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We consider a problem of derivatives design under asymmetry of information: the principal sells a contingent claim to an agent, the type of whom he does not know. More precisely, the principal designs a contingent claim and prices it for each possible agent type, in such a way that each agent picks the contingent claim and pays the price that the principal designed for him. We assume that the preferences of the agent depend linearly on the parameters which determine the agent’s type; this model is rich enough to accommodate quadratic utilities. The problem then is reformulated as an optimization problem, where the optimization is performed within a class of convex functions. We prove an existence result for the provide explicit examples in the case when the agent is fully characterized by a single parameter  相似文献
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This paper develops an adverse selection model for a two-stage supply chain with one supplier, one retailer, and a potential outside entrant supplier who makes a partially substitutable product. The work is different from most research on entry deterrence that only considers a single-stage model. Our main interest is to investigate how the incumbent supplier can strategically maximize her profit by a wholesale pricing policy when facing the potential entrant. We focus on a model where the entrant supplier will sell her product through the same incumbent retailer. We derive the optimal decisions for each player and study the comparative statics of the equilibrium. To investigate how the supply chain structure may affect the deterrence strategy of the incumbent supplier, we also consider three alternative models with different channel structures, when both suppliers sell their products directly, when the entrant has another independent retailer, and when the entrant sells her product directly. Through the comparison, we find that the existence of the common downstream retailer often enhances the deterring motivation of the incumbent supplier.  相似文献
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Using data from China’s individual health-insurance market, we study the problem of information asymmetry. Our preliminary results appear to contradict standard-model predictions, showing that higher-risk buyers are more likely to purchase “additional” insurance than lower-risk buyers, but that they also tend to purchase lower limits of “basic” insurance coverage. We therefore develop a theoretical model to capture the effects of buyers’ wealth levels and loss amounts, and show empirically that these effects, in the context of asymmetric information, lead to the coexistence of adverse selection and advantageous selection in China’s health-insurance market.  相似文献
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