共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
1.
The equilibrium balking strategies are investigated in the paper for observable and unobservable single-server queues with working vacations. In such an M/M/1 queue with working vacations, the server undertakes the workload with a lower service rate rather than completely stops to work during the vacation period. Upon arrival, the customers decide whether to join or balk the queue based on observation of the queue length and the status of the server, along with the reward-cost structure of the system. Accordingly, four cases with respect to different levels of information are studied and the corresponding Nash equilibria are derived. Finally, the effect of the information levels as well as several parameters on the equilibrium threshold and equilibrium entrance probabilities is illustrated by numerical examples. 相似文献
2.
考虑顾客在具有两种故障特性的马尔科夫排队系统中的均衡策略.在该系统中,正常工作的服务台随时都可能发生故障.假设服务台只要发生故障就不再接收新顾客,并且可能出现的故障类型有两种:(1)不完全故障:此类故障发生时,服务台仍有部分服务能力,以较低服务率服务完在场顾客后进行维修;(2)完全故障:此类故障发生时,服务台停滞服务并且立即进行维修,维修结束后重新接收新顾客.顾客到达时为了实现自身利益最大化都有选择是否进队的决策,基于线性“收益-损失”结构函数,分析了顾客在系统信息完全可见和几乎不可见情形下的均衡进队策略,及系统的平均社会收益,并在此基础上,通过一些数值例子展示系统参数对顾客策略行为的影响. 相似文献
3.
4.
This paper studies the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal joining–balking behavior in single-server Markovian queues with multiple working vacations. Different from the classical vacation policies, the server does not completely stop service but maintains a low service rate in vacation state in case there are customer arrivals. Based on different precision levels of the system information, we discuss the observable queues, the partially observable queues, and the unobservable queues, respectively. For each type of queues, we get both the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal joining–balking strategies and make numerical comparisons between them. We numerically observe that their equilibrium strategy is unique, and especially, the customers’ equilibrium joining probability in vacation state is not necessarily smaller than that in busy state in the partially observable queues. Moreover, we also find that the customers’ individual behavior always deviates from the social expectation and makes the system more congested. 相似文献
5.
6.
本文研究服务台不可靠的M/M/1常数率重试排队系统中顾客的均衡进队策略, 其中服务台在正常工作和空闲状态下以不同的速率发生故障。在该系统中, 服务台前没有等待空间, 如果到达的顾客发现服务台处于空闲状态, 该顾客可占用服务台开始服务。否则, 如果服务台处于忙碌状态, 顾客可以选择留下信息, 使得服务台在空闲时可以按顺序在重试空间中寻找之前留下信息的顾客进行服务。当服务台发生故障时, 正在被服务的顾客会发生丢失, 且系统拒绝新的顾客进入系统。根据系统提供给顾客的不同程度的信息, 研究队长可见和不可见两种信息情形下系统的稳态指标, 以及顾客基于收入-支出函数的均衡进队策略, 并建立单位时间内服务商的收益和社会福利函数。比较发现, 披露队长信息不一定能提高服务商收益和社会福利。 相似文献
7.
8.
We consider a single server retrial queue with waiting places in service area and three classes of customers subject to the server breakdowns and repairs. When the server is unavailable, the arriving class-1 customer is queued in the priority queue with infinite capacity whereas class-2 customer enters the retrial group. The class-3 customers which are also called negative customers do not receive service. If the server is found serving a customer, the arriving class-3 customer breaks the server down and simultaneously deletes the customer under service. The failed server is sent to repair immediately and after repair it is assumed as good as new. We study the ergodicity of the embedded Markov chains and their stationary distributions. We obtain the steady-state solutions for both queueing measures and reliability quantities. Moreover, we investigate the stochastic decomposition law, the busy period of the system and the virtual waiting times. Finally, an application to cellular mobile networks is provided and the effects of various parameters on the system performance are analyzed numerically. 相似文献
9.
We consider a single server Markovian queue with setup times. Whenever this system becomes empty, the server is turned off.
Whenever a customer arrives to an empty system, the server begins an exponential setup time to start service again. We assume
that arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, which incorporates
their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait.
We examine customer behavior under various levels of information regarding the system state. Specifically, before making the
decision, a customer may or may not know the state of the server and/or the number of present customers. We derive equilibrium
strategies for the customers under the various levels of information and analyze the stationary behavior of the system under
these strategies. We also illustrate further effects of the information level on the equilibrium behavior via numerical experiments.
相似文献
10.
Power consumption is a ubiquitous and challenging problem in modern society. To save energy, one should turn off an idle device which still consumes about 60% of its peak consumption and switch it on again when some jobs arrive. However, it is not tolerate for delay sensitive applications. Therefore, there is a trade-off between power consumption and delay performance. In this paper we study an M/G/1 retrial queueing system with setup times in which the server keeps idle for a reserved idle time after completion of a service. If there are arrivals during this reserved idle time, these customers can be served immediately. Otherwise, the server will be turned off for saving energy until a new customer comes to activate the server. The setup time follows an exponential distribution. Based on the reward-cost function and the expected payoff, all customers will make decisions on whether to join or balk the system upon arrival. Given these strategic behaviors we study the optimal pricing strategies from the perspective of the server and social planner, respectively. The optimization of the reserved idle time for maximizing the server’s profit is also studied. Finally, numerical experiments are presented to illustrate the impact of system parameters on the customers’ equilibrium behavior and profit maximization solutions. 相似文献