局部分数阶拉普拉斯算子的狄利克雷问题弱解的细正则性

In this paper, we study the Holder regularity of weak solutions to the Dirichlet problem associated with the regional fractional Laplacian (-△)^αΩ on a bounded open set Ω ■R(N ≥ 2) with C^(1,1) boundary ■Ω. We prove that when f ∈ L^p(Ω), and g ∈ C(Ω), the following problem (-△)^αΩu = f in Ω, u = g on ■Ω, admits a unique weak solution u ∈ W^(α,2)(Ω) ∩ C(Ω),where p >N/2-2α and 1/2< α < 1. To solve this problem, we consider it into two special cases, i.e.,g ≡ 0 on ■Ω and f ≡ 0 in Ω. Finally, taking into account the preceding two cases, the general conclusion is drawn.     

Normal approximation and fourth moment theorems for monochromatic triangles

Given a graph sequence denote by T₃(G_n) the number of monochromatic triangles in a uniformly random coloring of the vertices of G_n with colors. In this paper we prove a central limit theorem (CLT) for T₃(G_n) with explicit error rates, using a quantitative version of the martingale CLT. We then relate this error term to the well-known fourth-moment phenomenon, which, interestingly, holds only when the number of colors satisfies . We also show that the convergence of the fourth moment is necessary to obtain a Gaussian limit for any , which, together with the above result, implies that the fourth-moment condition characterizes the limiting normal distribution of T₃(G_n), whenever . Finally, to illustrate the promise of our approach, we include an alternative proof of the CLT for the number of monochromatic edges, which provides quantitative rates for the results obtained in [7].     

The value function of a transportation problem

We investigate the value of an optimal transportation problem with the maximization objective as a function of costs and vectors of production and consumption. The value is concave in production. For generic costs, the numbers of linearity domains and peak points are independent of costs and consumption. The peak points are determined by an auxiliary assignment problem. The volumes of the linearity domains are independent of costs while their dependence on consumption can be expressed via the multinomial distribution.     

Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.