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1.
有限理性条件下演化博弈行为分析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
基于博弈双方有限理性的假设,运用动力系统的相关理论和方法对一般2×2非对称演化博弈过程建立了动态复制方程,并对博弈双方在演化过程中的行为进行了分析,得出博弈双方交互系统均衡点及稳定性相应的结论及其全部动力学行为.  相似文献
2.
A selection mutation predator prey model for the distribution of individuals with respect to an evolutionary trait is considered. Existence of steady states is proved using the theory of positive semigroups. We show that these steady states tend to concentrate, when the mutation rate is small, at the so-called evolutionary stable value of the trait in the sense of adaptive dynamics of the corresponding ecological model.  相似文献
3.
This paper develops a one-population (indirect) evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer/supplier and many (a sufficiently large number of) retailers to study how the retailer’s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price, its observability, the error probability of the observed result on the rival’s preference, the market scale and the retailer’s bargaining power. This paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer. We find that the profit (revenue) maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high (low). Given an appropriate wholesale price, the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers’ population. The larger the market scale, the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price. The cross effects of the retailer’s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process.  相似文献
4.
In this paper, we study the single-population evolutionary game and construct an algorithm to find evolutionarily stable strategies. Finally, by an example, we illuminate the computing process of algorithm.  相似文献
5.
The concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) has been central to applications of game theory in evolutionary biology, and it has also had an influence on the modern development of game theory. A regular ESS is an important refinement the ESS concept. Although there is a substantial literature on computing evolutionarily stable strategies, the precise computational complexity of determining the existence of an ESS in a symmetric two-player strategic form game has remained open, though it has been speculated that the problem is -hard. In this paper we show that determining the existence of an ESS is both -hard and -hard, and that the problem is contained in , the second level of the polynomial time hierarchy. We also show that determining the existence of a regular ESS is indeed -complete. Our upper bounds also yield algorithms for computing a (regular) ESS, if one exists, with the same complexities.  相似文献
6.
In this paper, we discuss the concepts of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) and global invader strategy (GIS) in n‐species systems. We give their definitions both on system level and species level. Although the definition on system level and that on species level are apparently different, it is found that they are equivalent to one another. About the relationships among an ESS, an NIS and a GIS for n‐species systems, we obtain the results similar to the ones for single species models: a GIS must be an NIS; an NIS must be an ESS; an ESS may not be a GIS; a GIS must be unique. The stability in the frequency dynamics with two phenotypes is also considered and the global stability of a GIS is shown. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献
7.
We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.Received October 2001/Revised May 2003  相似文献
8.
研究包含生产同质电力产品的两组 (种群 )企业——低成本发电企业和高成本发电企业的发电侧电力市场的长期均衡问题 .应用演化博弈论的有限种群演化稳定战略概念 ,证明了有限种群的演化稳定战略产量分别等于两组 (种群 )企业的竞争产量 .通过建立基于企业战略模仿和试验的随机演化模型 ,分析了发电侧电力市场长期均衡的演化过程 .  相似文献
9.
In this paper, the formats of Julia sets for a class of nonlinear complex dynamic systems with variable coefficients were studied under certain conditions. For the complex dynamic systems in piecewise cases, we proposed some methods to control the forms of their Julia sets and stable domains analytically. What’s more, we illustrated that our methods worked well by computational simulations. Our work provides a better understanding about how to control the Julia sets of certain complex dynamic systems.  相似文献
10.
ABSTRACT. The evolutionary stability concepts continuously stable strategies (CSS) and evolutionarily stable neighborhood invader strategies (ESNIS) share two properties in common. First, they are both evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Secondly, given any strategy in the close neighborhood of the CSS or ESNIS, there are some strategies that are closer to the CSS or ESNIS that can invade it. An ESNIS is a CSS but the converse is not true in general. We examine evolutionary adaptive dynamics in the neighborhood of a CSS that is not an ESNIS. We show that if an evolutionary game possesses a CSS which is not an ESNIS, the succession of strategies mediated by natural selection become arbitrarily close to the CSS but the precise value of the CSS cannot be attained unless the CSS is the first strategy to invade into the environment and is henceforth never perturbed. Thus if evolution does not start with the CSS that is not an ESNIS, we will have a phenomenon of bounded evolutionary succession that does not come to an end. The analysis is applied to a class of monomorphic population evolutionary game models in which species ecological interaction is modeled by the Lotka‐Volterra equations.  相似文献
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