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1.
本文在考虑政府奖惩机制下,研究零售商主导的闭环供应链中成员的动态均衡策略,其中制造商负责回收再制造,回收率随时间动态变化。分别构建了三种模式下的Stackelberg微分博弈模型:政府不对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制、政府只对制造商实施奖惩机制以及政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制。运用贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论,求解了三种模式下制造商和零售商的决策均衡结果并进行了对比分析,从消费者剩余价值和成员利润的视角证明了政府实施奖惩机制的有效性。最后通过算例对成员均衡策略进行了稳态分析和非稳态分析。研究结果表明:政府的奖惩机制能够正确引导闭环供应链成员做出最优决策,有利于减缓分散决策所带来的双重边际效应,提高消费者剩余价值。零售商分担回收责任会削减政府对制造商回收的激励作用,降低闭环供应链整体利润。相比之下,政府只对制造商实施奖惩机制是最优模式选择,可以同时提高经济和环保双重效益。  相似文献   

2.
研究考虑消费者低碳偏好的闭环供应链回收、碳减排与专利授权决策问题。分别构建制造商回收再制造、零售商回收再制造支付固定专利费、零售商回收再制造支付单位专利费的闭环供应链模型,分析低碳消费者比例、普通消费者对再制品的接受程度及碳权交易价格,对企业回收、碳减排及定价决策的影响,并比较了三种模式下企业及供应链的利润。研究表明:随着市场中低碳消费者比例及普通消费者对再制品接受程度的提高,总会使得回收率及碳减排率增加;碳权交易价格的提高,也会促使制造商提高碳减排率;对制造商来说,其利润在零售商回收再制造且支付固定专利费用下实现最优。从自身利润最优的角度出发,作为领导者的制造商将总是选择零售商回收再制造且支付固定专利费用模式。  相似文献   

3.
A closed-loop supply chain is a complex system in which node enterprises play important roles and exert great influence. Firstly, this paper established a collecting price game model for a close-loop supply chain system with a manufacturer and a retailer who have different rationalities. It assumed that the node enterprises took the marginal utility maximization as the basis of decision-making. Secondly, through numerical simulation, we analyzed complex dynamic phenomena such as the bifurcation, chaos and continuous power spectrum and so on. Thirdly, we analyzed the influences of the system parameters; this further explained the complex nonlinear dynamics behavior from the perspective of economics. The results have significant theoretical and practical application value.  相似文献   

4.
在双渠道环境下,针对不同渠道权力结构对闭环供应链最优决策的影响情况,构建了三种分散化(制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈以及由制造商和零售商构成的Nash均衡博弈)和一种集中化的闭环供应链决策模型,并得出了相关的均衡策略。在此基础上进一步有针对性的设计了两种契约相结合的契约机制协调供应链,并利用数值算例分析验证所得结论以及契约机制的有效性与可实践性,同时分析模型中的一些重要参数如渠道替代系数、传统渠道所占市场份额、废旧产品回收率、再制造成本节约等对双渠道供应链各项最优决策及渠道利润的影响。  相似文献   

5.
研究奖惩机制下零售商的信息分享策略以及对闭环供应链的影响,建立了由制造商和零售商以及消费者组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商负责回收废旧产品并进行再制造。分别研究了集中式决策的情形和分散式决策下零售商信息分享和不分享的情形。研究发现,若政府在社会总福利目标中不考虑奖惩成本且回收难度较小时,零售商信息分享使社会总福利提高,反之,导致社会总福利降低;零售商信息分享总会使消费者剩余的期望值降低,但能够提高废旧产品的回收率。最后,针对零售商信息分享引起社会福利提高的情况设计了回收责任分担契约激励零售商分享信息。关键词:信息分享;奖惩机制;闭环供应链;社会福利;消费者剩余  相似文献   

6.

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) decision-making involves many uncertainties, which makes the decision-making process more complex and diversified. This study considered a two-stage CLSC consisting of an original manufacturer and a third-party recycler. Without any government policy support, considering the effects of market demand, product return rate, and consumer perceived value, a CLSC decision model based on market demand with a [0,1] distribution was established. The model analyzes three situations—a manufacturer monopoly, the Cournot duopoly game, and the Stackelberg competition game—and solves them. The optimal values of decision variables such as optimal pricing, market demand, and all parties’ profits in the CLSC are obtained, and a strict mathematical proof is given. Through the model-solving process, the effects of product return rate and consumer perceived value on decision variables are analyzed; then, the profit allocation between the original manufacturer and the third-party recycler under different cooperation modes is analyzed. In addition, the four combinations of competition and cooperation are analyzed based on game theory. The Nash equilibrium solution and Pareto optimal solution of the four modes are analyzed by drawing a bimatrix Nash equilibrium table. The results indicate that the cooperation–cooperation mode is difficult to produce automatically, and government policy guidance and support are often needed to achieve Pareto optimality. Finally, a numerical example is given to validate the proposed model. In this way, the proposed model provides reliable theoretical support for the decision-making of both sides in a CLSC.

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7.
双渠道闭环供应链的三种回收模式的建模分析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
针对生产商负责网上直销、零售商负责网下零售、且具有回收再制造功能的双渠道闭环供应链,首先分析了生产商负责产品回收和零售商负责产品回收下生产商和零售商之间的博弈行为,建立了刻画两种回收模式的两层规划模型;进而假定生产商委托第三方企业负责回收,分析了生产商、零售商和第三方回收企业之间的博弈行为,建立了对应此一主两从博弈结构的带均衡约束的两层规划模型.对所得模型进行了模型求解,得到了三种回收模式下双渠道闭环分散式供应链的最优直销价、零售价和回收再制造率决策.通过数值算例对上述三种回收模式进行了比较分析,并对刻画网上直销吸引力的相关参数进行了灵敏度分析.研究发现,生产商负责回收时的回收再制造率最高;网上直销具有激发潜在需求(正效应)和吸引零售市场需求发生转移(负效应)的双重效应等.  相似文献   

8.
在对称信息框架下,针对零售商存在风险厌恶特性的双渠道闭环供应链,基于Stackelberg博弈理论探讨了不同的回收再制造模式下(制造商不回收再制造、制造商独立回收再制造、制造商依托零售商回收再制造)供应链各主体的运作决策。研究发现,在不同回收再制造模式下,制造商与风险厌恶的零售商合作能够获得更多收益。市场波动的增大对供应链各主体并非始终是有害的,随着市场波动的增大,带有风险厌恶的零售商收益不断减小,而风险中性的双渠道制造商收益逐步增大,零售商风险厌恶特性为制造商带来了更多的收益。制造商独立回收再制造以及通过零售商进行回收再制造时,双渠道产品定价均低于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的定价,双渠道需求和利润均高于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的渠道需求和利润,即回收再制造模式不仅为下游顾客带来了更多的消费实惠,同时也为供应链各主体带来了更多的收益。  相似文献   

9.
以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。  相似文献   

10.
This study considers pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer, who sells a product to an independent retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manufacturer’s product, the retailer sells a substitute product produced by another manufacturer. Given the wholesale prices of the two substitute products, the manufacturer decides the retail price of the Internet channel, and the retailer decides the retail prices of the two substitute products. Both the manufacturer and the retailer choose their own decision variables to maximize their respective profits. This work formulates the price competition, using the settings of Nash and Stackelberg games, and derives the corresponding existence and uniqueness conditions for equilibrium solutions. A sensitivity analysis of an equilibrium solution is then conducted for the model parameters, and the profits are compared for two game settings. The findings show that improving brand loyalty is profitable for both of the manufacturer and retailer, and that an increased service value may alleviate the threat of the Internet channel for the retailer and increase the manufacturer’s profit. The study also derives some conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer mutually prefer the Stackelberg game. Based on these results, this study proposes an appropriate cooperation strategy for the manufacturer and retailer.  相似文献   

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