Response time and vendor–assembler relationship in a supply chain

Relationships between an assembler and a vendor in a supply chain are investigated in two-period models when the assembler wants to reduce response time by incentive systems. The assembler may offer myopic or farsighted incentive contracts to the vendor, under short-term or long-term relationships. Incentive schemes, effort levels, and expected payoffs under different perspectives and relationships are examined. We find that a farsighted assembler provides the vendor with a higher incentive than a myopic assembler in the first period. A long (short)-term relationship is preferred if the value of farsightedness under a long-term relationship is greater (less) than the switching option value under a short-term relationship. We propose several sufficient conditions regarding which perspectives and relationships are preferred.     

Contract and product quality in platform selling

More and more e-tailers (platforms) are allowing manufacturers direct access to customers. Two common contracts are offered by platforms to manufacturers: the revenue sharing contract where a platform appropriates a portion of the manufacturer’s revenue, and the fixed fee contract where a platform charges a fixed rent for each sale. Using an analytical model, this paper studies the interrelationship between a platform’s contract choice and a manufacturer’s product quality decision. We find that if product quality is exogenously given, the platform will always adopt the revenue sharing contract. If the manufacturer endogenously decides the quality, however, the platform’s contract choice may be changed. This is because the revenue sharing contract, compared to fixed fee, leads to a lower selling price of the manufacturer, whereas the fixed fee contract can motivate a higher quality than does revenue sharing. As a result, a large (small) market heterogeneity induces the platform to adopt the revenue sharing (fixed fee) contract. We also extend the model to several directions, finding that longer product line, manufacturer competition, lower marginal production cost, and higher platform cost all tend to induce the platform to put forward a fixed fee contract; while if quality decision is less flexible than contract decision, the platform is more ready to embrace revenue sharing. Besides, when there are two platforms competing for the same market, they should differentiate their contract choices so as to mitigate competition.     

On contracts for VMI program with continuous review (r, Q) policy

Based on continuous review (r, Q) policy, this paper deals with contracts for vendor managed inventory (VMI) program in a system comprising a single vendor and a single retailer. Two business scenarios that are popular in VMI program are “vendor with ownership” and “retailer with ownership”. Taking the system performance in centralized control as benchmark, we define a contract “perfect” if the contract can enable the system to be coordinated and can guarantee the program to be trusted. A revenue sharing contract is designed for vendor with ownership, and a franchising contract is designed for retailer with ownership. Without consideration of order policy and related costs at the vendor site, it is shown that one contract can perform satisfactorily and the other one is a perfect contract. With consideration of order policy and related costs at the vendor site, it is shown that one contract can perform satisfactorily and the performance of the other one depends on system parameters.     

Blow–Up Profiles in One–Dimensional. Semilinear Parabolic Problems

Partially supporte by CICYT Research Grant PB86–0112–00202 and EEC Contrast SCI–0019–c.

We consider the Cauchy Problem where p > 1 and U$sub:o$esub:(x) is continuous, nonnegative and bounded. Let u(x.t) be the solution of (1). (2). and assume that u blows up at t=T . and We then show that the blow–up set is discrete. Moreover, if x=0 is a blow–up point, one of the two following possibilities occurs. Either There exist c > 0 and an even number m such that     

Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.     

具有私人信息的道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约分析

本文对存在的不对称信息的环境下的具有私人信息道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约问题进行了详细的讨论,并得出一些有新意的结论.此讨论问题的方法很值得推荐和推广,特别是在最优激励合同中,比如投资激励,管理机制中的激励,销售激励,保险激励等合同的设计,都可以借鉴此方法来研究和分析.     

Contract-based scheme for computational resource allocation in cloud-assisted parked vehicular edge computing

Having shown promising performance with high flexibility and efficiency in vehicular edge computing (VEC) network, the parked vehicles (PVs) received an increasing number of attentions in recent years. However, PVs’ residual battery power restricts their running time. In addition, there is still no alternate resource pool for the PVs to cope with the emergencies in the previous VEC framework. To alleviate these problems, we model a cloud-assisted parked vehicular edge computing (PVEC) framework, in which the PVs are classified based on their residual battery power. PVs corporate with the cloud servers (CSs) for the computational resources provision. In addition, we formulate the utilities of the service provider (SP) and PVs and design a contract-based resource allocation problem for the maximization of the SP’s utility. Considering that it is intractable to solve the optimization problem directly, the primal problem is simplified and decoupled into two sub-problems. To design the optimal contracts, we solve the sub-problems by Lagrangian multiplier method and dual function. Simulation results prove that the utilities of PVs can reach to the maximum when they choose the contract corresponding to their types. In addition, the simulation results illustrate the superiority of proposed scheme over previous schemes in improving the utilities of the SP and social welfare.     

Analysis of a two-stage telecommunication supply chain with technology dependent demand

We analyze a two-stage telecommunication supply chain consisting of one operator and one vendor under a multiple period setting. The operator faces a stochastic market demand which depends on technology investment level. The decision variables for the operator are the initial technology investment level and the capacity of the network for each period. The capacity that the operator installs in one period also remains available in subsequent periods. The operator can increase or decrease the available capacity at each period. For this model, an algorithm to find the centralized optimal solution is proposed. A profit sharing contract where firms share both the revenue and operating costs generated throughout the periods along with initial technology investment is suggested. Also a coordinating quantity discount contract where the discount on the price depends on the total installed capacity is designed. The case where the vendor decides on the technology investment level and the operator decides on the capacity of the network is also analyzed and it is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium.     

Downside-risk测度下 闭环供应链风险共享契约研究

以具有下游风险的零售商和风险中性的制造商组成的闭环供应链系统为背景,分析提出了在Downside-risk约束下收益共享契约和批量折扣契约都不能使闭环供应链达到协调状态的结论.设计了一种收益共享和转移支付的组合机制来减轻风险约束的影响,使制造商和零售商能够达到双赢的结果,实现风险控制和闭环供应链协调.最后,通过数值分析验证了组合机制的可行性和有效性.     

贷款市场中基于最优博弈策略的激励契约

信贷风险是商业银行主要的信用风险,信贷风险分为企业的经营风险和企业违约赖账的道德风险.本文运用相关知识建立了双方的博弈模型,讨论了均衡状态下双方的最优博弈策略,通过制定合理的利率水平和惩罚力度来激励借款人按合同规定投资某项目而不去投资高风险项目,以达到有效控制道德风险的目的.