Edge-based-attack induced cascading failures on scale-free networks

Most previous existing works on cascading failures only focused on attacks on nodes rather than on edges. In this paper, we discuss the response of scale-free networks subject to two different attacks on edges during cascading propagation, i.e., edge removal by either the descending or ascending order of the loads. Adopting a cascading model with a breakdown probability p of an overload edge and the initial load (k_ik_j)^α of an edge ij, where k_i and k_j are the degrees of the nodes connected by the edge ij and α is a tunable parameter, we investigate the effects of two attacks for the robustness of Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free networks against cascading failures. In the case of α<1, our investigation by the numerical simulations leads to a counterintuitive finding that BA scale-free networks are more sensitive to attacks on the edges with the lowest loads than the ones with the highest loads, not relating to the breakdown probability. In addition, the same effect of two attacks in the case of α=1 may be useful in furthering studies on the control and defense of cascading failures in many real-life networks. We then confirm by the theoretical analysis these results observed in simulations.     

The evolutionary public goods game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous investment

The public goods game (PGG) is generally considered as a suitable paradigm to explain ubiquitous cooperative behavior. In this study, we investigated the evolutionary PGG on scale-free networks and studied the effect of individual heterogeneity by setting the cooperator x an investment value correlated to its degree as I_x=N⋅k_x^β/∑_jk_j^β, where k_x is the degree of x, j runs over all players and β is a tunable parameter. It is shown that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted by negative values of β whereas it is highly depressed by positive values of β. Moreover, the effect of environmental noise has also been investigated. Our result may sharpen the understanding of cooperation induced by the individual diversity.     

Evolutionary games on scale-free networks with a preferential selection mechanism

Considering the heterogeneity of individuals’ influence in the real world, we introduce a preferential selection mechanism to evolutionary games (the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and the Snowdrift Game) on scale-free networks and focus on the cooperative behavior of the system. In every step, each agent chooses an individual from all its neighbors with a probability proportional to k^α indicating the influence of the neighbor, where k is the degree. Simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on α. To understand the effect of preferential selection mechanism on the evolution of the system, we investigate the time series of the cooperator frequency in detail. It is found that the cooperator frequency is greatly influenced by the initial strategy of hub nodes when α>0. This observation is confirmed by investigating the system behavior when some hub nodes’ strategies are fixed.     

A model for cascading failures in scale-free networks with a breakdown probability

Considering that not all overload nodes will be removed from networks due to some effective measures to protect them, we propose a new cascading model with a breakdown probability. Adopting the initial load of a node j to be L_j=[k_j(∑_m∈Γjk_m)]^α with k_j and Γ_j being the degree of the node j and the set of its neighboring nodes, respectively, where α is a tunable parameter, we investigate the relationship between some parameters and universal robustness characteristics against cascading failures on scale-free networks. According to a new measure originated from a phase transition from the normal state to collapse, the numerical simulations show that Barabási-Albert (BA) networks reach the strongest robustness level against cascading failures when the tunable parameter α=0.5, while not relating to the breakdown probability. We furthermore explore the effect of the average degree 〈k〉 for network robustness, thus obtaining a positive correlation between 〈k〉 and network robustness. We then analyze the effect of the breakdown probability on the network robustness and confirm by theoretical predictions this universal robustness characteristic observed in simulations. Our work may have practical implications for controlling various cascading-failure-induced disasters in the real world.     

无标度网络上队列资源分配研究

研究了节点队列资源有限的条件下,无标度网络上的信息流动力学过程,发现了网络由自由流通到拥塞的相变现象,提出了一种基于节点度的队列资源分配模型.模型的核心是使节点i的队列长度与kβi成正比(ki为节点i的度,β为分配参数).仿真结果表明,在网络使用最短路径算法进行信息包传送的条件下,β近似等于1.25时队列资源分配最合理,网络容量最大,且该最佳值与队列总资源多少以及网络的规模无关.     

Traffic dynamics in scale-free networks with limited packet-delivering capacity

We propose a limited packet-delivering capacity model for traffic dynamics in scale-free networks. In this model, the total node’s packet-delivering capacity is fixed, and the allocation of packet-delivering capacity on node i is proportional to , where k_i is the degree of node i and ? is a adjustable parameter. We have applied this model on the shortest path routing strategy as well as the local routing strategy, and found that there exists an optimal value of parameter ? leading to the maximal network capacity under both routing strategies. We provide some explanations for the emergence of optimal ?.     

Attack vulnerability of scale-free networks due to cascading failures

In this paper, adopting the initial load of a node i to be with k_i being the degree of the node i, we propose a cascading model based on a load local redistribution rule and examine cascading failures on the typical network, i.e., the BA network with the scale-free property. We find that the BA scale-free network reaches the strongest robustness level in the case of α=1 and the robustness of the network has a positive correlation with the average degree 〈k〉, where the robustness is quantified by a transition from normal state to collapse. In addition, we further discuss the effects of two different attacks for the robustness against cascading failures on our cascading model and find an interesting result, i.e., the effects of two different attacks, strongly depending to the value α. These results may be very helpful for real-life networks to avoid cascading-failure-induced disasters.     

The effect of asymmetric payoff mechanism on evolutionary networked prisoner’s dilemma game

In social and biological systems, there are obvious individual divergence and asymmetric payoff phenomenon due to the strength, power and influence differences. In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff mechanism to evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) on scale-free networks. The co-effects of individual diversity and asymmetric payoff mechanism on the evolution of cooperation and the wealth distribution under different updating rules are investigated. Numerical results show that the cooperation is highly promoted when the hub nodes are favored in the payoff matrix, which seems to harm the interest of the majority. But the inequality of social wealth distribution grows with the unbalanced payoff rule. However, when the node difference is eliminated in the learning strategy, the asymmetric payoff rule will not affect the cooperation level. Our work may sharpen the understanding of the cooperative behavior and wealth inequality in the society.     

Spectral methods and cluster structure in correlation-based networks

We investigate how in complex systems the eigenpairs of the matrices derived from the correlations of multichannel observations reflect the cluster structure of the underlying networks. For this we use daily return data from the NYSE and focus specifically on the spectral properties of weight W_ij=|C|_ij−δ_ij and diffusion matrices D_ij=W_ij/s_j−δ_ij, where C_ij is the correlation matrix and s_i=∑_jW_ij the strength of node j. The eigenvalues (and corresponding eigenvectors) of the weight matrix are ranked in descending order. As in the earlier observations, the first eigenvector stands for a measure of the market correlations. Its components are, to first approximation, equal to the strengths of the nodes and there is a second order, roughly linear, correction. The high ranking eigenvectors, excluding the highest ranking one, are usually assigned to market sectors and industrial branches. Our study shows that both for weight and diffusion matrices the eigenpair analysis is not capable of easily deducing the cluster structure of the network without a priori knowledge. In addition we have studied the clustering of stocks using the asset graph approach with and without spectrum based noise filtering. It turns out that asset graphs are quite insensitive to noise and there is no sharp percolation transition as a function of the ratio of bonds included, thus no natural threshold value for that ratio seems to exist. We suggest that these observations can be of use for other correlation based networks as well.     

Properties of wealth distribution in multi-agent systems of a complex network

We present a simple model for examining the wealth distribution with agents playing evolutionary games (the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game) on complex networks. Pareto’s power law distribution of wealth (from 1897) is reproduced on a scale-free network, and the Gibbs or log-normal distribution for a low income population is reproduced on a random graph. The Pareto exponents of a scale-free network are in agreement with empirical observations. The Gini coefficient of an ER random graph shows a sudden increment with game parameters. We suggest that the social network of a high income group is scale-free, whereas it is more like a random graph for a low income group.     

Growing random networks with fitness

Three models of growing random networks with fitness-dependent growth rates are analysed using the rate equations for the distribution of their connectivities. In the first model (A), a network is built by connecting incoming nodes to nodes of connectivity k and random additive fitness η, with rate (k−1)+η. For η>0 we find the connectivity distribution is power law with exponent γ=〈η〉+2. In the second model (B), the network is built by connecting nodes to nodes of connectivity k, random additive fitness η and random multiplicative fitness ζ with rate ζ(k−1)+η. This model also has a power law connectivity distribution, but with an exponent which depends on the multiplicative fitness at each node. In the third model (C), a directed graph is considered and is built by the addition of nodes and the creation of links. A node with fitness (α,β), i incoming links and j outgoing links gains a new incoming link with rate α(i+1), and a new outgoing link with rate β(j+1). The distributions of the number of incoming and outgoing links both scale as power laws, with inverse logarithmic corrections.     

A new deterministic complex network model with hierarchical structure

We introduce a new simple pseudo tree-like network model, deterministic complex network (DCN). The proposed DCN model may simulate the hierarchical structure nature of real networks appropriately and have the unique property of ‘skipping the levels’, which is ubiquitous in social networks. Our results indicate that the DCN model has a rather small average path length and large clustering coefficient, leading to the small-world effect. Strikingly, our DCN model obeys a discrete power-law degree distribution P(k)∝k^−γ, with exponent γ approaching 1.0. We also discover that the relationship between the clustering coefficient and degree follows the scaling law C(k)∼k⁻¹, which quantitatively determines the DCN's hierarchical structure.     

General compliance transformation relation and applications for anisotropic hexagonal metals

In anisotropic crystals, the compliance (s_ij) and the stiffness (c_ij) matrices are usually specified in the orthogonal coordinate systems (X₁,Y₁,Z₁), which do not coincide with the crystal axes (X,Y,Z) used commonly, excepting cubic and orthorhombic crystal systems, and must be transformed to an arbitrary orthogonal coordinate system chosen to be convenient for the question. Such a transformation has been done in this paper for hexagonal crystals and a general compliance transformation relation is given. Accordingly, the useful expressions of the Young’s modulus E(hkl), Poisson’s ratio υ(hkl) and X-ray elastic constants (XREC) and are also given in terms of the Miller indices of the lattice plane (hkl) in the crystal axes (X,Y,Z) used commonly.     

Antiferromagnetic Ising model in scale-free networks

The antiferromagnetic Ising model in uncorrelated scale-free networks has been studied by means of Monte Carlo simulations. These networks are characterized by a connectivity (or degree) distribution P(k) ∼k^-γ. The disorder present in these complex networks frustrates the antiferromagnetic spin ordering, giving rise to a spin-glass (SG) phase at low temperature. The paramagnetic-SG transition temperature T_c has been studied as a function of the parameter γ and the minimum degree present in the networks. T_c is found to increase when the exponent γ is reduced, in line with a larger frustration caused by the presence of nodes with higher degree.     

Connection between scale-free networks and nonextensive statistical mechanics

The degree distribution of the so-called scale-free networks exhibits, quite often, the form p(k) ∝1/(k₀+k)^γ (with γ>0 and k₀>0), in the limit of large networks. It happens that this form precisely coincides with the q-exponential p(k) ∝exp _q(-k/κ) (q ≥1 and κ>0), with γ=1/(q-1) and k₀=κ/(q-1). It optimises the nonadditive entropy with mathematically the same constraints that yield the stationary (or quasi-stationary) distribution in nonextensive statistical mechanics. In other words, the most ubiquitous form of the degree distribution of scale-free networks is a realisation of the hypothesis involved within the q-generalisation of Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical mechanics. In addition to this, we show that growth is not a necessary condition for having scale-free networks, in contrast with a widely spread belief.     

Promotion of cooperation induced by nonuniform payoff allocation in spatial public goods game

A nonuniform payoff allocation mechanism is proposed for spatial public goods games where individuals are nodes on a scale-free network. Each individual is assigned a weight k_i ^α, where k_i is the degree of individual i and α is an adjustable parameter that controls the degree of diversity in individuals’ profits. During the evolution progress, the allocation of payoff on individual i is assumed to be proportional to its weight. Individuals synchronously update their strategies according to the stochastic rule with a fixed noise level. It is found that there exists an optimal value of α which yields the highest level of cooperation. Other pertinent quantities, including the payoff and the probability of finding a node playing as cooperator versus the degree, are also investigated computationally and analytically. Our results suggest that a suitable degree of diversity among individuals can promote the emergence of cooperation.     

Scale-free networks by super-linear preferential attachment rule

A network growth model with geographic limitation of accessible information about the status of existing nodes is investigated. In this model, the probability Π(k) of an existing node of degree k is found to be super-linear with Π(k)∼k^α and α>1 when there are links from new nodes. The numerical results show that the constructed networks have typical power-law degree distributions P(k)∼k^−γ and the exponent γ depends on the constraint level. An analysis of local structural features shows the robust emergence of scale-free network structure in spite of the super-linear preferential attachment rule. This local structural feature is directly associated with the geographical connection constraints which are widely observed in many real networks.     

Adjacency networks

We consider a finite set S={x₁,…,x_r} and associate to each element x_i a probability p_i. We then form sequences (N-strings) by drawing at random N elements from S with respect to the probabilities assigned to them. Each N-string generates a network where the elements of S are represented as vertices and edges are drawn between adjacent vertices. These structures are multigraphs having multiple edges and loops. We show that the degree distributions of these networks are invariant under permutations of the generating N-strings. We describe then a constructive method to generate scale-free networks and we show how scale-free topologies naturally emerge when the probabilities are Zipf distributed.     

Other-regarding preference and the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex networks

Prevailing models of the evolutionary prisoner’s game on networks always assume that agents are pursuing their own profit maximization. But the results from experimental games show that many agents have other-regarding preference. In this paper, we study the emergence of cooperation from the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks while some agents exhibit other-regarding preference such as inequality aversion, envious and guilty emotions. Contrary to common ideas, the simulation results show that the existence of inequality aversion agents does not promote cooperation emergence on a BA (Barabási and Albert) scale-free network in most situations. If the defection attraction is big and agents exhibit strong preference for inequality aversion, the frequency of cooperators will be lower than in situations where no inequality aversion agents exist. In some cases, the existence of the inequality agents will even induce the frequency of cooperators to zero, a feature which is not observed in previous research on the prisoner’s dilemma game when the underlying interaction topology is a BA scale-free network. This means that if an agent cares about equality too much, it will be difficult for cooperation to emerge and the frequency of cooperators will be low on BA networks. The research on the effect of envy or guilty emotions on the emergence of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on BA networks obtains similar results, though some differences exist. However, simulation results on a WS (Watts and Strogatz) small-world network display another scenario. If agents care about the inequality of agents very much, the WS network favors cooperation emergence in the prisoners’ dilemma game when other-regarding agents exist. If the agent weight on other-regarding is lowered, the cooperation frequencies emerging on a WS network are not much different from those in situations without other-regarding agents, although the frequency of cooperators is lower than those of the situation without other-regarding preference agents sometimes. All the simulation results imply that inequality aversion and its variations can have important effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and different network topologies have different effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game played on complex networks.     

An analytic approach to the measurement of nestedness in bipartite networks

We present an index that measures the nestedness pattern of bipartite networks, a problem that arises in theoretical ecology. Our measure is derived using the sum of distances of the occupied elements in the incidence matrix of the network. This index quantifies directly the deviation of a given matrix from the nested pattern. In the simplest case the distance of the matrix element a_i,j is d_i,j=i+j, the Manhattan distance. A generic distance is obtained as d_i,j=(i^χ+j^χ)^1/χ. The nestedness index is defined by ν=1−τ, where τ is the “temperature” of the matrix. We construct the temperature index using two benchmarks: the distance of the complete nested matrix that corresponds to zero temperature and the distance of the average random matrix where the temperature is defined as one. We discuss an important feature of the problem: matrix occupancy ρ. We address this question using a metric index χ that adjusts for matrix occupancy.