Almost Stationary ∈-Equilibria in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We show the existence of almost stationary -equilibria, for all > 0, in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. These are -equilibria with the property that, if neither player deviates, then stationary strategies are played forever with probability almost 1. The proof is based on the construction of specific stationary strategy pairs, with corresponding rewards equal to the value, which can be supplemented with history-dependent -optimal strategies, with small > 0, in order to obtain almost stationary -equilibria.     

Existence and Uniqueness of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

We present existence and uniqueness results for a hierarchical or Stackelberg equilibrium in a two-player differential game with open-loop information structure. There is a known convexity condition ensuring the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium, which was derived by Simaan and Cruz (Ref. 1). This condition applies to games with a rather nonconflicting structure of their cost criteria. By another approach, we obtain here new sufficient existence conditions for an open-loop equilibrium in terms of the solvability of a terminal-value problem of two symmetric Riccati differential equations and a coupled system of Riccati matrix differential equations. The latter coupled system appears also in the necessary conditions, but contrary to the above as a boundary-value problem. In case that the convexity condition holds, both symmetric equations are of standard type and admit globally a positive-semidefinite solution. But the conditions apply also to more conflicting situations. Then, the corresponding Riccati differential equations may be of H-type. We obtain also different uniqueness conditions using a Lyapunov-type approach. The case of time-invariant parameters is discussed in more detail and we present a numerical example.     

Nash Equilibria of Risk-Sensitive Nonlinear Stochastic Differential Games

This paper considers a class of risk-sensitive stochastic nonzero-sum differential games with parametrized nonlinear dynamics and parametrized cost functions. The parametrization is such that, if all or some of the parameters are set equal to some nominal values, then the differential game either becomes equivalent to a risk-sensitive stochastic control (RSSC) problem or decouples into several independent RSSC problems, which in turn are equivalent to a class of stochastic zero-sum differential games. This framework allows us to study the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the original stochastic game to changes in the values of these parameters, and to relate the NE (generally difficult to compute and to establish existence and uniqueness, at least directly) to solutions of RSSC problems, which are relatively easier to obtain. It also allows us to quantify the sensitivity of solutions to RSSC problems (and thereby nonlinear H-control problems) to unmodeled subsystem dynamics controlled by multiple players.     

Metric Characterizations of Tikhonov Well-Posedness in Value

In this paper, we discuss and give metric characterizations of Tikhonov well-posedness in value for Nash equilibria. Roughly speaking, Tikhonov well-posedness of a problem means that approximate solutions converge to the true solution when the degree of approximation goes to zero. If we add to the condition of -equilibrium that of -closeness in value to some Nash equilibrium, we obtain Tikhonov well-posedness in value, which we have defined in a previous paper. This generalization of Tikhonov well-posedness has the remarkable property of ordinality; namely, it is preserved under monotonic transformations of the payoffs. We show that a metric characterization of Tikhonov well-posedness in value is not possible unless the set of Nash equilibria is compact and nonempty.     

On the complete solution of ∈y″=y 3

In Ref. 1, the author claimed that the problem y=y ³ is soluble only for a certain range of the parameter . An analytic approach, as adopted in the following contribution, reveals that a unique solution exists for any positive value of . The solution is given in closed form by means of Jacobian elliptic functions, which can be numerically computed very efficiently. In the limit 0+, the solutions exhibit boundary-layer behavior at both endpoints. An easily interpretable approximate solution for small is obtained using a three-variable approach.     

Mixed Solutions for Weak Stackelberg Problems: Existence and Stability Results

We are concerned with -mixed solutions for weak Stackelberg problems corresponding to two-player nonzero-sum noncooperative games. Two cases are considered: (i) mixed strategies for only the second player; (ii) mixed strategies for both players. After giving basic results relating convergence of functions and weak convergence of probability measures, we establish existence and stability results for -mixed solutions under general assumptions of minimal character without any convexity assumption. Our results improve previous work of Mallozzi and Morgan (Refs. 1–2).     

Perturbation theory for games in normal form and stochastic games

In this paper, the effect on values and optimal strategies of perturbations of game parameters (payoff function, transition probability function, and discount factor) is studied for the class of zero-sum games in normal form and for the class of stationary, discounted, two-person, zero-sum stochastic games.A main result is that, under certain conditions, the value depends on these parameters in a pointwise Lipschitz continuous way and that the sets of -optimal strategies for both players are upper semicontinuous multifunctions of the game parameters.Extensions to general-sum games and nonstationary stochastic games are also indicated.     

On a classical Nicoletti boundary value problem

We shall derive existence, uniqueness and comparison results for the functional differential equationx(t)=f(t, x), a. e.tI, with classical Nicoletti boundary conditionsx _i(t_i)=y _iX, iA, whereI is a real interval,A is a nonempty set andX is a Banach space.     

On variational principles,level sets,well-posedness,and ∈-solutions in vector optimization

Using the concept for -efficient solutions introduced in Refs. 1 and 2, we extend the Ekeland variational principle and another variational principle given in Ref. 3 to vector-valued objective functions. This enables us to establish a kind of well-posedness for the resulting perturbed vector optimization problems. Based on this definition of -efficiency, we also formulate a concept for level sets and prove some results about the Kuratowski limits of level sets.This research was supported by the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.     

Convergence Analysis of an Infeasible Interior Point Algorithm Based on a Regularized Central Path for Linear Complementarity Problems

Most existing interior-point methods for a linear complementarity problem (LCP) require the existence of a strictly feasible point to guarantee that the iterates are bounded. Based on a regularized central path, we present an infeasible interior-point algorithm for LCPs without requiring the strict feasibility condition. The iterates generated by the algorithm are bounded when the problem is a P _* LCP and has a solution. Moreover, when the problem is a monotone LCP and has a solution, we prove that the convergence rate is globally linear and it achieves `-feasibility and `-complementarity in at most O(n ² ln(1/`)) iterations with a properly chosen starting point.