京津地区跨界空气污染问题研究

利用拟合有限体积法研究京津地区跨界空气污染问题,提出碳排放交易条件下的随机微分博弈模型,利用随机最优控制理论推导出合作博弈模型的哈密顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程,并利用京津地区数据实证分析了算法的实用性和有效性.     

CLEANING A RIVER: AN ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT ACTION

Abstract River pollution creates negative externalities to downstream water users. In this paper, we analyze how voluntary joint action of water users can improve pollution abatement when optimal treatment cannot be enforced. We model a transboundary pollution game with a unidirectional pollutant flow. Players are identical except for their location along the river. We find that, surprisingly, the location of coalition members has no impact on coalition stability. Location does, however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members of the coalition are, the higher is the overall welfare because the positive externalities of cleaning accrue to a larger number of downstream water users.     

Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution

This paper presents a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. A noted feature of the game model is that the industrial sectors remain competitive among themselves while the governments cooperate in pollution abatement. It is the first time that time consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. A stochastic version of the model is presented and a subgame-consistent cooperative solution is provided. This is the first study of pollution management in a stochastic differential game framework. This research was supported by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong Grant HKBU2103/04H and Hong Kong Baptist University Grant FRG/05-06/II22.     

INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS

This paper addresses the problem of designing environmental regulations when firms possess better information about the cost of pollution abatement than regulators. In the regulatory equilibrium derived in the paper, firms are induced to reveal the information they have concerning abatement costs through the judicious use of abatement standard-subsidy combinations. Offering firms a menu of regulatory contracts, each one specifying a required level of pollution abatement as well as a lump sum subsidy to be paid by the regulatory agency to the firm, is shown to be superior to optimal uniform standard-subsidy schemes. By appealing to the revelation principle and employing a second policy instrument (subsidies), albeit a costly one, in conjunction with an abatement standard, the incentive compatible approach to environmental regulation presented in the paper minimizes the economic inefficiency customarily attributable to a lack of initial information regarding pollution abatement costs.     

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS WITH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A DYNAMIC APPROACH

This paper is devoted to study the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a pollution abatement model. We focus our attention on two asymmetric agents: developed countries characterized by a strong measure of environmental awareness and developing ones characterized by less attention to environmental preservation. We model a differential game in order to determine both the optimal path of the abatement levels and stock pollutant as results of open‐loop and feedback Nash equilibria. By means of the concepts of internal and external stability, we explain how the environmental awareness of two types of countries and the number of cooperators and defectors influence the size of stable coalitions. The results establish that the asymmetry assumption does not have consequences for the stability of the grand coalition, which can be obtained only with transfers.     

Symmetric low‐rank corrections to quadratic models

In this paper, we study the quadratic model updating problems by using symmetric low‐rank correcting, which incorporates the measured model data into the analytical quadratic model to produce an adjusted model that matches the experimental model data, and minimizes the distance between the analytical and updated models. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on the existence of solutions to the symmetric low‐rank correcting problems under some mild conditions, and propose two algorithms for finding approximate solutions to the corresponding optimization problems. The good performance of the two algorithms is illustrated by numerical examples. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION: THE CASE OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION FROM CONSUMPTION

Abstract This paper develops a reciprocal market model of international duopoly with transboundary pollution from consumption to examine the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the equilibrium pollution tax and welfare. I show that tariff reductions induce each country to raise an emission tax and that trade liberalization is welfare improving if the parameter of pollution damages is sufficiently large. These results are in contrast to the case of production‐generated pollution, and I seek the reason for this contrast.     

POLLUTION, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, TAXES AND STOCHASTIC GROWTH

This paper studies a stochastic endogenous growth model with pollution. It introduces government expenditure and exogenous pollution abatement technology to eliminate pollution and proves that under appropriate equilibrium conditions the main economic indexes （including economic growth rate, the optimal government expenditure rate） in the centrally planned economy and decentralized economy can be expressed by the parameters of the model uniquely. The optimal tax policy is analyzed ,and the optimal pollution is derived.     

个体投资治理污染的随机增长模型

本文研究了个体投资治理污染的随机增长模型.利用随机最优化的方法,得出了随机扰动、个体环保投资及环保技术对福利和经济增长的影响.对我国制定环保政策具有一定的积极作用.     

图形技术分析的统计刻画

本文在Lo等(2000)研究的基础上,给出了基于局部极值点刻画的4种技术形态的数学定义,并基于局部多项式估计方法给出了这些形态的自动识别算法。应用所提出的算法对我国沪市A股进行了图形技术分析的实证研究。研究结果表明本文定义的技术形态包含一般统计意义上显著的附加信息,从而证明了图形技术分析的有效性。     

THE OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES: GAME THEORETIC CONSIDERATIONS

One of the most ubiquitous of the fishery management problems to have arisen as a result of E.F.J. is that of managing transboundary resources. Economic analysis of this problem rests upon models blending the standard dynamic economic analysis of fisheries with game theory. The analysis reveals that noncooperation is likely to have severe economic consequences and that cooperative arrangements must deal with possible conflicting goals of management, as well as the division of economic returns from the fishery. While the existing economic analysis of transboundary fishery management is far from complete, it can be shown that the analysis is capable of providing important insights into existing real world cases of transboundary resource management.     

THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Abstract The game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems has received increasing attention in recent years. Major issues are as follows. Under which conditions will an international environmental agreement (IEA) be signed? Will the agreement be stable? Game theory has given different answers to these questions; in particular, it is possible to show that if countries are myopic then only small stable coalitions occur, but if they are farsighted then both large and small stable coalitions exist. This paper studies the size of a farsighted stable IEA by considering a quadratic cost function in a pollution abatement model. Following Rubio and Ulph [2006] , we consider both the case of non‐negative emissions as well as the case of unrestricted ones.     

基于组合预测模型的广东省第三产业产值预测

首先分析了影响广东省第三产业发展的主要因素,指出由于上述因素相互制约、相互影响,导致第三产业的发展呈现出高度的非线性特征,并使得单一的预测模型在预测效果和泛化能力方面难以胜任.在此基础上,提出了基于神经网络集成的组合预测模型,对广东省第三产业的发展进行预测,阐述了算法的基本原理和数据处理流程,实证分析表明:基于神经网络集成的组合预测模型要比单一预测模型的预测精度高.     

A Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution with Emission Permits Trading

Transboundary pollution is a particularly serious problem as it leads people located at regional borders to disproportionately suffer from pollution. In 2007, a cooperative differential game model of transboundary industrial pollution was presented by Yeung. It is the first time that time-consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. In this paper, we extend Yeung’s model to an even more general model, in which emission permits trading is taken into account. Our objective is to make use of optimal control theory to find the two regions’ noncooperative and cooperative optimal emission paths such that the regions’ discounted stream of net revenues is maximized. We illustrate the results with a numerical example.     

CLIMATE CHANGE AND COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SHARING: AN APPLICATION OF STOCHASTIC STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAMES IN VOLTA RIVER BASIN

Abstract As multiple countries share a river, the likelihood of conflicts over distributing water resources increases, particularly under the effects of climate change. In this paper, we demonstrate how countries can cooperate in sustainable transboundary water sharing under such conditions. We examine the case of water distribution in the Volta Basin of West Africa between the upstream country, Burkina Faso, and the downstream country, Ghana. The latter faces an additional tradeoff between the production of hydropower in the south, close to the outlet of the basin, and agricultural water use in the reservoir’s catchment area in the north. In the framework of a stochastic Stackelberg differential game, we show how sustainable water‐sharing agreements can be achieved by linking transboundary flows to hydropower exports. Our results indicate that, through cooperation, Ghana will have an opportunity to increase its water abstraction for agriculture, which has remained largely restricted. We also find that the equilibrium strategies for the long‐run distribution are stable even with increasing variances of water flow.     

广西能源、环境和经济增长的动态关系研究——基于VAR模型的实证分析

利用广西1990-2011年GDP、能源消费和工业废气排放总量的数据,应用基于VAR模型的动态计量分析方法,对广西经济、能源和环境的关系进行实证研究.结果表明:三者之间存在长期稳定的协整关系,能源消耗是经济增长和环境污染的Granger原因,经济增长是能源消耗和环境污染的Granger原因.能源消耗对经济增长的正向影响效应时间较长且较稳定,环境污染初期对经济增长的抑制作用较弱却呈现缓慢增强的趋势;而经济增长对能源消耗和环境污染的影响持续时间较短.经济增长与能源消耗两者之间的相互影响较大,而环境污染受能源消耗变化影响较明显.     

HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME‐THEORETIC APPROACH

Abstract In this paper, we search for multistage realization of international environmental agreements. To analyze countries' incentives and the results of their interactions, we mathematically represent players' strategic preferences and apply a game‐theoretic approach to make predictions about their outcomes. The initial decision on emissions reduction is determined by the Stackelberg equilibrium concept. We generalize Barrett's static “emission” model to a dynamic framework and answer the question “how rapid should the emission reduction be?” It appears that sharper abatement is desirable in the early term, which is similar to the conclusion of the Stern review. Numerical example demonstrates that abatement dynamics of the coalition and the free‐rider differ when discounting of the future payoffs increases. We show that without incentives from external organizations or governments, such pollution reduction path can actually lead to a decline in the agreement's membership size.     

Short Cycle Structure of Graphs on Surfaces （1） -the Uniqueness Theorems

In this paper we investigate cycle base structures of a （weighted） graph and show that much information of short cycles is contained in a MCB （minimum cycle base）. After setting up a Hall type theorem for base-transformation, we give a sufficient and necessary condition for a cycle base to be a MCB. Further more, we show that the structure of MCB in a （weighted） graph is unique. In the case of nonnegative weight, every pair of MCB have the same number of k-cycles for each integer k ≥ 3. The property is also true for those having longest length （although much work has been down in evaluating MCB, little is known for those having longest length）.     

CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE INVARIANT SETS AND INVARIANT MEASURES

In this paper, we will discuss the constructiOn problems about the invariant sets and invariant measures of continues maps~ which map complexes into themselves, using simplical approximation and Markov cbeirs. In [7], the author defined a matrix by using r-normal subdivi of the w,dimensional unit cube, considered it a Markov matrix, and constructed the invariantset and invafiant measure, In fact, the matrix he defined is not Markov matrix generally. So wewill give [7] and amendment in the last pert of this paper. We also construct an invariant set thatis the chain-recurrent set of the map by means of a non-negative matrix which only depends on themap. At hst, we will prove the higher dimension?Banach variation formuls that can simplify thetransition matrix.     

我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证分析

本文首次选取我国第一支统一指数沪深300的指标股2005年年报披露的审计费用作为研究对象,应用多元线性回归的统计方法,对我国上市公司审计收费影响因素进行实证研究。研究表明:企业资产规模、纳入合并报表的子公司数、会计师事务所为"国际四大"显著影响审计收费;而存货和应收账款占总资产的比例、资产负债率、净资产收益率、审计意见类型、独立董事的数量、公司所在地等对审计收费不存在显著的影响。最后提出有针对性的政策建议。