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Competitive location problems can be characterized by the fact that the decisions made by others will affect our own payoffs. In this paper, we address a discrete competitive location game in which two decision-makers have to decide simultaneously where to locate their services without knowing the decisions of one another. This problem arises in a franchising environment in which the decision-makers are the franchisees and the franchiser defines the potential sites for locating services and the rules of the game. At most one service can be located at each site, and one of the franchisees has preferential rights over the other. This means that if both franchisees are interested in opening the service in the same site, only the one that has preferential rights will open it. We consider that both franchisees have budget constraints, but the franchisee without preferential rights is allowed to show interest in more sites than the ones she can afford. We are interested in studying the influence of the existence of preferential rights and overbidding on the outcomes for both franchisees and franchiser. A model is presented and an algorithmic approach is developed for the calculation of Nash equilibria. Several computational experiments are defined and their results are analysed, showing that preferential rights give its holder a relative advantage over the other competitor. The possibility of overbidding seems to be advantageous for the franchiser, as well as the inclusion of some level of asymmetry between the two decision-makers. 相似文献
3.
Marc Levy 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,215(2):411-421
In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers. Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the Banzhaf index. This paper firstly offers a new algorithm to compute this index in all structures and then suggests some modelisations of the floating shareholder. Then, our model is applied to a real case study: the French group Lafarge. This exemplary case demonstrates how the float’s structure and hidden coalition can impact the power relationship between dominant shareholders. 相似文献
4.
J.M. Díaz-Báñez M. Heredia B. Pelegrín P. Pérez-Lantero I. Ventura 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,214(1):91-98
In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. If firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy Nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served. We present characterizations of local and global Nash equilibria. Then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible Nash equilibrium pairs of locations. The minimization of the social cost leads to a Nash equilibrium. An example shows that there may exist multiple Nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost. 相似文献
5.
Chunming Shi Shilei YangYu Xia Xuan Zhao 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,215(2):367-373
Inventory competition for newsvendors (NVs) has been studied extensively under the objective of expected profit maximization which is based on risk neutrality. In this paper, we study this classic problem under the objective of profit satisficing which is based on downside-risk aversion. Consistent with prior literature, we consider two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, each NV’s demand depends on the stocking levels of all NVs other than herself. In this scenario, we show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium where all NVs optimally order as if they were independent. In the second scenario, each NV’s demand depends on the stocking levels of all NVs including herself. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for both additive and multiplicative forms of demands. As a special case, we also study symmetrical NVs under the proportional allocation model. We show that at equilibrium, if the number of NVs exceeds a threshold, the market becomes highly competitive. 相似文献
6.
George F. Georgakopoulos 《Discrete Mathematics》2009,309(13):4332-379
We consider the problem of routing a number of communication requests in WDM (wavelength division multiplexing) all-optical networks from the standpoint of game theory. If we view each routing request (pair of source-target nodes) as a player, then a strategy consists of a path from the source to the target and a frequency (color). To reflect the restriction that two requests must not use the same frequency on the same edge, conflicting strategies are assigned a prohibitively high cost.Under this formulation, we consider several natural cost functions, each one reflecting a different aspect of restriction in the available bandwidth. For each cost function we examine the problem of the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the complexity of recognizing and computing them and finally, the problem in which we are given a Nash equilibrium and we are asked to find a better one in the sense that the total bandwidth used is less. As it turns out some of these problems are tractable and others are NP-hard. 相似文献
7.
K. Vela Velupillai 《Applied mathematics and computation》2009,215(4):1404-1416
Economic theory, game theory and mathematical statistics have all increasingly become algorithmic sciences. Computable Economics, Algorithmic Game Theory[Noam Nisan, Tim Roiughgarden, Éva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani (Eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007] and Algorithmic Statistics[Péter Gács, John T. Tromp, Paul M.B. Vitányi, Algorithmic statistics, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 47 (6) (2001) 2443-2463] are frontier research subjects. All of them, each in its own way, are underpinned by (classical) recursion theory - and its applied branches, say computational complexity theory or algorithmic information theory - and, occasionally, proof theory. These research paradigms have posed new mathematical and metamathematical questions and, inadvertently, undermined the traditional mathematical foundations of economic theory. A concise, but partial, pathway into these new frontiers is the subject matter of this paper. Interpreting the core of mathematical economic theory to be defined by General Equilibrium Theory and Game Theory, a general - but concise - analysis of the computable and decidable content of the implications of these two areas are discussed. Issues at the frontiers of macroeconomics, now dominated by Recursive Macroeconomic Theory (The qualification ‘recursive’ here has nothing to do with ‘recursion theory’. Instead, this is a reference to the mathematical formalizations of the rational economic agent’s intertemporal optimization problems, in terms of Markov Decision Processes, (Kalman) Filtering and Dynamic Programming, where a kind of ‘recursion’ is invoked in the solution methods. The metaphor of the rational economic agent as a ‘signal processor’ underpins the recursive macroeconomic paradigm.), are also tackled, albeit ultra briefly. The point of view adopted is that of classical recursion theory and varieties of constructive mathematics. 相似文献
8.
In distributed computing, the recent paradigm shift from centrally-owned clusters to organizationally distributed computational grids introduces a number of new challenges in resource management and scheduling. In this work, we study the problem of Selfish Load Balancing which extends the well-known load balancing (LB) problem to scenarios in which each processor is concerned only with the performance of its local jobs. We propose a simple mathematical model for such systems and a novel function for computing the cost of the execution of foreign jobs. Then, we use the game-theoretic framework to analyze the model in order to compute the expected result of LB performed in a grid formed by two clusters. We show that, firstly, LB is a socially-optimal strategy, and secondly, for similarly loaded clusters, it is sufficient to collaborate during longer time periods in order to make LB the dominant strategy for each cluster. However, we show that if we allow clusters to make decisions depending on their current queue length, LB will never be performed. Then, we propose a LB algorithm which balances the load more equitably, even in the presence of overloaded clusters. Our algorithms do not use any external forms of compensation (such as money). The load is balanced only by considering the parameters of execution of jobs. This analysis is assessed experimentally by simulation, involving scenarios with multiple clusters and heterogeneous load. 相似文献
9.
In many parliamentary systems, election timing is an important decision made by governments in order to maximize their expected remaining life in power. Governments can also introduce policy or economic actions to enhance their popular standing and thus their chance of being re-elected. On the other hand, an oppositions’ natural objective is to gain power, and they will also apply controls through their own policies to reduce the governments’ chance of being re-elected. In this paper we employ a dynamic programming approach to determine the optimal timing for governments and oppositions to best utilize their limited resources. At each decision branch, the optimal control is interpreted as a Nash–Cournot equilibrium of a zero-sum political game which, in certain states, admits mixed strategy solutions. We perform a case study on the Australian Federal Election for House of Representatives. 相似文献
10.
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class. 相似文献