Convex two-level optimization

In this paper a model for a two-level planning problem is presented in the form of a static Stackelberg game. By assumption, play is sequential and noncooperative; however, the leader can influence the actions of the followers through a set of coordination variables while the followers' responses may partly determine the leader's payoff.Under certain convexity assumptions, it is shown that the feasible region induced by the leader is continuous in the original problem variables. This observation, coupled with two corollary results, are used as a basis for a hybrid algorithm which clings to the inducible region until a local optimum is found. A branching scheme is then employed to located other segments of the region, eventually terminating with the global optimum. A number of examples are given to highlight the results, while the algorithm's performance is tested in a comparison with two other procedures.     

Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with non-unique solutions

Stackelberg games, which was originally introduced by Stackelberg, are widely applied in such fields as economics, management, politics and behavioral sciences. Stackelberg games can be modelled as a bi-level optimization problem. There exists an extensive literature about static bi-level optimization problems. However, the studies on dynamic bi-level optimization problems are fairly scarce in spite of the importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena rationally. In this paper, we consider discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with feedback information. In general, the lower-level strategies are non-unique in practice. For a unique solution, dynamic programming algorithms have been presented with multiple players. We revisit dynamic programming for feedback information dynamic Stackelberg games with non-unique lower-level solution. First, we define some kind of solutions related to the decisions styles. Then, we analyze them, respectively. Moreover, dynamic programming algorithm is successful in solving solve feedback information dynamic Stackelberg games with non-unique lower-level solutions.     

Dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers

Stackelberg games play an extremely important role in such fields as economics, management, politics and behavioral sciences. Stackelberg game can be modelled as a bilevel optimization problem. There exists extensive literature about static bilevel optimization problems. However, the studies on dynamic bilevel optimization problems are relatively scarce in spite of the importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena rationally. In this paper, we consider discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with feedback information. Dynamic programming algorithms are presented for the solution of discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with multiple players both for independent followers and for dependent followers. When the followers act dependently, the game in this paper is a combination of Stackelberg game and Nash game.     

Weak via strong Stackelberg problem: New results

We are concerned with weak Stackelberg problems such as those considered in [19], [23] and [25]. Based on a method due to Molodtsov, we present new results to approximate such problems by sequences of strong Stackelberg problems. Results related to convergence of marginal functions and approximate solutions are given. The case of data perturbations is also considered.     

Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games,Part 1: Static Problems

Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as leaders, others as followers. Such games are named after Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of these games is considered, known in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader (or: leaders) announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower (or: followers) decision space into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. The routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful. Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples. Phenomena in problems with more than one leader and/or follower are studied within the context of the inverse Stackelberg concept. As a side issue, expressions like “two captains on a ship” and “divide and conquer” are given a mathematical foundation.     

动态 Stackelberg 诱导对策问题

Stackelberg 诱导(Incentive)对策,以简单的二人对策来说,是讨论对一个具有递阶决策结构的系统,处于领导地位的决策者,如何通过选择和宣布适当的策略,来诱导处于随从地位的决策者采取对领导最为有利行动的问题.自从文[1]从控制理论的观点讨论了 Incentive 的概念后,Stackelberg 诱导对策的研究受到了较多的关注,发现了不少研究成果.然而从到迄今所出现的文献来看,对概念性问题的研究较多,而较缺乏有效的,特     

Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games,Part 2: Dynamic Problems

Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as leaders, others as followers. Such games are named after Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of these games is considered, known in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader (or: leaders) announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower (or: followers) decision space into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. The routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful. Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples. Phenomena in problems with more than one leader and/or follower are studied within the context of the inverse Stackelberg concept. As a side issue, expressions like “two captains on a ship” and “divide and conquer” are given a mathematical foundation.     

Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic stochastic differential games

This paper obtains the Stackelberg solution to a class of two-player stochastic differential games described by linear state dynamics and quadratic objective functionals. The information structure of the problem is such that the players make independent noisy measurements of the initial state and are permitted to utilize only this information in constructing their controls. Furthermore, by the very nature of the Stackelberg solution concept, one of the players is assumed to know, in advance, the strategy of the other player (the leader). For this class of problems, we first establish existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg solution and then relate the derivation of the leader's Stackelberg solution to the optimal solution of a nonstandard stochastic control problem. This stochastic control problem is solved in a more general context, and its solution is utilized in constructing the Stackelberg strategy of the leader. For the special case Gaussian statistics, it is shown that this optimal strategy is affine in observation of the leader. The paper also discusses numerical aspects of the Stackelberg solution under general statistics and develops algorithms which converge to the unique Stackelberg solution.This work was performed while the second author was on sabbatical leave at the Department of Applied Mathematics, Twente University of Technology, Enschede, Holland.     

Stackelberg solutions for fuzzy random two-level linear programming through probability maximization with possibility

This paper considers Stackelberg solutions for decision making problems in hierarchical organizations under fuzzy random environments. Taking into account vagueness of judgments of decision makers, fuzzy goals are introduced into the formulated fuzzy random two-level linear programming problems. On the basis of the possibility and necessity measures that each objective function fulfills the corresponding fuzzy goal, together with the introduction of probability maximization criterion in stochastic programming, we propose new two-level fuzzy random decision making models which maximize the probabilities that the degrees of possibility and necessity are greater than or equal to certain values. Through the proposed models, it is shown that the original two-level linear programming problems with fuzzy random variables can be transformed into deterministic two-level linear fractional programming problems. For the transformed problems, extended concepts of Stackelberg solutions are defined and computational methods are also presented. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the proposed methods.     

双渠道供应链协调及价值扰动

本文研究了消费者选择行为给出的需求模型下双渠道供应链的协调与价值扰动问题.利用Stackelberg博弈对系统建模及其应急管理方法考虑价值扰动问题,获得了扰动前的Stackelberg博弈系统的均衡解和中心决策系统的最优解对价值扰动具有一定的橹棒性的结果,推广了供应链中的应急管理研究结果.     

求解多主多从线性斯坦伯格问题的新方法

在本文中,我们研究斯坦伯格问题,发展了罚函数法。     

Multilevel Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic systems

Open-loop multilevel Stackelberg strategies in deterministic, sequential decision-making problems for continuous linear systems and quadratic criteria are developed. Characterization of the Stackelberg controls via the solution of a higher-order square-matrix-Riccati differential equation is established; also, the basic structural properties of the coefficient matrices of this differential equation are established, and the basic structural properties of its solution are inferred.This work was supported in part by the Energy Research and Development Administration, Contract No. ERDA E(49-18)-2088.on leave from the Mihailo Pupin Institute, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.     

On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games

The properties of the Stackelberg solution in static and dynamic nonzero-sum two-player games are investigated, and necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence are derived. Several game problems, such as games where one of the two players does not know the other's performance criterion or games with different speeds in computing the strategies, are best modeled and solved within this solution concept. In the case of dynamic games, linear-quadratic problems are formulated and solved in a Hilbert space setting. As a special case, nonzero-sum linear-quadratic differential games are treated in detail, and the open-loop Stackelberg solution is obtained in terms of Riccati-like matrix differential equations. The results are applied to a simple nonzero-sum pursuit-evasion problem.This work was supported in part by the US Air Force under Grant No. AFOSR-68-1579D, in part by NSF under Grant No. GK-36276, and in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program under Contract No. DAAB-07-72-C-0259 with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.     

Existence and stability of solutions for a class of generalized vector equilibrium problems

In this paper, two existence theorems concerning the strong efficient solutions and the weakly efficient solutions of generalized vector equilibrium problems are derived by using the Fan-KKM Theorem and an existence theorem for the efficient solutions of generalized vector equilibrium problems is established by using the scalarization method. Moreover, the lower semicontinuity of the strong efficient solution mapping and the weakly efficient solution mapping to parametric generalized vector equilibrium problems are showed under suitable conditions with neither monotonicity nor any information of the solution mappings. Finally, some applications to the vector optimization problems and the Stackelberg equilibrium problem are also given.     

Discrete time dynamic multi-leader–follower games with stage-depending leaders under feedback information

Discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with alternating leaders are recently brought forward by and dynamic programming algorithms are extended to discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games of two players with alternating leaders under feedback information structure. In many practical problems, there are multiple leaders and multiple followers. Moreover, the positions of leaders and followers may change at some stages. We aim to extend the results of discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with alternating leaders to multi-leader–follower games and to obtain a new type of game, dynamic multi-leader–follower game with stage-depending leaders. To simplify the problem, all players in the model are divided into two groups. At each stage, players in one group act as leaders and the players in other group are followers. In the subsequent stage, the positions may go to the contrary. Actually, whether the players in some group act as leaders or not at some stage, depends on the information at the previous stage(s). Furthermore, dynamic programming algorithms are extended to dynamic multi-leader–follower game with stage-depending leaders under feedback information structure in this paper.     

Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with alternating leaders

In all past researches on dynamic Stackelberg games, the leader(s) and the followers are always assumed to be fixed. In practice, the roles of the players in a game may change from time to time. Some player in contract bridge, for example, acts as a leader at some stage but as a follower at the subsequent stage, which motivates the Stackelberg games with unfixed leaders. We aim to analyze the dynamic Stackelberg games with two players under such circumstances and call them dynamic Stackelberg games with alternating leaders. There are two goals in this paper. One goal is to establish models for a new type of games, dynamic Stackelberg games of alternating leaders with two players. The other goal is to extend dynamic programming algorithms to discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with alternating leaders under feedback information structure.     

随机环境下再制造产品的定价策略研究

再制造产品的定价是逆向供应链中重要的决策问题之一。依据目前我国废旧品回收和再制造的运作机制,在随机环境下建立了以传统生产厂为主导、再制造工厂为从属的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了新产品与再制造产品的差异定价策略,结合数值算例给出了最优的定价结果。并进一步将模型进行扩展,考虑了二者形成垂直纳什均衡以及存在集成厂商时的情形。研究表明:集成厂商对两种产品的定价最高,系统收益也最大,Stack-elberg情形次之,纳什均衡时最低。     

A note on dynamic Stackelberg games with leaders in turn

Recently, a model of dynamic Stackelberg games with leaders in turn has been proposed, and dynamic Stackelberg games with leaders in turn have been exploited under a feedback information structure. This paper characterizes dynamic Stackelberg games with leaders in turn under other information structures, both closed-loop and open-loop information structures. Explicit solutions are given for linear-quadratic systems under an open-loop information structure for dynamic Stackelberg games with leaders in turn.     

A theoretical approximation scheme for Stackelberg problems

We consider the Stackelberg problem corresponding to a two-player game in which one of the two players has the leadership in playing the game. We present a general approach for approximating the considered hierarchical programming problem by a sequence of two-level optimization problems. From a practical point of view, we also give some results for asymptotically Stackelberg approximating sequences and for problems with perturbed constraints.This paper is based upon results first presented at Journées Fermat: Mathematics for Optimization, Toulouse, France, May 1985.