纳入政策预期的国际气候博弈

本研究首先对Baumol和Oates构建的公共外部性模型的假设条件进行修正,从而构建起更符合实际的国际气候治理的数理模型;求解该数理模型,本研究推导出同时实现全球帕累托最优和自身财政收支平衡下,国际环境协议必须遵循的唯一政策规则;最后,以此为基础,本研究进一步构建起纳入政策预期的国际气候博弈模型,并通过数理分析论证,揭示了:如果世界各国都只考虑自身利益最大化,纳入政策预期下的气候博弈的均衡结果,将无法实现全球气候治理的帕累托最优。     

随机需求下竞争零售商的定价策略研究

本文研究了随机需求下两竞争零售商的定价策略选择(响应性定价或清仓定价)、产品订货量及响应性价格的联合决策问题。通过将问题转化为一个三阶段的博弈模型,基于Kuhn-Tucker条件求解了两零售商不同定价策略子博弈下的均衡产品订货量及响应性定价决策,分析了不同定价策略子博弈下产品订货量及价格决策的差别以及潜在市场需求不确定(期望和方差变动)对订货量和定价策略的影响。数值分析结果表明,当潜在市场需求服从均匀分布时,响应性定价子博弈是帕累托最优策略,清仓定价子博弈是零售商的均衡策略,混合定价子博弈下两零售商的收益差距较大。     

区域品牌过度使用与投入不足的风险防范及规避

区域品牌作为一种公共物品，同其他公共物品一样具有非竞争性和非排他性的性质，现有理论和研究表明，这种性质决定了区域品牌具有“公共地悲剧”风险，这种风险表现为过度使用.但通过构建博弈模型，对比模型的纳什均衡解和帕累托最优解，可以发现区域品牌化过程中的“公共地悲剧”风险不仅表现为过度使用，也表现为投入不足，即具有双重性.并通过对这种双重性的内在机理进行分析，提出有效防范和规避“公共地悲剧”风险的政策建议.     

基于训练和过滤的期望均衡及其实现路径

期望均衡是博弈局中人或局外人对于博弈均衡点的一致期望,强调互利共赢,它要求博弈群体的每个成员对期望均衡点有一个共同的预期.显然,基于纳什均衡的帕累托优化组合策略是一个比纳什均衡更有效的期望均衡.要实现期望均衡,可采用局中人参与的训练与学习使得群体的预期一致,也可采用第三方过滤器来达到期望目标.在期望均衡的概率分布下,个体行为的偏离不能比均衡态取得更多收益.否则,训练就是无效的,第三方过滤器就是不公平的.     

动态需求背景下两阶段供应链博弈分析

在两阶段供应链中,市场营销也会导致需求的变动.引入营销费用与零售价格共同影响市场需求,并假设卖方决定订货批量,分别从非合作博弈和合作博弈两个角度对两阶段供应链管理问题进行分析.非合作博弈分析的是卖方或买方分别作为领导者时的Stackelberg模型;合作博弈是把卖方和买方的利润函数加权后作为目标函数,求出了帕累托最优解.结果证明,在合作博弈中存在帕累托有效解,与非合作博弈相比,合作博弈的订货批量更小,零售价格更低,市场营销费用更少.并列举案例,对模型中主要参数进行敏感性分析.     

在两用户干扰信道通信中的帕累托最优解

从信息论的角度研究了两用户干扰信道的可达速率问题.将帕累托优化方法应用于耦合两用户干扰信道传输功率分配策略.结果表明:当系统处于帕累托最优时,使用最小发射功率可以达到最大信道速率.此外,每个信道的可达速率相等,且它仅与信道的参数有关.结论提供一个理论工具,应用该工具可以避免使用大量复杂的干扰抑制方法,达到获得最大信道速率的目的.     

我国市场机制条件下工资率与工作时间的关系

本文根据社会主义市场机制的特点，建立了一类描述社会总福利最大的模型，给出了所有消费者处于均衡状态时实现帕累托最优的条件．研究了当消费者处于均衡状态时，工资率与工作时间之间的变化关系．     

不完全信息博弈视角下的互联网借贷行为研究——以P2P网络贷款为例

P2P网络贷款的兴起为个人和小微企业带来了诸多的融资便利.但由于P2P网络贷款市场上存在着信息不对称的问题,导致市场上出现了诸多乱象.本文针对P2P行业信息不对称的现状,以P2P网络贷款平台和借款者作为参与者,构建了不完全信息博弈模型.该模型以实现P2P市场上的帕累托最优为研究目的,并分别探讨了在混合均衡和准分离均衡两种不同情况下,各自达到帕累托最优状态所需的市场条件,以及相关影响因素,并据此提出了相应的政策建议.     

不同信息条件下创新联盟合作伙伴的选择——基于知识获取的研究视角

以知识获取为研究视角,应用动态博弈理论,研究了不同信息条件下创新联盟合作伙伴选择的问题.通过研究发现,在信息对称条件下,知识共享成本越低或者知识获取能力越高,越容易实现帕累托改进;在信息非对称条件下,企业的合作成本、知识获取能力影响了分离均衡区间的范围,并进而影响帕累托效率与逆向选择风险的大小.     

代理人跨期消费决策下的有限合伙制序贯博弈均衡分析

本文基于委托代理理论研究了代理人跨期消费决策下有限合伙制和公司制的序贯博弈均衡.本文通过比较分析两种机制博弈均衡结果得出:代理人进行最优跨期消费决策时,仅有限合伙制能发挥激励作用从而改善道德风险问题.特别地,有限合伙制可在博弈区间趋于零时达到帕累托最优.通过与公司制的对比可知,公司制不是占优机制,博弈双方不会同时选择接受公司制,但在特定条件下有限合伙制占优于公司制,因而双方会选择接受有限合伙制,有限合伙制相比于公司制更具有激励优势.     

A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem

We study the properties of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect equilibria. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage. Our second main result is a strong anti-Folk Theorem, since, in contrast to what is described by the Folk Theorem, the set of equilibrium payoffs does not expand when the game is repeated.This paper is a revised version of Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. thesis, which has circulated under the title “An Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions”.     

Nondominated equilibrium solutions of a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form and corresponding mathematical programming problem

In most of studies on multiobjective noncooperative games, games are represented in normal form and a solution concept of Pareto equilibrium solutions which is an extension of Nash equilibrium solutions has been focused on. However, for analyzing economic situations and modeling real world applications, we often see cases where the extensive form representation of games is more appropriate than the normal form representation. In this paper, in a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form, we employ the sequence form of strategy representation to define a nondominated equilibrium solution which is an extension of a Pareto equilibrium solution, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition that a pair of realization plans, which are strategies of players in sequence form, is a nondominated equilibrium solution. Using the necessary and sufficient condition, we formulate a mathematical programming problem yielding nondominated equilibrium solutions. Finally, giving a numerical example, we demonstrate that nondominated equilibrium solutions can be obtained by solving the formulated mathematical programming problem.     

A class of games having Pareto optimal Nash equilibria

A simple two-person exchange model is considered first as a cooperative game without side payments, then as a non-cooperative game. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium solution of the latter agrees with the von Neumann-Morgenstern and core solutions of the former. This is made possible by the Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium, which is the main theoretical result presented.     

On Nash Equilibrium Strategy of Two-person Zero-sum Games with Trapezoidal Fuzzy Payoffs

In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, Maeda and Cunlin constructed several models in symmetric triangular and asymmetric triangular fuzzy environment, respectively. We extended their models in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and proposed the existence of equilibrium strategies for these models. We also established the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix game. In addition, numerical examples are presented to find Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy from bi-matrix game.     

不确定条件下n人非合作博弈均衡点集的通有稳定性

基于经典博弈模型的Nash均衡点集的通有稳定性和具有不确定参数的n人非合作博弈均衡点的概念,探讨了具有不确定参数博弈的均衡点集的通有稳定性.参照Nash均衡点集稳定性的统一模式,构造了不确定博弈的问题空间和解空间,并证明了问题空间是一个完备度量空间,解映射是上半连续的,且解集是紧集（即usco（upper semicontinuous and compact-valued）映射）,得到不确定参数博弈模型的解集通有稳定性的相关结论.     

A sufficiency condition for coalitive pareto-optimal solutions

In ak-player, nonzero-sum differential game, there exists the possibility that a group of players will form a coalition and work together. If allk players form the coalition, the criterion usually chosen is Pareto optimality whereas, if the coalition consists of only one player, a minmax or Nash equilibrium solution is sought.In this paper, games with coalitions of more than one but less thank players are considered. Coalitive Pareto optimality is chosen as the criterion. Sufficient conditions are presented for coalitive Pareto-optimal solutions, and the results are illustrated with an example.     

Juche versus Sadae: Game-theoretic approach

We argue that to some degree Juche is represented by the concept of Nash equilibrium, and Sadae by Thompson and Faith's truly perfect information equilibrium. We characterize the latter, and show that for a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, Juche is as good as, or better than Sadae. This includes the game of brinkmanship.     

碳税机制下考虑不同低碳策略的动态博弈模型及复杂性研究

考虑碳排放税,建立双寡头制造商分别实施废品回收和绿色低碳广告投入策略的动态博弈模型。通过系统稳定域,分岔图,功率谱等分析了博弈模型纳什均衡解处的稳定性及参数对系统稳定域的影响,同时对系统的复杂性特征进行了研究。结果表明,消费者回收价格敏感性增加会使整个系统稳定域缩小,而绿色低碳广告投入水平增加只会使实施该策略的企业自身稳定域扩大;当制造商价格调整速度过快时,系统会进入混沌状态;混沌状态下,对比实施广告策略的制造商,实施废品回收策略的制造商价格调整行为对市场造成的震荡更大。最后使用反馈控制策略对系统混沌状态进行了有效的控制,研究结果对制造商低碳策略选择及价格决策有着较好的借鉴意义。     

Pareto efficiency,simple game stability,and social structure in finitely repeated games

Simple game (sensu Brown and Vincent, 1987) evolutionary theory, when coupled with social structure measured as non‐random encounter of strategy “clones”, often permits equilibrium refinement leading to Pareto superior outcomes (e.g., Axelrod, 1981; Myerson et al., 1991), a foundational goal of economic game theory (Myerson, 1991: 370–375). This conclusion, derived from analyses of one‐shot and infinitely repeated games, fails for finitely repeated games. While mutant cluster invasion enhances Pareto efficiency of equilibria in the former, it can depress Pareto efficiency in the latter. Cooperative equilibria of finitely repeated games (under economic analysis) can be susceptible to cluster‐invasion by even more Pareto efficient strategies which are not themselves evolutionarily stable. Evolutionary (simple) game theory's ability to eliminate Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium strategies induces vulnerabilities foreign to economic analysis. Simple game analysis of finitely repeated games suggests that social structure, modeled as perennial invasion by mutant‐clusters, can induce cyclic invasion, saturation, and loss of cooperation.