财政支出、电力消费与农民收入的时空特征分析

本文将财政农业人均支出和农村人均用电量作为解释变量,农民人均纯收入作为被解释变量,利用2000-2005年中国31个省、市和自治区的有关时空数据,建立相应的空间自回归模型.模型数据统计分析表明:a)农民人均纯收入不仅存在空间自相关的特点,而且具有异质性;b)农民人均收入对财政农业人均支出、农村人均用电量存在明显的空间依赖性;c)用财政农业支出和农村用电量来反映农民收入水平十分有效,且都具有显著的正面影响.据此,文章提出了一些有针对性的提高农民收入的政策建议.     

Tiebout and sympathy

In its simplest form the Tiebout hypothesis suggests that redistribution by local government is not sustainable because individuals, when confronted by negative net fiscal benefits, will vote with their feet, changing their residential locations to jurisdictions which offer a more favorable fiscal balance. It is usually thought, moreover, that they will move (e.g. from central city to suburbs) in descending order of income.Recognition of extended preference modifies this simple characterization of the tiebout process, in which the process of relocation is like ‘peeling an onion’. Any relocation sequence is possible, with either sympathy or antipathy. Even for sympathetic individuals with identical tastes, restrictive and unrealistic assumptions are required to predict, with certainty, that individuals with higher incomes would be the first to move. In particular the marginal tax rate must exceed unity. With antipathy, individuals with lower incomes may move before those with higher incomes, even if net fiscal benefits decrease with income, if they become more willing to begrudge transfers to others as their incomes increase.     

地方政府竞争、重复建设及其规制政策分析

分权体制下地方政府竞争引发的重复建设和产业同构问题影响了区域经济的协调发展。本文构建了地方政府投资博弈的重复建设模型,并在此基础上探讨使地方政府行为从产业竞争转向合作的激励机制和制度安排。研究发现:在中国垂直的政治管理体制下,中央政府实施对高利润行业征税或者对低利润行业补贴或者两者并举的政策,可以降低重复建设率,且两者并举的双重激励制度效果最优。这些制度安排在保持地方政府发展经济积极性的同时,约束地方政府竞争行为,有利于区域产业体系的完善和区域经济的和谐发展。     

分权体制下地方政府财政支出的环境效应研究

运用2000~2015年31个省级行政单位的数据,构建固定效应面板模型,实证研究分权体制下地方政府支出的环境效应.以"工业三废"作为环境质量衡量指标,考虑到中国式财政分权对地方财政支出的影响,引入财政分权度与财政支出规模的交叉项进行研究.研究结果显示:财政支出对环境质量的影响具有不确定性,财政分权与"工业三废"存在正相关关系,且通过财政支出规模间接的对"工业三废"产生负向影响.分权体制下政府财政支出规模对环境质量的影响存在区域差异,财政分权通过财政支出规模对高污染区域的"工业三废"减排作用最大,中度污染区域次之,轻度污染区域最小.     

财政腐败的宏观经济分析:一个理论框架

建立了一个考虑税收腐败和公共支出腐败的经济增长模型,从理论上探讨财政腐败行为及其影响.主要结论归纳:第一,财政腐败降低私人资本的回报率,使厂商的生产力下降,就整体而言阻碍了经济增长.第二,最优税率可能大于或小于Barro的最优税率,取决于征税效率和寻租引发的行政成本,第三,两种类型的公共支出隐含着不同程度的腐败机会,以...     

官员腐败的经济学分析及对策研究——基于信号传递博弈模型

针对官员腐败现象,从经济学的视角出发,在信息不对称条件下展开分析,基于斯宾塞的劳动力模型弓l入信号传递模型的建立廉洁声誉信号博弈模型.通过分析,得出官员选择存在逆向选择问题的结论,并进一步研究了分离精炼贝叶斯均衡及其影响.在分离均衡范围一定存在的情况下,建立财产公示制度、加强监督、提高查处力度以及高薪养廉对策能配合模型系统地提高反腐效果.     

腐败的三方动态博弈模型及其治理对策

本建立了腐败问题的三方动态博弈模型，并求出博弈模型的均衡解模型，根据均衡解，提出了治理腐败问题的对策。     

Organized vs. Competitive Corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighing off the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibility for the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impact on equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption. To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings: (1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individual utility (competitive corruption); (2) An illegal syndicate oversees the corruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way as to maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions and corruption is lower when it is organized than when it is competitive.     

1953-1998我国政府间转移支付的统计分析

本文分析了 1953-1998年间我国政府间转移支付制度,分析是在不同经济体制、财政体制下,通过研究各地区财政资金净流入流出量的状况对各地区预算内、外财政收入弹性等因素的影响来进行的,结论是我国各地区的经济发展差异很大,“抽肥补瘦”式的政府间转移支付只能在中央集权的财政体制中得到实施,地方财政分权只能局限于地方公共产品供应范围内。过度分权只能助长地方保护主义,破坏统一市场的形成。     

地方财政公共文化服务支出的效率评价——基于三阶段DEA窗口模型

利用三阶段DEA窗口模型对2005-2014年我国其中31个省市自治区的公共文化服务支出效率进行评估,结果表明:环境因素和随机误差对我国公共文化服务支出效率有显著影响;我国公共文化服务支出效率的总体水平较高,但呈下降趋势;我国公共文化服务支出效率存在明显的地区差异,且地区间效率水平无收敛趋势.