Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.     

不同补贴对象下闭环供应链信息共享价值研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级闭环供应链中,为研究政府补贴下供应链需求信息共享对决策的影响及共享价值,针对两种补贴对象,构建并求解无信息共享和信息共享博弈模型,并进行仿真验证.研究表明:1)两种补贴对象下,制造商均能从信息共享中获益,零售商仅在绿色成本和回收成本较低时才会从信息共享中获益;绿色成本和回收成本稍高时,设计基于谈判势力的信息补偿机制能有效促进零售商共享信息.2)产品绿色度和回收率随预测需求量的提高而提高,批发价和零售价仅在回收成本较低时,才会随预测需求量的提高而提高.3)在仅补贴一方情况下,当补贴对象为低补贴一方时,两个主体所获的信息共享价值大;若对两者的补贴均较低,两个主体均希望补贴对象为零售商;若对两者的补贴均较高,零售商不愿共享需求信息.     

政府监管下的医院医疗信息分享演化博弈分析

在分析政府监管下医院间医疗信息分享特征的基础上,结合我国当前正在推行的医联体医院间信息分享运作模式,引入梅特卡夫定律并考虑患者评价的影响,分析了监管部门与医院各自的利益组成,建立了监管部门与医院两者之间的演化博弈模型,并采用复制动态方程研究了不同情形下医院间信息分享的演化博弈轨迹。研究表明,政府通过监管并建立激励惩罚机制等引导措施对医院最终达到的演化稳定态具有极大影响;降低医院主体信息分享的风险成本、规范提高医院分享信息的质量、引导患者增强对医院信息分享的关注、制定有吸引力和威慑力的奖惩政策,是促进医院医疗信息分享的关键。研究结果可为政府监管部门预测医院间的信息分享趋势和制定精准化政策以促进分享提供参考。     

基于碳关税和配额的再制造决策研究

在跨国闭环供应链中考虑碳关税、碳配额和碳税三种政策的影响,分别建立了出口国制造商(OEM)再制造模型和OEM授权进口国零售商进行再制造模型,得到不同模型中OEM和零售商的最优价格、最优销售量、最优利润,进一步分析了产品碳排放总量是否超过配额的不同情形下新产品碳排放量对新产品和再制造品价格、销售量的影响以及其中碳关税和碳税发挥的作用.结果表明,在配额限制下,存在碳关税、碳税以及两种政策共同约束的取值区间,当税率水平在不同区间时,新产品碳排放量对两种产品的价格、销售量有不同的影响.     

A dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit adjustments

We study a dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit of firms under general demand and cost functions. We show that the number of firms in a steady-state open-loop solution for a dynamic free-entry oligopoly is smaller than that at static equilibrium and that the number of firms in a steady-state memoryless closed-loop solution is larger than that in an open-loop solution.     

基于演化博弈的公共交通、共享汽车与私家车的博弈分析

出行者的选择行为分析是交通系统中的一项重要内容,随着城市的发展,交通出行方式大体分为三大类:公共交通出行、辅助公共交通出行和私人交通出行。本文在以往的研究基础上,采用演化博弈的方法研究公共交通、共享汽车以及私家车三者之间的博弈关系,模拟出行者的选择行为,分析博弈均衡点稳定性及参数条件。通过模型仿真实验,演化结果中各项比例大小取决于各项收益、补贴、损失以及额外收益,要增加公共交通的配套设施,增收拥堵费以及增加对共享汽车的补贴及配套服务。     

基于FDI收益分成视角的FTA网络演化

本文假定双边自由贸易协定(bilateral free trade agreement,简称FTA)包含着无限制对外直接投资(foreign direct investment,简称FDI),并且通过FDI销售到非FTA伙伴国的收益按照一定比例在母国和东道国之间进行分配。基于Goyal和Joshi^[1],本文构建了FTA网络形成博弈模型。本文发现,FTA网络演化过程分为两个阶段:第一阶段,从空FTA网络到星状FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利、世界总福利均改善,在此过程中,国家福利存在不对称性;第二阶段,从星状FTA网络到全连接FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利改善,在此过程中,世界总福利不变,国家福利不对称性逐步消除。     

Cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the second-order reputation evaluation

The existence of reputation can significantly promote the level of cooperation within the human population. In the recent years, most of the researches were based on binary image score or first-order evaluation standard. In this paper, we propose a second-order reputation evaluation model, in which the individual's image score will change not only in accordance with his own strategy, but also the reputation value of neighbors. Individuals try to enhance their reputation to cooperate with the surrounding high-reputation individuals, and then becomes an influential individual in the population. The existence of this mechanism renders the individuals who at the edge of the clusters formed by the cooperators to rapidly accumulate their reputation values through the adoption of cooperative strategy, and then the cooperative strategy can be spread widely and rapidly in the whole population. Through extensive numerical simulations, it is clearly indicated that the population cooperation behavior will be obviously improved when the individual's influence factor becomes smaller or the reputation step length increases. The current results are further conducive to understanding the emergence of cooperation in many real world systems.