共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 172 毫秒
1.
Yasuhiro Shirata 《International Journal of Game Theory》2012,41(1):1-21
This paper studies how a matching rule affects the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game. Gale et al. (Games Econ Behav
8: 56–90, 1995) show that under the random matching rule, a partially fair imperfect Nash equilibrium in which all proposers are fair but
some responders are selfish is asymptotically stable in the limit as noise in learning vanishes if responders are noisier
than proposers. This paper shows that, under an assortative matching rule, a mutually fair imperfect Nash equilibrium in which
all proposers are fair and all responders are reciprocal is limit asymptotically stable as noise due to committed agents vanishes. 相似文献
2.
M. Josune Albizuri 《Annals of Operations Research》2009,172(1):363-374
In this paper we define a solution for multichoice games which is a generalization of the Owen coalition value (Lecture Notes
in Economics and Mathematical Systems: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Springer, New York, pp. 76–88, 1977) for transferable utility cooperative games and the Egalitarian solution (Peters and Zanks, Ann. Oper. Res. 137, 399–409,
2005) for multichoice games. We also prove that this solution can be seen as a generalization of the configuration value and the
dual configuration value (Albizuri et al., Games Econ. Behav. 57, 1–17, 2006) for transferable utility cooperative games. 相似文献
3.
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account,
don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining
game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement
concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games
of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria. 相似文献
4.
Consider a set N of n (> 1) stores with single-item and single-period nondeterministic demands like in a classic newsvendor setting with holding
and penalty costs only. Assume a risk-pooling single-warehouse centralized inventory ordering option. Allocation of costs
in the centralized inventory ordering corresponds to modelling it as a cooperative cost game whose players are the stores.
It has been shown that when holding and penalty costs are identical for all subsets of stores, the game based on optimal expected
costs has a non empty core (Hartman et al. 2000, Games Econ Behav 31:26–49; Muller et al. 2002, Games Econ Behav 38:118–126).
In this paper we examine a related inventory centralization game based on demand realizations that has, in general, an empty
core even with identical penalty and holding costs (Hartman and Dror 2005, IIE Trans Scheduling Logistics 37:93–107). We propose
a repeated cost allocation scheme for dynamic realization games based on allocation processes introduced by Lehrer (2002a,
Int J Game Theor 31:341–351). We prove that the cost subsequences of the dynamic realization game process, based on Lehrer’s
rules, converge almost surely to either a least square value or the core of the expected game. We extend the above results
to more general dynamic cost games and relax the independence hypothesis of the sequence of players’ demands at different
stages. 相似文献
5.
In this paper, optimal derivative design when multiple firms compete for heterogenous customers is studied. Ties in the agents’
best responses generate discontinuous payoffs. Efficient tie-breaking rules are considered: In a first step, the model presented
by Carlier et al. (Math Financ Econ 1:57–80, 2007) is extended, and results of Page and Monteiro (J Math Econ 39:63–109, 2003, J Econ Theory 134:566–575, 2007, Econ Theory 34:503–524, 2008) are used to prove the existence of (mixed-strategies) Nash equilibria. In a second step, the case of risk minimizing firms
is studied. Socially efficient allocations are introduced, and their existence is proved. In particular, the entropic risk
measure is considered. 相似文献
6.
In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57–61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.
相似文献
7.
Yusuke Hino 《International Journal of Game Theory》2011,40(1):199-205
This note presents a simple necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be a potential game. My condition improves on
the well-known condition in Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996) in the sense that it leads to a significant
reduction in the computational burden in determining whether a given game is a potential game. It also provides a logical
connection between finite and continuous potential games, as it can be understood as a faithful translation of one type of
characterization for a continuous potential game. 相似文献
8.
We extend the Coase conjecture to the case of a seller with a single object, who faces n potential buyers and holds a sequence of English auctions until the object is sold. In an independent-private-values environment
in which buyers and sellers share the same discount factor, we show that the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium path of reserve
prices obeys a Coasian logic. Moreover, the equilibrium reserve path lies below that for the repeated sealed-bid, second-price
auctions studied by McAfee and Vincent (in Games Econ Behav 18:246–276). Nevertheless, the open (English) and sealed-bid formats
are shown to be revenue equivalent. 相似文献
9.
Yuichi Noguchi 《International Journal of Game Theory》2009,38(2):193-207
This note clarifies the implication of universal conditional consistency (UCC) in Fudenberg and Levine (Games Econ Behav 29:104–130,
1999) from the viewpoint of the no-regret test. We first show that the UCC property implies (universally) passing any countable
set of no-regret tests. Furthermore, we show that the UCC implies universally passing uncountable (particular) no-regret tests
so that the UCC theorem and the wide-range no-regret (WRNR) theorem in Lehrer (Games Econ Behav 42:101–115, 2003) may differ,
as opposed to the thought that the UCC property is a special case of the WRNR property.
Y. Noguchi is very grateful to Drew Fudenberg for his encouragement and helpful comments. He also thank an anonymous referee
and Tatsuro Ichiishi for their helpful comments. 相似文献
10.
In a strategic game, a curb set (Basu and Weibull, Econ Lett 36:141–146, 1991) is a product set of pure strategies containing
all best responses to every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets (Voorneveld, Games Econ Behav 48:403–414, 2004)
relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions under which minimal prep sets
give sharp predictions. These conditions are satisfied in many economically relevant classes of games, including supermodular
games, potential games, and congestion games with player-specific payoffs. In these classes, minimal curb sets generically
have a large cutting power as well, although it is shown that there are relevant subclasses of coordination games and congestion
games where minimal curb sets have no cutting power at all and simply consist of the entire strategy space. 相似文献