基于博弈论的促销商广告微分方程决策分析

将供应链看作为一个整体,他们需要经手一种新型时髦的商品或季节性商品,促销商作为供应链中一个独立的部门,专门负责季节性商品的促销工作,在供应链管理体系中处于一个核心地位,制造商与零售商则专门按照促销商提供的信息,专职从事制造与销售工作.以此假设为前提,分别建立了三类广告促销的微分方程对策模型,研究广告对季节性商品销售量的影响,以及在促进供应链整体绩效中的作用,进而确定合理的广告强度和时间.最后,在假设广告收益函数与成本函数服从均匀分布的情况下,由建立的广告决策模型得出了恰当的广告使用费用和时间.并由此得到了一些对决策有重要参考价值的结论.     

制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告模型研究

研究制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告问题.在需求不确定的情况下,建立了制造商和零售商的分散式与集中式系统下的合作广告模型,得到了不同系统下制造商和强势零售商的最优合作广告策略、强势零售商和边缘零售商的最优订货策略,及他们的最优期望利润.通过对不同系统下均衡结果的比较分析,证明了分散式系统存在不协调.设计了实现渠道协调的联合契约,指出分散式协调系统下的联合契约不唯一,契约参数两两正相关,广告补贴率、产品批发价格和回购价格是制造商和强势零售商力量平衡的焦点.     

Retail competition and cooperative advertising

We consider a cooperative advertising channel consisting of a manufacturer selling its product through a retailer in competition with another independent retailer. The manufacturer subsidizes its retailer’s advertising only when a certain threshold is positive. Moreover, the manufacturer’s support for its retailer is higher under competition than in its absence.     

Delayed effects of cooperative advertising in goodwill dynamics

This paper proposes a tool to control cooperative advertising which increases the goodwill of companies operating in a competitive market. We introduce the lag between advertising exposure and customer reaction in the goodwill dynamics evolved à la Nerlove–Arrow. As a result, we obtain a cooperative differential game with immediate and delayed effects of control variables for which we investigate the optimal solution. We examine the role the pre-coalition programmes and the length of delayed response in generating goodwill.