When Can Statistical Theories Be Causally Closed?

The notion of common cause closedness of a classical, Kolmogorovian probability space with respect to a causal independence relation between the random events is defined, and propositions are presented that characterize common cause closedness for specific probability spaces. It is proved in particular that no probability space with a finite number of random events can contain common causes of all the correlations it predicts; however, it is demonstrated that probability spaces even with a finite number of random events can be common cause closed with respect to a causal independence relation that is stronger than logical independence. Furthermore it is shown that infinite, atomless probability spaces are always common cause closed in the strongest possible sense. Open problems concerning common cause closedness are formulated and the results are interpreted from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle (RCCP).     

Complexity-entropy causality plane: A useful approach to quantify the stock market inefficiency

The complexity-entropy causality plane has been recently introduced as a powerful tool for discriminating Gaussian from non-Gaussian process and different degrees of correlations [O.A. Rosso, H.A. Larrondo, M.T. Martín, A. Plastino, M.A. Fuentes, Distinguishing noise from chaos, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99 (2007) 154102]. We propose to use this representation space to distinguish the stage of stock market development. Our empirical results demonstrate that this statistical physics approach is useful, allowing a more refined classification of stock market dynamics.     

Macroscopic Determinism in Interacting Systems Using Large Deviation Theory

We consider the quasi-deterministic behavior of systems with a large number, n, of deterministically interacting constituents. This work extends the results of a previous paper [J. Statist. Phys. 99:1225–1249 (2000)] to include vector-valued observables on interacting systems. The approach used here, however, differs markedly in that a level-1 large deviation principle (LDP) on joint observables, rather than a level-2 LDP on empirical distributions, is employed. As before, we seek a mapping _t on the set of (possibly vector-valued) macrostates such that, when the macrostate is given to be a ₀ at time zero, the macrostate at time t is _t (a ₀) with a probability approaching one as n tends to infinity. We show that such a map exists and derives from a generalized dynamic free energy function, provided the latter is everywhere well defined, finite, and differentiable. We discuss some general properties of _t relevant to issues of irreversibility and end with an example of a simple interacting lattice, for which an exact macroscopic solution is obtained.     

Local Causality and Completeness: Bell <Emphasis Type="Italic">vs.</Emphasis> Jarrett

J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook writers and other commentators, that Bell’s own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some other such principle that (unlike local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway. Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell’s own. Here we try to shed some light on the situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell’s theorem, and, in particular, by contrasting Bell’s own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We point out a crucial difference between Jarrett’s and Bell’s own understanding of Bell’s formulation of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem.