首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   29篇
  国内免费   1篇
  数学   30篇
  2019年   1篇
  2016年   1篇
  2014年   2篇
  2013年   3篇
  2012年   3篇
  2011年   3篇
  2010年   1篇
  2009年   1篇
  2008年   4篇
  2007年   5篇
  2006年   2篇
  2004年   1篇
  2001年   1篇
  1996年   1篇
  1993年   1篇
排序方式: 共有30条查询结果,搜索用时 250 毫秒
1.
In this paper, we provide several extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem from single-valued mappings to set-valued mappings on chain-complete posets. Then we examine some non-monetized, non-cooperative games where both the collections of the strategies and the ranges of the utilities for the players are posets. By applying the extensions of the Abian–Brown Fixed Point Theorem and by applying the order-preserving property of mappings, we prove some existence theorems of extended and generalized Nash equilibria for non-monetized, non-cooperative games on chain-complete posets.  相似文献
2.
We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm’s type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs.  相似文献
3.
分析了包含一个供应商和两个不同零售商的供应链网络的协调问题.将这一问题构建为一个两层次的博弈模型:零售商之间的非合作博弈以及供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈.博弈的均衡表明,通过简单的价格歧视,供应商就能够实现整个供应链网络的协调,而且价格歧视的水平与零售商之间的市场容量差异、产品需求的价格敏感系数以及产品的边际生产成本有关.在合理的参数范围内,市场容量更大的零售商所收取的零售价格较低,从供应商那里取货的成本也较低.这样的结论是比较符合现实情形的,这也就说明该模型为现实世界中的价格差异提供了另一种解释.此外,还分析了当供应商无法实施价格歧视时,由此导致的供应链的损失.  相似文献
4.
Two manufacturers produce substitutable goods for a homogeneous market. The advertising efforts of the two manufacturers determine the demand for the goods and interfere negatively with each other. The demand of each good is a piecewise linear function of the product goodwill, and the latter is a linear function of advertising efforts. In a game with two competing profit-maximizing manufacturers who have access to a set of several advertising media, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are characterized and their existence is shown.  相似文献
5.
In this note we prove the existence of minmax points for strategic form games where the sets of strategies are topological spaces and the payoff functions satisfy conditions weaker than continuity. The employed tools are the class of transfer weakly upper continuous functions and the class of weakly lower pseudocontinuous functions. An example shows that our result is of minimal character.  相似文献
6.
The goal of this paper is to study Nash Equilibrium (NE) existence of some game-theoretic pricing models. In Soon et al. [17], deterministic pricing models incorporating a complete demand system were proposed. As in those models, the demand function is defined via a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP), the models’ pricing constraints include complementarity conditions. When incorporated within a game, the best response problem facing each seller is a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints. A randomized version of this pricing problem will be introduced in this work and the issue of NE existence will be discussed for both the deterministic and random pricing games.  相似文献
7.
Early mobile phones only provided voice transmission, for a fee. They have now evolved into voice and online data portals for providing additional services through 3rd party vendors. These service providers (vendors) are given access to a customer base “owned” by the mobile phone companies, for a fee. Typically customers make two payments: to the mobile phone company for phone services and to the 3rd party vendors for specific services bought from them. Variations to the above business model may involve outsourcing the online portal and/or acquiring customers from other independent portals. For these scenarios, we study how the fees for phone service and customer access are established and how they may relate to the prices of vendor services, and which services should be located on the portal - all in a game-theoretic context. Our results prove that it is possible to reorganize revenue flows through an invoicing process that may benefit the mobile network operator more than the other parties. In addition, we establish optimality in terms of the number of vendors on the portal, and determine a rank-ordering of vendors for their inclusion into the portal.  相似文献
8.
In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. The non-cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strategy solution concept, where we consider separately the case when the seller is the leader (Seller-Stackelberg) and also when the buyer is the leader (Buyer-Stackelberg). Pareto efficient solutions will be provided for the cooperative game model. Numerical examples presented in this paper, including sensitivity analysis of some key parameters, will compare the results between different models considered.  相似文献
9.
In this paper the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria in mixed strategies is central. Sufficient conditions are given under which approximate equilibria exist for non-finite Bayesian games. Further one possible approach is suggested to the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria for the class of multicriteria Bayesian games.  相似文献
10.
This paper contributes to the supply chain contracts literature in economics and operations by performing qualitative sensitivity analysis of a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon supply chain setting. Order-theory tools are used to derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity of contract parameters.The upstream supplier is modeled as a Stackelberg leader. The supplier is assumed to have complete information about the costs and revenue function of the downstream retailer. It is shown that an equilibrium wholesale price weakly increases with an increase in the supplier production cost rate, but it may increase or decrease with an increase in the retailer cost rate. As either the supplier production cost or the retailer cost increases, the supplier profit decreases weakly. Additional sensitivity analysis is performed assuming certain properties of the retailer revenue function.Several well-known results in the supply chain contracting literature can be considered as special cases of the more general theorems developed here. In particular, this paper reexamines the analysis of a newsvendor supply chain problem by Lariviere and Porteus [Lariviere, M.A., Porteus, E.L., 2001. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3, 293–305]. This paper generalizes and extends their work, by establishing properties of the newsvendor demand distribution that guarantee monotonicity of the contract parameters, without requiring a unique contract solution.  相似文献
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号