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Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in manufacturer-retailer channels   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
The problem of establishing efficiency in a manufacturer-retailer channel (channel coordination) is extensively discussed in the industrial economics, the marketing and the operations research literature. However, studies considering consumer demand to be simultaneously affected by price and non-price variables are scarce. One subset of models investigates efficient contracts with non-linear tariffs, but requires mechanisms which are rarely observed in managerial practice. The other subset analyses channel efficiency effects of alternative royalty payments, but omits to design an efficient contract. We contribute to this literature by investigating a contract of royalty payments that is sufficient for channel coordination. Based on the analysis of the underlying vertical externalities, we show that channel coordination requires cost and revenue sharing via a revenue sharing rate and marketing effort participation rates on both manufacturer and retailer level. Some surprising findings are highlighted: there exists a continuum of efficient contracts. Efficiency requires a retailer’s participation of at least 50% in the manufacturer’s cost of marketing effort. Moreover, the elimination of double marginalisation is not necessary for channel coordination. Manufacturer and retailer can choose an efficient contract via bargaining over the wholesale price. The main challenge for managers will be to create acceptance of new types of royalty payments based on a trustful manufacturer-retailer relationship. We also discuss the cases of the Apple iPhone market launch and of innovative restaurant franchising to further illustrate and underline the relevance of our results.  相似文献
On the role of revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The supply chain coordinating role of revenue-sharing has, to date, been examined only in static models. With downstream competition, the central conclusion in these models is negative: revenue-sharing cannot, except in degenerate form, achieve coordination. Incorporating dynamics, by allowing inventory carryover in discrete time, this paper establishes a foundation for revenue-sharing contracts in aligning incentives.  相似文献
竞争环境下双渠道供应链的决策与协调研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
基于收益共享契约协调的二级供应链, 在考虑市场竞争环境中需求转移为非线性的情况下,探讨供应商增加直销渠道的条件,并研究双渠道供应链中供应商在直销渠道上的最优定价,总的最优生产量及零售商的最优订货量,研究表明,在一定直销渠道建设成本范围内,供应商加入直销渠道会增加供应商以及供应链的总期望收益,但会减小零售商的期望收益.文中通过解析和数值分析指出,供应商采用网络收益共享契约可以减小零售渠道与直销渠道的冲突,提高系统收益,实现双渠道供应链的协调.  相似文献
基于需求和生产成本偏差的Cournot竞争供应链协调   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
分析一个供应商和两个Cournot竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,为使供应链收益最大,提出了调整生产计划和零售价格的协调策略,进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本偏差的分权供应链;最后进行了数值实验.  相似文献
当供应商受到生产能力限制时,单位产品生产成本会随产量的提高而增加。而订货量增加时,零售商会尽力实现自己的销售目标,销售成本会随订货量递增。综合考虑单位产品生产成本递增和销售成本递增,以及市场需求函数为相乘型形式,以一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,建立了基于收益共享契约的协调模型,研究发现零售商订购量增加,供应商会提高批发价格,但它会主动替零售商承担一部分递增的销售成本,其承担比例与其占零售商销售收益的份额成正比关系,可实现供应链的完美协调。最后,进行数值分析验证了研究结论。  相似文献
This paper studies channel coordination through revenue sharing contract between a single retailer and a single wholesaler in a two-period newsboy problem. Two models are discussed, a single-buying-opportunity model and a two-buying-opportunity model. We discuss how the revenue sharing ratio and the wholesale prices are to be determined in order to achieve channel coordination and a win–win outcome. We find that the wholesale prices are set to be lower than the retail prices and the optimal revenue sharing ratio is linearly increasing in the wholesale prices. The proposed revenue sharing contract has more flexibility than price protection, in that the optimal revenue sharing ratio can be settled reasonably through negotiation between the retailer and wholesaler.  相似文献
使用收益分享合同获得渠道协调   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
考虑单周期库存(报童)类型的供应链协调问题,制造商将采用两种方式销售给零售商:直接销售方式(也称批发价合同)和收益分享方式.在收益分享方式中,零售商支付给制造商的批发价将小于直接由零售商购买时的批发价,但零售商必须将部分收益与制造商分享.文研究借助数值方法分析了制造商采用收益分享合同时的效果并证明收益分享合同可以获得渠道协调(帕累托提高).  相似文献
Products that are not recycled at the end of their life increasingly damage the environment. In a collection – remanufacturing scheme, these end-of-life products can generate new profits. Designed on the personal computers industry, this study defines an analytical model used to explore the implications of recycling on the reverse supply chain from an efficiency perspective for all participants in the process. The cases considered for analysis are the two- and three-echelon supply chains, where we first look at the decentralized reverse setting followed by the coordinated setting through implementation of revenue sharing contract. We define customer willingness to return obsolete units as a function of the discount offered by the retailer in exchange for recycling devices with a remanufacturing value. The results show that performance measures and total supply chain profits improve through coordination with revenue sharing contracts on both two- and three-echelon reverse supply chains.  相似文献
We analyze a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under consignment sales with a revenue sharing contract. The manufacturer produces before, but charges price to sell the products through the retailer after the demand curve is revealed. The retailer deducts a fraction from the selling price for each unit sold and remits the balance to manufacturer. We refer to the capability whereby firms delay price decision and make sales in response to actual market condition as postponement. We find that, when market demand admits a multiplicative structure, the revenue share and allocation of channel profit between the firms when they have postponement capability are similar to when they do not have such capability. Postponement improves the profits of individual firms. Such an effect is more phenomenal in the centralized system than in decentralized system, and when the market demand is more sensitive to price changes. However, it causes the profit loss, defined as the percentage deviation of channel profit in the decentralized system relative to the centralized system, to worsen, and the gap widens with retailer’s sales cost. When the demand has an additive structure, while the roles of postponement on firms’ decisions differ slightly from those under the multiplicative structure, the structure of the strategic interactions between firms and relative channel performance are not significantly altered.  相似文献
Alliances allow the airlines to extend their networks and increase the number of destinations they can access. Different from the traditional single airline approach, in an alliance, partner airlines may sell tickets for the same itinerary. In addition, one itinerary may consist of several flight legs, each of which may be operated by a different airline. A major issue that needs to be addressed is how to share the revenue generated from selling a ticket for a product among the individual airlines in a fair way. The fair allocation of the revenue has a critical importance for the long-term stability of the alliance. We model the problem as a cooperative game and show that the core of the game is non-empty. We propose to use a revenue proration scheme based on the concept of the nucleolus. The numerical studies reveal that the revenue shares can effectively be computed even for large alliance networks.  相似文献
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