煤企成本管控对策

随着我国市场经济的飞速发展．现代煤矿企业的经济增长方式也由开放型向集约型转变，成本成为现代煤矿企业竞争的核心内容。     

现代企业的销售分析

本文应用社会学、文化学、预测学等理论，就现代企业的销售环境、影响销售的因素．以及销售预测等问题作了比较全面的分析，为现代企业参与市场经济活动提供了理论依据．     

《货币战争3》：带你认识金融高边疆

用一句话概括《货币战争3：金融高边疆》,那就是—以金融的视角解读中国近现代史。 本书作者宋鸿兵先生,于2007年出版《货币战争》一书,随即便在国内外引起巨大反响,该书也迅速成为了一本超级畅销书,当然在之后的评论中也不乏对书中观点的争议。     

农业供应链金融能有效缓解企业的融资约束？——涉农企业参与精准扶贫的实证研究

农业供应链金融为涉农企业融资难问题提供了新思路。本文以上市涉农上市企业2016~2018年的财务数据为样本,探讨了农业供应链金融对缓解企业融资约束的影响,以及涉农企业参与精准扶贫对缓解融资约束的调节作用。研究发现:涉农企业普遍面临融资约束问题,而农业供应链金融显著缓解了涉农企业的融资约束,且对参与精准扶贫企业的融资约束缓解更为显著。本文揭示了:农业供应链金融能有效缓解涉农企业的融资约束问题,再次证明了农业供应链金融缓解涉农企业融资约束的重要性和必要性,拓展了供应链金融研究的领域,同时对企业参与精准扶贫,响应新时期涉农企业社会责任的具体要求,形成政府、企业等共同承担社会责任的多元化减贫治理机制,助力乡村振兴提供相应借鉴。     

如何调控经济金融化？——基于中国经济的三方演化博弈视角

十九大以来,中国的改革开放进程不断加快,在金融领域体制改革也是不断深化,开放程度不断提高,期间实体经济金融化的问题在我国日益凸显,经济“脱实向虚”的现象愈发严重,而实体经济能否健康发展将决定一个国家综合国力的强弱。因此,通过研究实体企业金融化问题来探讨中国防范产业“空心化”的策略非常必要。运用演化博弈和模拟仿真的方法,构建基于政府监管部门、实体企业和金融企业金融化的三方演化博弈分析框架,重点分析政府监管对企业策略选择的影响,并对演化均衡过程进行模拟仿真。研究表明,政府对企业所采取措施譬如加大处罚、提高减税幅度或补贴等对促进实体企业和金融企业达成合作关系有积极作用,实体企业和金融企业对分利技术水平和社会禀赋倍增率的变化敏感。     

二元图的最佳连通性

本文介绍二元图的最佳连通性问题，给出了有关最佳连通性的若干结果；并就一般情形，给出了二元图最佳连通性问题的解．     

弧长仪及其几何原理

弧长仪是一种圆弧长度测量仪。 长期以来,人们通常采用弧长公式:弧长=计算圆弧长度，弧长仪的出现改变了这种传统的方法，可以象直尺度量直线那样直接度量，因而，探讨弧长仪的几何原理成为许多人共同关心的问题。     

浅议国有企业如何建立现代企业制度

国有企业特别是国有大中型企业，如何在国有企业中率先建立现代企业制度，是摆脱困境，提高经济效益的根本途径。本文拟从现代企业与传统企业的差别中，对当前建立现代企业制度必须突破的几个问题进行论述。     

中国工商银行

中国工商银行在国内拥有领先的市场地位，优质的客户基础，多元的业务结构，强劲的创新能力和市场竞争力，以及卓越的品牌价值。更以建设国际一流现代金融企业为目标，不断发展进步，力求以真诚的服务与专业的能力帮助全球客户管理资产、创造财富。     

有限监管能力与异质风险偏好下污染物减排监管机制优化

近年来，随着工业化进程不断推进，污染物排放带来的环境问题备受社会各界关注。为了向监管部门提供监管策略支持，对污染物减排监管机制优化问题展开研究。针对区域性企业污染物减排与监管问题，考虑罚款和关停两种惩罚策略，结合复杂网络理论与博弈论建立减排联盟网络上的演化博弈模型。基于有限理性假设，考虑企业异质风险偏好与监管者的有限监管能力，提出改进的监管机制，即智能监管机制。借助数值仿真方法，对比随机监管机制与智能监管机制，验证智能监管机制的有效性。研究结果表明：不同的惩罚策略影响企业的决策结果，例如若面临被关停的风险，企业表现出更强烈的合作意愿；在有限监管能力下，监管能力与减排效果呈正相关关系；与随机监管机制比较，智能监管机制更能促进企业采取合作策略，达到更好的减排效果；增加白名单长度能够提升整体的合作水平；当白名单长度较小时，适当延长对企业的考察期能提升合作水平；当白名单长度较大时，适当缩短对企业的考察期能提升合作水平。     

小波基的选取对图像去噪的影响

小波图像去噪方法是现代图像处理中的重要组成部分，小波基的不同选取直接影响到去噪的效果．本文在全局阈值的标准下，通过对噪声水平和图像纹理特征的估计，讨论了小波基的正交性和线性相位性对去噪结果的不同影响，提出了选取小波基的近似标准．     

Ensuring responsive capacity: How to contract with backup suppliers

Firms that source from offshore plants frequently perceive the lack of reliability and flexibility to be among the major drawbacks of their strategy. To mitigate against imminent mismatches of uncertain supply and demand, establishing capacity hedges in the form of responsive backup suppliers is a way out that many firms follow. This article analyzes how firms should contract with backup suppliers, inducing the latter to install responsive capacity. We show that supply options are appropriate to achieve sourcing channel coordination under forced compliance, whereas any firm commitment contract imposes a deadweight loss on the system. Whereas price-only contracts are unable to coordinate the sourcing channel under voluntary compliance, utilization-dependent price-only contracts are. Under the former contract, a price-focused strategy on the part of the manufacturer turns out to diminish the system’s service level and possibly has negative implications on installed backup capacity, and not least on the manufacturer’s profit.     

Allocating the gains from resource pooling with the Shapley Value

To make their cost structure more efficient, firms often pool their critical resources: small divisions of a large firm may negotiate a joint contract to benefit from volume discounts; or firms may outsource their call centres to an independent provider who is able to increase utilization by reducing variability since demand is now pooled. Since pooling demand reduces total joint costs, an immediate question is how the realized savings should be shared. We model the problem as a cooperative game and use the resulting allocation schemes to distribute the savings. One popular scheme is the Shapley Value, which always exists and, we show, represents each player's incremental value to the pool. When the pooled savings depend on the sum of each player's demand, we label the game coalition symmetric and propose, for those games, an algorithm that makes pseudo-polynomial the computation of the Shapley Value.     

Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibria with Forward Contracts

We consider markets in which firms offer supply functions, rather than a quantity or price alone: the most important examples are wholesale electricity markets. The equilibria in such markets can be hard to characterize. In many cases, whole families of supply function equilibria occur so there are difficulties in determining which equilibrium will be chosen. In this paper, we consider supply function equilibria, when firms hold forward contracts, which is common in electricity markets. Under the assumption that contract positions have been fixed in advance, we characterize the families of supply function equilibria in a duopoly. The existence of forward contracts implies a tightening of the conditions for an equilibrium, and a greater likelihood that no equilibrium solution exists. In the case of three firms, there can be at most one supply function equilibrium, provided that the lowest demand be small enough.     

Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisficing objectives

Supply chain coordination has become critical to firms as increased pressure is placed on them to improve performance. We evaluate the performance of Push, Pull, and Advance-purchase discount (APD) contracts in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain where one or both firms have a satisficing objective of maximizing the probability of achieving a target profit. We identify the resulting operational modes of the supply chain and potential conflicts over the preferred contracts under the Push, Pull, and APD contracts. When both firms are satisficing, conflict over the preferred contract arises when the manufacturer has an ambitious profit target or the retailer has a low profit target. We show that the Push contract can result in a large decrease in the expected profit of a risk-neutral manufacturer when the retailer maximizes the probability of achieving her maximum expected profit. We find that a modified buy-back and profit guarantee contracts can provide significant Pareto improvement over Push or APD contracts when the manufacturer is risk-neutral and the retailer is satisficing, while revenue-sharing contracts cannot. In contrast, revenue sharing and modified buy-back contracts are Pareto dominant under certain conditions when the manufacturer is satisficing and the retailer is risk-neutral.     

A note on yardstick regulation of fishery monopolies

This note considers a two-period model of a fishery exploited by two firms selling their harvests in separate local markets. Assuming the harvesting cost is a private information to the firms, there is an agency that can regulate the market. I propose a contract in the realm of yardstick competition framework that allows the regulator to solve the information asymmetry problem and achieve cooperation.     

Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry

In this article we propose a model of the supply chain in electricity markets with multiple generators and retailers and considering several market structures. We analyze how market design interacts with the different types of contract and market structure to affect the coordination between the different firms and the performance of the supply chain as a whole. We compare the implications on supply chain coordination and on the players’ profitability of two different market structures: a pool based market vs. bilateral contracts, taking into consideration the relationship between futures and spot markets. Furthermore, we analyze the use of contracts for differences and two-part-tariffs as tools for supply chain coordination. We have concluded that there are multiple equilibria in the supply chain contracts and structure and that the two-part tariff is the best contract to reduce double marginalization and increase efficiency in the management of the supply chain.     

More than a second channel? Supply chain strategies in B2B spot markets

The emergence of B2B spot markets has greatly facilitated spot trading and impacted supply chain structures as well as the way commercial transactions take place between firms in many industries. While providing new opportunities, the B2B spot market also exposes participants to a price risk. This new business landscape raises some important questions on how the supplier and manufacturer should change their sales channel and procurement strategies and tailor their decisions to this changing environment. In this paper, we study the channel-choice, pricing and ordering/production decisions of the risk-averse supplier and manufacturer in a two-tier supply chain with a B2B spot market. Our analysis shows that, to benefit from the B2B spot market and control the risk exposure, the upstream supplier should develop an integrated channel-choice and pricing strategy. When the supplier adopts a dual-channel strategy, the equilibrium contract price decreases in the supplier’s risk attitude, but increases in the demand uncertainty. However, it first decreases and then increases in the manufacturer’s risk attitude and spot price volatility. We conclude that rather than simply being a second channel, the B2B spot market provides a strategic tool to supply chain members to achieve an advantageous position in their contract trading.     

全要素生产率如何影响我国制造业企业的区位选址决策

新经济地理理论以及新近发展的“‘新’新经济地理理论”认为,高生产率企业通过集聚效应和选择效应存在于规模较大的市场,本文在后者理论框架下考察中国企业区位选址这一被忽视的问题。运用中国1999~2007年297个地级及以上城市100多万家企业的微观数据,采用倾向得分匹配方法克服样本选择性偏误,本文发现:相比低生产率企业组,高生产率企业选址于更大规模的城市。而且,这种选址倾向在不同区域和企业所有制上具有差异表现:相比传统中、西部地区,东部地区高生产率企业选址于大城市的倾向更为明显;相比集体企业,港澳台、外商及私营企业的这种倾向性更为显著,且估计结果显示国有企业选址不受全要素生产率水平的影响。以上发现为我国制造业企业区位选址决策的制定提供了新的思路。     

基于多任务委托代理模型的导游动态薪酬契约设计

旅游服务质量是旅游业可持续发展的重要决定因素,如何通过设计合理的薪酬契约激励导游努力提高服务质量是现今旅行社面临的难题。基于Holmstrom提出的多任务代理模型,考虑导游的纵向多任务特性,将导游投入划分为追求当期业绩和追求服务质量的旅行社声誉建设两个维度的多任务问题,导游的服务绩效由其个人业绩和服务质量决定,以此为基础构建了多周期动态契约,与没有考虑服务质量投入的单周期静态契约进行比较分析,最后给出了其数值仿真结果。结果表明:本文所提多周期动态契约对旅行社和导游双方具有明显的帕累托效率改进,且从长远来看,对旅行社声誉的提高以及游客满意度的提升效果显著。