工程招投标中的激励机制分析

本文试图利用博弈理论 ,对工程招投标过程中存在的现象进行分析 ,并建立了相应的对策模型 .目的是通过所建模型讨论工程招投标过程中招投标双方的对策及博弈 ,力图达到一种均衡  

优质猪肉供应链中养猪场的行为选择机理及其优化策略研究

实施供应链管理是优质猪肉生产的有效途径,养猪场行为是决定猪肉产品质量安全的关键.本文依据博弈理论和方法,分析了优质猪肉供应链中养猪场和公司行为选择的机理,导出了双方行为选择的混合战略纳什均衡点.研究表明:降低风险偏好、监督成本和违约超常收益,增加违约惩罚、违约潜在损失、违约信用损失、供应链内外收益差和合作期限,是优化养猪场行为选择的有效途径,据此从强制性和诱致性两种作用入手提出了6种基本优化策略.  

Explicit Stability Zones for Cournot Game with 3 and 4 Competitors

The dynamical system of 3 and 4 competitors in a Cournot game is studied. The stability of its fixed points (Nash-equilibria) are also investigated. The stable and unstable regions are explicitly shown. The bifurcation characteristics are found. Periodic orbits with different periods 7, 25, 18, 13, 17 etc., are detected in both cases. The study of these models is very rich in bifurcation phenomena.  

Basin-wide cooperative water resources allocation

The Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) is designed within a general mathematical programming framework for modeling equitable and efficient water allocation among competing users at the basin level and applied to a large-scale water allocation problem in the South Saskatchewan River Basin located in southern Alberta, Canada. This comprehensive model consists of two main steps: initial water rights allocation and subsequent water and net benefits reallocation. Two mathematical programming approaches, called the priority-based maximal multiperiod network flow (PMMNF) method and the lexicographic minimax water shortage ratios (LMWSR) technique, are developed for use in the first step. Cooperative game theoretic approaches are utilized to investigate how the net benefits can be fairly reallocated to achieve optimal economic reallocation of water resources in the second step. The application of this methodology to the South Saskatchewan River Basin shows that CWAM can be utilized as a tool for promoting the understanding and cooperation of water users to achieve maximum welfare in a river basin and minimize the potential damage caused by water shortages, through water rights allocation, and water and net benefit transfers among water users under a regulated water market or administrative allocation mechanism.  

多目标决策问题的博弈论方法初探

本通过对多目标决策中常用解法的改进，提出了运用博弈论的方法求解多目标评价的思想，讨论了相互冲突的目标决策和非合作博弈问题中的三种类型，并给出了相应的求解路径。  

农户生产合作博弈模型

合作是广大分散的小规模经营的农户进入市场、改善自身经济地位的有效途径。本文从农户之间相互作用、相互影响的角度出发，用博弈模型对农户之间合作的动机和制约因素进行了合理的解释。结果表明：一次性博弈和重复博弈无法使农户摆脱合作失败的困境，引入激励机制，成立农户自愿参加的合作组织是适合我国国情的农户合作之路。  

保险公司与医院合作的博弈分析

本文在委托-代理理论的框架下构建了在医疗保险风险控制过程中保险公司与医院的委托-代理模型,分析了这种合作的可行性;并运用无限期重复博弈模型探讨了合作的稳定性,同时引证国外管理医疗模式下的POS组织的实例 ,揭示了保险公司与医院之间应该建立"利益共享,风险共担"的有效的激励机制.  

公共物品私人供给的纳什均衡分析

按私人供给的决定方式，公共物品可以划分为三类，替代型、互补型和包含型。本采用博弈论的方法，通过模型对三种情况下参与方的供给决策行为进行分析，并求出纳什均衡解，章最后讨论了所求解的合理性，并通过比较提出了一些有益的结论和启示。  

Solution concepts in two-person multicriteria games

In this paper, we propose new solution concepts for multicriteria games and compare them with existing ones. The general setting is that of two-person finite games in normal form (matrix games) with pure and mixed strategy sets for the players. The notions of efficiency (Pareto optimality), security levels, and response strategies have all been used in defining solutions ranging from equilibrium points to Pareto saddle points. Methods for obtaining strategies that yield Pareto security levels to the players or Pareto saddle points to the game, when they exist, are presented. Finally, we study games with more than two qualitative outcomes such as combat games. Using the notion of guaranteed outcomes, we obtain saddle-point solutions in mixed strategies for a number of cases. Examples illustrating the concepts, methods, and solutions are included.  

产学研合作收益分配的博弈分析

产学研的合作促进了科研成果的产业化进程,同时也加速了企业的产品创新.但由于收益分配的不合理,导致了许多产学研合作的失败.从博弈论的观点来看产学研的组建和运行过程,建立了合作收益最优分配系数模型,分析了考虑学研方技术风险条件下的合作收益分配系数,并对合作各方在协议的收益分配方案下会如何进行自己的最优行动选择进行了非合作博弈分析.