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基于需求和生产成本偏差的Cournot竞争供应链协调 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
分析一个供应商和两个Cournot竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,为使供应链收益最大,提出了调整生产计划和零售价格的协调策略,进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本偏差的分权供应链;最后进行了数值实验. 相似文献
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以包含一个供应商和一个分销商的供应链为研究对象,其中分销商面临市场需求不确定性,供应商存在资金约束且面临产出不确定性。 提出期望利率的概念,研究银行贷款期望利率一定的情况下,供应链银行融资最优策略。 构建了供应链预付款融资机制,在此基础上研究预付款模式下供应链的融资与生产订购的最优策略,并讨论了预付款期望利率的可行范围。 研究表明,预付款融资模式下,分销商愿意以低于银行贷款利率的期望利率向供应商提供预付款; 存在预付款期望利率可行区间,实现预付款协调模式下供应链系统的帕累托改进。 相似文献
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Phouratsamay Siao-Leu Kedad-Sidhoum Safia Pascual Fanny 《4OR: A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research》2021,19(2):235-264
4OR - We consider the coordination of planning decisions of a single product in a supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, by using contracts. We assume that the retailer has the... 相似文献
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J C Fransoo M J F Wouters T G de Kok 《The Journal of the Operational Research Society》2001,52(7):830-838
Supply chain planning concepts from multi-echelon inventory theory are generally based on some form of centralised planning of supply chains. Those multi-echelon models that do consider decentralised planning, assume complete information and/or a specific single objective function. This paper investigates how multi-echelon inventory theory can accommodate a setting with decentralised decision makers (a supplier and a number of retail groups) without complete information. We present a coordination procedure that does not require the retail groups to exchange demand information, but does allow using opportunities for demand pooling between them. We illustrate our ideas by way of a quantitative analysis of a two-echelon divergent supply chain, with both cooperative and non cooperative retail groups. We conclude that coordination across a supply chain with decentralised control and limited centralised information is feasible by using available algorithms with satisfactory service level and cost performance. 相似文献
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Yahya Pezeshki Armand Baboli Naoufel Cheikhrouhou Mohammad Modarres Mohammad R. Akbari Jokar 《European Journal of Operational Research》2013
Coordination of decentralized supply chains using contract design is a problem that has been widely addressed in the literature. We consider a divergent supply chain including a supplier and several retailers producing fashion products with short sale seasons. The retailers cooperate with the supplier as sales agents; i.e., they work in the framework of revenue sharing contracts. Because of their proximity to the market, retailers can provide more accurate demand forecasts to the supplier that is used to decide on issues such as capacity building and market prices with regard to retailers stiff due dates, different lead times and different price-dependent demand functions. To ensure abundant supply and cope with the demand variability, the retailers have an incentive to exaggerate their private forecast information. In this study, we propose a new rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on trust between supply chain tiers, considered as a differentiation factor between honest and deceptive partners. An optimization model is developed as a building block of this mechanism. An approximation method is used to simplify and solve the problem. The model is then implemented using Monte-Carlo simulation in four different situations, according to 10 different strategies for forecast information sharing. The findings from the tests show that the mechanism including trust as a decisional factor performs better than ‘No Trust’ mechanism in all situations. These results suggest that taking into account Trust in designing coordination mechanism may have significant influence on the financial performance of the supply chain. 相似文献
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This article considers a single product coordination system using a periodic review policy, participants of the system including a supplier and one or more heterogeneous buyers over a discrete time planning horizon in a manufacturing supply chain. In the coordination system, the demand of buyer in each period is deterministic, the supplier replenishes all the buyers, and all participants agree to plan replenishment to minimize total system costs. To achieve the objective of the coordination system, we make use of small lot sizing and frequent delivery policies (JIT philosophy) to transport inventory between supplier and buyers. Moreover, demand variations of buyers are allowed in the coordination system to suit real-world situations, especially for hi-tech industries. Furthermore, according to the mechanisms of minimizing the total relevant costs, the proposed method can obtain the optimal number of deliveries, shipping points and shipping quantities in each order for all participants in the coordination system. 相似文献
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We address the coordination problem in a single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain. The supplier wishes to coordinate the supply chain by offering quantity discounts. To obtain their complete cost information, the supplier exchanges his own cost parameters with buyers leading to vertical information sharing. The supplier thinks that the buyers, as they have access to supplier’s setup and holding cost information, may demand a portion of the anticipated coordination savings based on the partial information they hold about the cost structure of the entire supply chain. We model each buyer’s expectations based on her limited view of the entire supply chain which consists of herself and the supplier only. These expectations are then incorporated into the modeling of the supply chain, which results in a generalization of the traditional Stackelberg type models. We discuss alternative efficiency sharing mechanisms, and propose methods to design the associated discount schemes that take buyers’ expectations into account. In designing the discount schemes, we consider both price discriminatory and non-price discriminatory approaches. The study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers’ expectations into a constrained Stackelberg structure, and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the supplier’s replenishment period in choosing their order quantities. The numerical analysis of the coordination efficiency and allocation of the net savings of the proposed discount schemes shows that the supplier is still able to coordinate the supply chain with high efficiency levels, and retain a significant portion of the net savings. 相似文献