多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Berge均衡的存在性

研究了具有任意多个局中人的非合作多目标博弈(多目标大博弈).基于一般非合作博弈中的Berge均衡概念,定义多目标大博弈中的弱Pareto-Berge均衡.进一步推广了截口定理,得到新的截口定理,并且利用这个新的截口定理证明多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Berge均衡的存在性.多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Nash均衡的存在性结论可作为弱Pareto-Berge均衡存在性的特例给出.     

FC-空间中的不动点定理定理及应用

在FC-空间中建立了一个不动点定理,推广了近期文献的一个相关结论利用这个结果,我们建立了一些广义型定理,推广了著名的截口定理到FC-空间中借助这个截口定理,在FC-空间得到一些新的广义向量均衡问题解的存在性定理.     

非紧集上不连续函数的Ky Fan不等式及其等价形式和应用

证明了非紧集上不具有任何连续性的函数弱Ky Fan点的存在性,给出了在函数只具非常弱的连续性和凸性条件下非紧集上Ky Fan不等式解的存在性,并给出它的两种等价形式.作为应用:(1)得到Ky Fan截口定理和Fan-Browder不动点定理的推广;(2)应用于博弈理论,得到几个新的Nash平衡存在性定理.     

抽象经济均衡问题解的存在性及其算法

本文首先研究一类新的向量均衡问题,利用截口定理与KKM定理两种不同的工具证明此类均衡问题解的存在性,接着,把这类向量均衡问题推广到更为一般的情形,随后讨论了具有上下界的均衡问题,它是由Isac,Sehgal和Singh于1999年提出的一个公开问题,本文在一定条件下获得了一个新的解的存在性定理,并构造了一个迭代算法,讨论了算法的收敛性。     

具有控制结构的集值强向量均衡问题的稳定性

研究了具有控制结构的集值强向量均衡问题.通过Ky Fan截口定理得到了具有控制结构的集值强向量均衡问题解的存在性定理.并在映射满足一定条件的基础上,得到了集值强向量均衡问题所构成的空间M中,大多数(在Baire分类意义下)强向量均衡问题解集是稳定的.     

锥凸对称向量拟均衡问题解集的通有稳定性

在拓扑向量空间中,利用Ky Fan截口定理得到一个锥凸向量拟均衡问题弱Pareto解的存在性结果.作为该结果的应用,得到了一个对称向量拟均衡问题在支付映射为锥凸条件下弱Pareto解的存在性定理.该定理在较弱的条件下回答了Fu在文献[1]中提出的第二个问题,即在支付映射为锥凸且连续的条件下对称向量拟均衡问题的弱Pareto解是否存在.最后在赋范线性空间中研究了锥凸对称向量拟均衡问题弱Pareto解集的通有稳定性.     

约束形式下广义最大元Nash均衡的存在性

运用广义最大元方法在非传递性偏好下给出了博弈均衡的存在性定理,推广了一些经典的博弈均衡存在性定理.在文中介绍策略式博弈的Nash均衡具有宽泛的条件,在微观经济理论中有广泛的应用.     

一类隐式集值向量均衡问题解的存在性和解集的稳定性

研究一类隐式集值向量均衡问题,它是隐式向量均衡问题、隐式变分不等式问题、隐式相补问题、向量均衡问题和向量变分不等式问题等的推广.利用截口定理,在Hausdorff拓扑线性空间的非紧子集上得出了一些隐式集值向量均衡问题解的存在性结果.并且还讨论了该隐式集值向量均衡问题解集的通有稳定性.这些结果推广和统一了近期的一些相关结果.     

年龄分布下种群资源开发动态博弈的Nash均衡

研究具有年龄结构的种群资源开发中的动态博弈问题.应用~Kakutani~多值映射不动点定理证明了Nash均衡的存在性,借助切锥－法锥和共轭系统技巧刻画了均衡策略.结果表明,在一定条件下,均衡策略具有Bang-Bang结构.     

不动点与平衡点

介绍Brouwer不动点定理、Kakutani不动点定理与数理经济学中平衡点和博弈论中Nash平衡点存在性定理的等价性结果.     

Variational inequality formulation for the games with random payoffs

We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player does not depend on the strategies of other players. If a random vector defining the payoffs of each player follows a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria using the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem. Next, we consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player is defined by a shared constraint set. In this case, we show that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium for elliptically symmetric distributed payoffs. Under certain conditions, we characterize the set of a generalized Nash equilibria using the solution set of a VI problem. As an application, the random payoff games arising from electricity market are studied under chance-constrained game framework.     

两阶段主从博弈均衡解的存在性

首先给出带参数的纳什均衡问题Γ(x),在此基础上给出了具有带参数的纳什均衡约束的两阶段主从博弈问题G.可以证明带参数的纳什均衡点是存在的,即无论领导者选择何种策略,跟随者的最佳回应集都是非空的.最后推出了关于两阶段主从博弈均衡点的存在性定理.     

关于无限对策Nash平衡点集的本质连通区

证明了任意纯策略集是紧度量空间和支付函数连续的n人无限非合作对策存在 Nash平衡点集的本质连通区．     

On Existence of Nash Equilibria of Games with Constraints on Multistrategies

In this paper, sufficient conditions are given, which are less restrictivethan those required by the Arrow–Debreu–Nash theorem, on theexistence of a Nash equilibrium of an n-player game {₁, . . . , Y_n,f₁, . . . , f_n} in normal form with a nonempty closedconvex constraint C on the set Y=i Y_i of multistrategies. Theith player has to minimize the function fi with respect to the ithvariable. We consider two cases.In the first case, Y is a real Hilbert space and the loss function class isquadratic. In this case, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteedas a simple consequence of the projection theorem for Hilbert spaces. In thesecond case, Y is a Euclidean space, the loss functions are continuous, andf_i is convex with respect to the ith variable. In this case, the techniqueis quite particular, because the constrained game is approximated with asequence of free games, each with a Nash equilibrium in an appropriatecompact space X. Since X is compact, there exists a subsequence of theseNash equilibrium points which is convergent in the norm. If thelimit point is in C and if the order of convergence is greater than one,then this is a Nash equilibrium of the constrained game.     

Non-cooperative n-person game with a stopped set

A continuous time non-cooperative n-person Markov game with a stopped set is studied in this paper. We prove that, in the game process with or without discount factor, there exists an optimal stationary point of strategies, called the equilibrium point, and each player has his equilibrium stationary strategy, such that the total expected discounted or non-discounted gain are maximums.     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.     

On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games

We study the existence of Nash equilibria in games with an infinite number of players. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in all normal form games such that pure strategy sets are compact metric spaces and utility functions are continuous. The player set can be any nonempty set.     

双人静态博弈纯战略纳什均衡存在性判别

本文给出了双人有限静态博弈纯战略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。并且，在纳什均衡存在的条件下，本判别法将给出纳什均衡解及解的唯一性判别。     

A finite step algorithm via a bimatrix game to a single controller non-zero sum stochastic game

Given a non-zero sum discounted stochastic game with finitely many states and actions one can form a bimatrix game whose pure strategies are the pure stationary strategies of the players and whose penalty payoffs consist of the total discounted costs over all states at any pure stationary pair. It is shown that any Nash equilibrium point of this bimatrix game can be used to find a Nash equilibrium point of the stochastic game whenever the law of motion is controlled by one player. The theorem is extended to undiscounted stochastic games with irreducible transitions when the law of motion is controlled by one player. Examples are worked out to illustrate the algorithm proposed.The work of this author was supported in part by the NSF grants DMS-9024408 and DMS 8802260.