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We conduct a simple principal-agent experiment in order to find the effects of information asymmetry on compensation. Our aim is the analysis of the appropriate compensation and its impact on employee’s effort. Furthermore we want to compare the offered compensation and the supplied effort in the version without communication and we want to know whether the experimental observations are consistent with the theoretical considerations.The experimenters found out that compensations observed during the experiment were different from those suggested by the theory and although they were theoretically not enough to induce high effort, we could observe high performance supplied by the agents. 相似文献
13.
Eitan Altman Konstantin Avrachenkov Merouane Debbah Daniel Sadoc Menasche 《Operations Research Letters》2008,36(2):160-164
We study non-cooperative constrained stochastic games in which each player controls its own Markov chain based on its own state and actions. Interactions between players occur through their costs and constraints which depend on the state and actions of all players. We provide an example from wireless communications. 相似文献
14.
Andreas Polymris 《Discrete Applied Mathematics》2008,156(14):2636-2646
We have extended a two player game-theoretical model proposed by V. Gurvich [To theory of multi-step games, USSR Comput. Math and Math. Phys. 13 (1973)] and H. Moulin [The Strategy of Social Choice, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1983]: All the considered game situations are framed by the same game structure. The structure determines the families of potential decisions of the two players, as well as the subsets of possible outcomes allowed by pairs of such choices. To be a solution of a game, a pair of decisions has to determine a (pure) functional equilibrium of the situational pair of payoff mappings which transforms the realized outcome into real-valued rewards of the players. Accordingly we understand that a structure is stable, if it admits functional equilibria for all possible game situations; and that it is complete, if every situation that only partitions the potential outcomes, is dominated by one of the players. We have generalized and strengthened a theorem by V. Gurvich [Equilibrium in pure strategies, Soviet Math. Dokl. 38 (1989)], proving that a proper structure is stable iff it is complete. Additional results provide game-theoretical insight that focuses the inquiry on the complexity of the stability decision problem; in particular, for coherent structures.These results also have combinatorial importance because every structure is characterized by a pair of hypergraphs [C. Berge, Graphes et Hypergraphes, Dunod, 1970] over a common ground set. The structure is dual (complete/coherent) iff the clutter of one hypergraph equals (includes/is included in) the blocker of the other one. So, for non-void coherent structures, the stability decision problem is equivalent to the much studied subexponential [M.L. Fredman, L. Khachiyan, On the complexity of dualization of monotone disjunctive normal forms, J. Algorithms 21 (1996)] hypergraph duality decision problem. 相似文献
15.
Producers submit offer curves to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before uncertain demand has been realised. In the supply function equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the offer curve that maximises its expected profit, given the offer curves of competitors. The equilibrium is given by a system of differential equations. In practice, it has been very difficult to find valid SFE, i.e. non-decreasing solutions, from this system, especially for asymmetric producers. This paper shows that valid SFE can be calculated by means of a shooting algorithm that combines numerical integration with an optimisation procedure that searches for an end-condition. Multiple/parallel shooting is used for ill-conditioned cases. 相似文献
16.
博弈期权是由kifer(2000)提出的,但就其本质而言,仍是美式期权的一种,只是增加了卖方中止合约的权利.本文主要对连续市场模型中具交易费用和限制投资组合的博弈未定权益的保值问题进行了研究,给出了买卖双方的保值价格和一个无套利区间. 相似文献
17.
Emission trading schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS) attempt to reconcile economic efficiency with ecological efficiency by creating financial incentives for companies to invest in climate-friendly innovations. Using real options methodology, we demonstrate that under uncertainty, economic and ecological efficiency continue to be mutually exclusive. This problem is even worse if a climate-friendly project depends on investing in of a whole supply chain. We model a sequential bargaining game in a supply chain where the parties negotiate over implementation of a carbon dioxide (CO2) saving investment project. We show that the outcome of their bargaining is not economically efficient and even less ecologically efficient. Furthermore, we show that a supply chain becomes less economically efficient and less ecologically efficient with every additional chain link. Finally, we make recommendations for how managers or politicians can improve the situation and thereby increase economic as well as ecological efficiency and thus also the eco-efficiency of supply chains. 相似文献
18.
This paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising, a topic which has gained substantial interest in the recent years. Thereby, we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature. After that, we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising, which is the most common object of investigation and is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer’s advertising expenditures. In total, we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising. These articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting (e.g., the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program). After that, we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed, whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models. The last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game-theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel. 相似文献
19.
In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost). 相似文献
20.
This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity, scale economies, and production policy have an important influence on the capacity outcomes when firms compete in the market place. We formulate a game-theoretical model where each firm has an existing capacity and faces both fixed and variable costs in purchasing additional capacity. Specifically, the firms simultaneously (or sequentially) make their expansion decisions, and then simultaneously decide their production decisions with these outputs being capacity constrained. We also compare our results with cases where production has to match capacity. By characterizing the firms’ capacity and production choices in equilibrium, our analysis shows that the operational factors play a crucial role in determining what happens. The modeling and analysis in the paper gives insight into the way that the ability to use less production capacity than has been built will undermine the commitment value of existing capacity. If a commitment to full production is not possible, sinking operational costs can enable a firm to keep some preemptive advantage. We also show that the existence of fixed costs can introduce cases where there are either no pure strategy equilibrium or multiple equilibria. The managerial implications of our analysis are noted in the discussion. Our central contribution in this paper is the innovative integration of the strategic analysis of capacity expansion and well-known (s,S) policy in operations and supply chain theory. 相似文献