A genetic algorithm for the two-stage supply chain distribution problem associated with a fixed charge

This paper considers a two-stage distribution problem of a supply chain that is associated with a fixed charge. Two kinds of cost are involved in this problem: a continuous cost that linearly increases with the amount transported between a source and a destination, and secondly, a fixed charge, that incurs whenever there exists a transportation of a non-zero quantity between a source and a destination. The objective criterion is the minimisation of the total cost of distribution. A genetic algorithm (GA) that belongs to evolutionary search heuristics is proposed and illustrated. The proposed methodology is evaluated for its solution quality by comparing it with the approximate and lower bound solutions. Thus, the comparison reveals that the GA generates better solution than the approximation method and is capable of providing solution either equal or closer to the lower bound solution of the problem.     

Numerical calculation of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints

Producers submit offer curves to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before uncertain demand has been realised. In the supply function equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the offer curve that maximises its expected profit, given the offer curves of competitors. The equilibrium is given by a system of differential equations. In practice, it has been very difficult to find valid SFE, i.e. non-decreasing solutions, from this system, especially for asymmetric producers. This paper shows that valid SFE can be calculated by means of a shooting algorithm that combines numerical integration with an optimisation procedure that searches for an end-condition. Multiple/parallel shooting is used for ill-conditioned cases.     

Monotonicity properties of wholesale price contracts

This paper contributes to the supply chain contracts literature in economics and operations by performing qualitative sensitivity analysis of a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon supply chain setting. Order-theory tools are used to derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity of contract parameters.The upstream supplier is modeled as a Stackelberg leader. The supplier is assumed to have complete information about the costs and revenue function of the downstream retailer. It is shown that an equilibrium wholesale price weakly increases with an increase in the supplier production cost rate, but it may increase or decrease with an increase in the retailer cost rate. As either the supplier production cost or the retailer cost increases, the supplier profit decreases weakly. Additional sensitivity analysis is performed assuming certain properties of the retailer revenue function.Several well-known results in the supply chain contracting literature can be considered as special cases of the more general theorems developed here. In particular, this paper reexamines the analysis of a newsvendor supply chain problem by Lariviere and Porteus [Lariviere, M.A., Porteus, E.L., 2001. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3, 293–305]. This paper generalizes and extends their work, by establishing properties of the newsvendor demand distribution that guarantee monotonicity of the contract parameters, without requiring a unique contract solution.     

Supply chain optimization of petroleum organization under uncertainty in market demands and prices

A multi-period stochastic planning model has been developed and implemented for a supply chain network of a petroleum organization operating in an oil producing country under uncertain market conditions. The proposed supply chain network consists of all activities related to crude oil production, processing and distribution. Uncertainties were introduced in market demands and prices. A deterministic optimization model was first developed and tested. The impact of uncertainty on the supply chain was studied by performing a sensitivity analysis in which ±20% deviations were introduced in market demands and prices of different commodities. A stochastic formulation was then proposed, which is based on the two-stage problem with finite number of realizations. The proposed stochastic programming approach proved to be quite effective in developing resilient production plans in light of high degree of uncertainty in market conditions. The anticipated production plans have a considerably lower expected value of perfect information (EVPI). The main conclusion of this study is that for an oil producing country with oil processing capabilities, the impact of economic uncertainties may be tolerated by an appropriate balance between crude exports and processing capacities.     

A fuzzy simple additive weighting system under group decision-making for facility location selection with objective/subjective attributes

This work presents a new fuzzy multiple attributes decision-making (FMADM) approach, i.e., fuzzy simple additive weighting system (FSAWS), for solving facility location selection problems by using objective/subjective attributes under group decision-making (GDM) conditions. The proposed system integrates fuzzy set theory (FST), the factor rating system (FRS) and simple additive weighting (SAW) to evaluate facility locations alternatives. The FSAWS is applied to deal with both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The FSAWS process considers the importance of each decision-maker, and the total scores for alternative locations are then derived by homo/heterogeneous group of decision-makers. Finally, a numerical example illustrates the procedure of the proposed FSAWS.     

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed.     

Single-vendor multi-buyer inventory coordination under private information

This paper considers the problem of coordinating a single-vendor multi-buyer inventory system when there are privacy restrictions in the information required to solve the problem. The objective function and cost parameters of each facility are regarded as private information that no other facilities in the system have access to. Moreover, each facility is responsible to specify its own replenishment policy. The objective is to minimize the total average setup/ordering and inventory-related cost. Solution methodologies under private and global information are developed to find two types of nested power-of-two stationary policies. The first policy assumes all the buyers must replenish simultaneously. The second policy is a more general case where the common replenishment assumption is relaxed. A simple form of information exchange is uncovered that allows the solution methodologies for private and global information yield the same results. The experimental results suggest that the performance of the proposed heuristics is comparable or better than an existing method.     

Reducing Cognitive Effort in Scoring Negotiation Space Using the Fuzzy Clustering Model

Negotiation scoring systems are fundamental tools used in negotiation support to facilitate parties searching for negotiation agreement and analyzing its efficiency and fairness. Such a scoring system is obtained in prenegotiation by implementing selected multiple criteria decision-aiding methods to elicit the negotiator’s preferences precisely and ensure that the support is reliable. However, the methods classically used in the preference elicitation require much cognitive effort from the negotiators, and hence, do not prevent them from using heuristics and making simple errors that result in inaccurate scoring systems. This paper aims to develop an alternative tool that allows scoring the negotiation offers by implementing a sorting approach and the reference set of limiting profiles defined individually by the negotiators in the form of complete packages. These limiting profiles are evaluated holistically and verbally by the negotiator. Then the fuzzy decision model is built that uses the notion of increasing the preference granularity by introducing a series of limiting sub-profiles for corresponding sub-categories of offers. This process is performed automatically by the support algorithm and does not require any additional preferential information from the negotiator. A new method of generating reference fuzzy scores to allow a detailed assignment of any negotiation offer from feasible negotiation space to clusters and sub-clusters is proposed. Finally, the efficient frontier and Nash’s fair division are used to identify the recommended packages for negotiation in the bargaining phase. This new approach allows negotiators to obtain economically efficient, fair, balanced, and reciprocated agreements while minimizing information needs and effort.     

Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition

This paper investigates a revenue-sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a revenue-sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season. Under the offered contract terms, the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer, prior to the season, and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season. The process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the Bayesian Nash game. On the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract. Adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods, the study finds that the provision of revenue-sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price-only contract. However, the benefits earned under the revenue-sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price-sensitivity factors. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price, order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers. Lastly, it investigates how the competition (between retailers) factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

A genetic algorithm for optimizing defective goods supply chain costs using JIT logistics and each-cycle lengths

The competitive environment of global markets has forced many manufacturers to select the most appropriate supply chain network (SCN) for reduction of total costs and wasted time. Cost reduction and selection of the appropriate length of each period are two important factors in the competitive market that are often not addressed comprehensively by researchers. In our study, we proposed genetic algorithms (GAs) for optimising a novel mathematical model of the defective goods supply chain network (DGSCN). In the proposed model, we assumed that all imperfect-quality products are not repairable, whereas those considered as scrap are directly sold to customers at a low price. The objective of the proposed model is to minimise the costs of production, distribution, holding and backorder. In addition to minimising the costs, the model can determine the economic production quantity (EPQ), the appropriate length of each cycle (ALOEC) and the quantities of defective products, scrap products and retailer shortages using Just-In-Time logistics (JIT-L). We used the GAs and a Cplex solver with probability parameters and various dimensions for validation of the studied model in real-life situations, and we compared the outputs to demonstrate the performance of the model. Additionally, to identify the appropriate length of each cycle (ALOEC), we needed to solve the model using exact parameters and same dimensions and prefer to use Lingo for this application.