Economic order quantity under conditionally permissible delay in payments

Within the economic order quantity (EOQ) framework, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the retailer’s optimal replenishment policy under permissible delay in payments. All previously published articles dealing with optimal order quantity with permissible delay in payments assumed that the supplier only offers the retailer fully permissible delay in payments if the retailer ordered a sufficient quantity. Otherwise, permissible delay in payments would not be permitted. However, in this paper, we want to extend this extreme case by assuming that the supplier would offer the retailer partially permissible delay in payments when the order quantity is smaller than a predetermined quantity. Under this condition, we model the retailer’s inventory system as a cost minimization problem to determine the retailer’s optimal inventory cycle time and optimal order quantity. Three theorems are established to describe the optimal replenishment policy for the retailer. Some previously published results of other researchers can be deduced as special cases. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate all these theorems and to draw managerial insights.     

Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains

We solve a buyback contract design problem for a supplier who is working with a retailer who possesses private information about the demand distribution. We model the retailer’s private information as a space of either discrete or continuous demand states so that only the retailer knows its demand state and the demand for the product is stochastically increasing in the state. We focus on contracts that are viable in practice, where the buyback price being strictly less than the wholesale price, which is itself strictly less than the retail price. We derive the optimal (for the supplier) buyback contract that allows for arbitrary allocation of profits to the retailer (subject to the retailer’s reservation profit requirements) and show that in the limit this contract leads to the first-best solution with the supplier keeping the entire channel’s profit (after the retailer’s reservation profit).     

Production and availability policies through the Markov Decision Process and myopic methods for contractual and selective orders

In this paper, we consider a supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and some online customers. In addition to supplying the retailer, manufacturers may selectively take orders from individuals online. Through the Markov Decision Process, we explore the optimal production and availability policy for a manufacturer to determine whether to produce one more unit of products and whether to indicate “in stock” or “out of stock” on website. We measure the benefits and influences of adding online customers with and without the retailer’s inventory information sharing. We also simulate the production and availability policy via a myopic method, which can be implemented easily in the real world. Prediction of simple switching functions for the production and availability is proposed. We find the information sharing, production capacity and unit profit from online orders are the primary factors influencing manufacturer profits and optimal policy. The manufacturer might reserve 50% production capacity for contractual orders from the retailer and devote the remaining capacity to selective orders from spontaneous online customers.     

Optimal retailer’s replenishment decisions in the EPQ model under two levels of trade credit policy

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal retailer’s replenishment decisions under two levels of trade credit policy within the economic production quantity (EPQ) framework. We assume that the supplier would offer the retailer a delay period and the retailer also adopts the trade credit policy to stimulate his/her customer demand to develop the retailer’s replenishment model under the replenishment rate is finite. Furthermore, we assume that the retailer’s trade credit period offered by supplier M is not shorter than the customer’s trade credit period offered by retailer N (M ? N). Since the retailer cannot earn any interest in this situation, M < N.     

The role of retailer’s performance in optimal wholesale price discount policies

The main goal of this paper is to model the effects of wholesale price control on manufacturer’s profit, taking explicitly into account the retailer’s sales motivation and performance. We consider a stylized distribution channel where a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a single retailer. Wholesale price discounts are assumed to increase the retailer’s motivation thus improving sales. We study the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem as an optimal control model where the manufacturer’s control is the discount on wholesale price and retailer’s motivation is one of the state variables. In particular in the paper we prove that an increasing discount policy is optimal for the manufacturer when the retailer is not efficient while efficient retailers may require to decrease the trade discounts at the end of the selling period. Computational experiments point out how the discount on wholesale price passed by the retailer to the market (pass-through) influences the optimal profit of the manufacturer.     

Optimal order lot sizing and pricing with free shipping

Companies, especially those in e-business, are increasingly offering free shipping to buyers whose order sizes exceed the free shipping quantity. In this paper, given that the supplier offers free shipping, we determine the retailer’s optimal order lot size and the optimal retail price. We explicitly incorporate the supplier’s quantity discount, and transportation cost into the model. We analytically and numerically examine the impacts of free shipping, quantity discount and transportation cost on the retailer’s optimal lot sizing and pricing decisions. We find that free shipping can benefit the supplier, the retailer, and the end customers, and can effectively encourage the retailer to order more of the good, to the extent of ordering a few times of the optimal order lot size without free shipping. The order lot size will increase and the retail price will decrease if the supplier offers proper free shipping.     

Wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective

This paper develops a one-population (indirect) evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer/supplier and many (a sufficiently large number of) retailers to study how the retailer’s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price, its observability, the error probability of the observed result on the rival’s preference, the market scale and the retailer’s bargaining power. This paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer. We find that the profit (revenue) maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high (low). Given an appropriate wholesale price, the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers’ population. The larger the market scale, the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price. The cross effects of the retailer’s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process.     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.     

Coordinating lead times and safety stocks under autocorrelated demand

We consider a supply chain in which orders and lead times are linked endogenously, as opposed to assuming lead times are exogenous. This assumption is relevant when a retailer’s orders are produced by a supplier with finite capacity and replenished when the order is completed. The retailer faces demands that are correlated over time – either positively or negatively – which may, for example, be induced by a pricing or promotion policy. The auto-correlation in demand affects the order stream placed by the retailer onto the supplier, and this in turn influences the resulting lead times seen by the retailer. Since these lead times also determine the retailer’s orders and its safety stocks (which the retailer must set to cover lead time demand), there is a mutual dependency between orders and lead times. The inclusion of endogenous lead times and autocorrelated demand represents a better fit with real-life situations. However, it poses some additional methodological issues, compared to assuming exogenous lead times or stationary demand processes that are independent over time. By means of a Markov chain analysis and matrix analytic methods, we develop a procedure to determine the distribution of lead times and inventories, that takes into account the correlation between orders and lead times. Our analysis shows that negative autocorrelation in demand, although more erratic, improves both lead time and inventory performance relative to IID demand. Positive correlation makes matters worse than IID demand. Due to the endogeneity of lead times, these effects are much more pronounced and substantial error may be incurred if this endogeneity is ignored.     

Retailer’s optimal replenishment and payment policies in the EPQ model under cash discount and two-level trade credit policy

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the retailer’s optimal cycle time and optimal payment time under the supplier’s cash discount and trade credit policy within the economic production quantity (EPQ) framework. In this paper, we assume that the retailer will provide a full trade credit to his/her good credit customers and request his/her bad credit customers pay for the items as soon as receiving them. Under this assumption, we model the retailer’s inventory system as a cost minimization problem to determine the retailer’s optimal inventory cycle time and optimal payment time under the replenishment rate is finite. Then, an algorithm is established to obtain the optimal strategy. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and obtain some managerial phenomena.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

A Production Lot-Size Model for Perishable Items Under Two Level Trade Credit Policy for a Retailer with a Powerful Position in a Supply Chain System

This paper investigates a production lot-size inventory model for perishable items under two levels of trade credit for a retailer to reflect the supply chain management situation. We assume that the retailer maintains a powerful position and can obtain full trade credit offered by supplier yet retailer just offers the partial trade credit to customers. Under these conditions, retailer can obtain the most benefits. Then, we investigate the retailer’s inventory policy as a cost minimization problem to determine the retailer’s inventory policy. A rigorous mathematical analysis is used to prove that the annual total variable cost for the retailer is convex, that is, unique and global-optimal solution exists. Mathematical theorems are developed to efficiently determine the optimal ordering policies for the retailer. The results in this paper generalize some already published results. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theorems and obtain a lot of managerial phenomena.     

Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

An integrated production and inventory model to dampen upstream demand variability in the supply chain

We consider a two-echelon supply chain: a single retailer holds a finished goods inventory to meet an i.i.d. customer demand, and a single manufacturer produces the retailer’s replenishment orders on a make-to-order basis. In this setting the retailer’s order decision has a direct impact on the manufacturer’s production. It is a well known phenomenon that inventory control policies at the retailer level often propagate customer demand variability towards the manufacturer, sometimes even in an amplified form (known as the bullwhip effect). The manufacturer, however, prefers to smooth production, and thus he prefers a smooth order pattern from the retailer. At first sight a decrease in order variability comes at the cost of an increased variance of the retailer’s inventory levels, inflating the retailer’s safety stock requirements. However, integrating the impact of the retailer’s order decision on the manufacturer’s production leads to new insights. A smooth order pattern generates shorter and less variable (production/replenishment) lead times, introducing a compensating effect on the retailer’s safety stock. We show that by including the impact of the order decision on lead times, the order pattern can be smoothed to a considerable extent without increasing stock levels. This leads to a situation where both parties are better off.     

Retailer��s optimal sourcing strategy by using one major supplier and one emergent supplier

Fast-changing market demand, short product life cycle, and unpredictable events have been enforcing companies in a supply chain to respond to customers’ needs as quickly as possible. While many firms are still seeking a better inventory management within the general business environment, this paper develops an ordering decision support model within a business environment with more unpredictable events. To reduce the uncertainty, a retailer adopts a double sourcing policy with one major supplier and one emergent supplier. Through a two-period dynamic programming model formulation and the simulations based on design of experiments, we analyzed the effects of factors such as penalty cost, backup ratio, purchasing cost ratio, and demand correlation coefficient on retailer’s ordering policy and expected profit. Detailed sensitivity analysis is further conducted based on combinations of penalty cost and backup ratio. Results show that the use of an emergent supplier help increase the retailer’s expected profits. It not only increases the retailer’s upstream sourcing flexibility, but also increases the retailer’s service level with a lower inventory level. As penalty cost or backup ratio increases, the contribution of emergent supplier increases.     

Online retailers’ promotional pricing,free-shipping threshold,and inventory decisions: A simulation-based analysis

We consider a two-stage decision problem, in which an online retailer first makes optimal decisions on his profit margin and free-shipping threshold, and then determines his inventory level. We start by developing the retailer’s expected profit function. Then, we use publicly-available statistics to find the best-fitting distribution for consumers’ purchase amounts and the best-fitting function for conversion rate (i.e., probability that an arriving visitor places an online order with the retailer). We show that: (i) a reduction of the profit margin does not significantly affect the standard deviation of consumers’ order sizes (purchase amounts) but increases the average order size; whereas, (ii) variations in a positive finite free-shipping threshold affect both the average value and the standard deviation of the order sizes. We then use Arena to simulate the online retailing system and OptQuest to find the retailer’s optimal decisions and maximum profit. Next, we perform a sensitivity analysis to examine the impact of the ratio of the unit holding and salvage cost to the unit shipping cost on the retailer’s optimal decisions. We also draw some important managerial insights.     

Trade credit for supply chain coordination

Trade-credit is a seller’s short-term loan to the buyer, allowing the buyer to delay payment of an invoice. It has been the largest source of working capital for a majority of business-to-business firms in the United States. Numerous theories have been proposed to explain trade-credit, mainly from finance perspectives. It has also been an important issue in supply chain management. Surprisingly, most literature in supply chain management has examined the retailer’s stocking policies given a supplier’s trade-credit. This paper attempts to shed light on trade-credit from a supplier’s perspective, and presents it as a tool for supply chain coordination. Specifically, we explicitly assume firms’ financial needs for inventory. Following a Newsvendor framework, we assume that the supplier grants trade-credit and markdown allowance. Given the supplier’s offer, the retailer determines order quantity and the financing option for the inventory, either trade-credit or direct financing from a financial institution. Our result shows that the supplier’s markdown allowance alone cannot fully coordinate the supply chain if the retailer employs direct financing. Positive financing costs call for trade-credit in order to subsidize the retailer’s costs of inventory financing. Using trade-credit in addition to markdown allowance, the supplier fully coordinates the retailer’s decisions for the largest joint profit, and extracts a greater portion of the maximized joint profit.     

Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

From the practices of Chinese consumer electronics market, we find there are two key issues in supply chain management: The first issue is the contract type of either wholesale price contracts or consignment contracts with revenue sharing, and the second issue is the decision right of sales promotion (such as advertising, on-site shopping assistance, rebates, and post-sales service) owned by either manufacturers or retailers. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who has limited capital and faces deterministic demand depending on retail price and sales promotion. The two issues interact with each other. We show that only the combination (called as chain business mode) of a consignment contract with the manufacturer’s right of sales promotion or a wholesale price contract with the retailer’s right of sales promotion is better for both members. Moreover, the latter chain business mode is realized only when the retailer has more power in the chain and has enough capital, otherwise the former one is realized. But which one is preferred by customers? We find that the former is preferred by customers who mainly enjoy low price, while the latter is preferred by those who enjoy high sales promotion level.     

Ordering and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric demand information

This article examines coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer, and faces random demand of a single product with a short life cycle. We consider a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the supplier does not. Such a problem with asymmetric demand information can be viewed as an extension of the newsboy problem in which both the supplier and the retailer possess the same demand information. Combining the mechanism of sharing demand information and that of quantity discount and return policy enables us to develop three coordinated models in contrast with the basic and uncoordinated model. We are able to show the ordinal relationship among the retailer’s optimal order quantities in these four models under a general form of random demand, and compare the supply chain profits and conduct sensitivity analysis analytically in four models under uniform random demand. We also provide numerical results under normal random demand that bear a resemblance to those under uniform random demand.     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.