenance contracts to the system owner, which also can be changed after each specified time period. The owner of the system would like to determine a series of repair contracts during the system life cycle in order to minimize the total expected cost while satisfying the system availability. Operating cost, repair cost and penalty cost for system failures should be taken into account. The paper proposes a method for determining such optimal series of maintenance contracts. The method is based on the piecewise constant approximation for an increasing failure rate function in order to assess lower and upper bounds of the total expected cost and system availability by using Markov models. The genetic algorithm is used as the optimization technique. Numerical example is presented to illustrate the approach. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
8.
为解决项目管理中承包商不努力工作的问题,运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论,建立了业主一承包商间的激励数学模型.构造了努力产出函数和努力成本函数,求出了业主的最优激励水平以及相应的承包商最优努力水平,给出了业主的最优激励合同安排.最后,通过一个简化算例求出了模型均衡解的解析式,结果表明模型的结论是符合工程项目实际的,从而本模型能够为业主的激励合同设计提供指导.  相似文献   
9.
In a recent paper [Weng, Z.K., 2004. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: A generalized newsvendor model. European Journal of Operational Research 156, 148–161], a newsvendor-type coordination model was developed for a single-manufacturer single-buyer channel with two ordering opportunities. This paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order (if happened). We show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost, which is opposite to that obtained in Weng (2004). Another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system, the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel’s benefit rather than based on the buyer’s benefit as in Weng (2004). It is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in Weng (2004). In order to maximize the expected profit of the channel, two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination: a two-part-tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost, and a revised revenue-sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost.  相似文献   
10.
We consider a real option model in which a principal funds an agent to implement a project. Success depends on the quality of the project as well as the unknown ability of the agent. The possibility of the agent diverting project implementation funds to his private uses creates an agency problem which leads to delayed investment and over-experimentation. The principal prefers to fund an agent who is overconfident about his ability and such overconfidence reduces inefficiency due to agency problem.  相似文献   
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